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Imagine two of my friends Tyler and Edward, who both just got scolded at by their 
respective bosses. Tyler reacts with an initial disappointment and mild discouragement, 
but quickly decides that the opinion of his boss is only one view, and feels determined 
that it shouldn’t affect his self-view or how he functions. Edward, however, feels 
personally criticized and starts worrying he is not the person he wants to, could or 
should be. Moreover, over time he becomes more and more self-critical, and feels 
stressed every time someone criticizes him, until finally, he cannot cope with it 
anymore and decides to see a clinical psychologist. Edward is diagnosed with 
depression. Now, why is it that Edward becomes depressed and Tyler does not? What 
are the underlying mechanisms of this vulnerability that might cause a different 
reaction of my two friends? Moreover, what is the relation between, being criticized, 
worrying and how Edward looks at himself? More importantly, could I have helped 











“Depression is a prison where you are both the suffering prisoner and the cruel 
jailer” (Dr. Dorothy Rowe, psychologist). In the last decades, the prevalence of mental 
illness has increased immensely, especially for mood disorders, such as depression (e.g., 
Wittchen et al., 2011). According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2016) 
depression is worldwide a common illness, with an estimated 350 million people 
affected, and population estimates indicating a life-time prevalence of 19% in the 
United States (Kessler et al., 2009) and similar rates in Europe (Wittchen et al., 2011). 
This makes depression one of the most burdensome of mental disorders and the 
greatest single contributor of all disease burden in the European Union (Witcchen et al., 
2011). It is not only associated with severe individual suffering, but also a heavy burden 
on the direct social environment, (mental) health services, and gives way to a 
substantial cost to society (Kessler et al., 2010; Gustavsson et al., 2011).  
Depression is a mental disorder that not only affects our feelings, but also the way 
we perceive and think about ourselves and our environment. According to The 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American 
Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), a major depressive episode is characterized by the 
experience of negative mood and/or the loss of interest and pleasure in (almost) all 
activities most of the day and nearly every day. Additional symptoms described are, 
categorized as somatic, affective, and cognitive, including changes in sleeping and 
eating patterns, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue or loss of energy, self-
criticism, feelings of worthlessness, excessive or inappropriate guilt, concentration 
problems, indecisiveness, and recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation (APA, 
2013). 
In spite of the correct use of pharmacological or psychotherapeutic approaches, a 
substantial number of patients become treatment resistant (up to 15%) (Burrows, 
Norman, & Judd, 1994; Fava, 2003). Although, pharmacological and psychological 
interventions show efficacy in the short term, there is a pressing need for improved 
long term effectiveness of treatments. This is especially true with regard to the 
prevention of recurrence. Many of these interventions have proven efficacy (Cuijpers et 
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al., 2013) but relapse or recurrence rates are very high (Beshai, Dobson, Bockting, & 
Quigley, 2011). Numerous studies indicate that remitted patients have a 70% risk of 
developing new depressive episodes. Moreover, the risk of new episodes increases as a 
function of the number of previous episodes (Keller 2003). After multiple prior episodes 
of depression even minor stressors can become triggers for new depressive episodes 
(Monroe and Harkness 2005). Therefore, there is a dire need for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that might lead to depression, and this by 
integrating both cognitive and neurobiological findings.  
Hence, in facing the challenges of improving the understanding of depression it is 
clear that, given the heterogeneity of risk for depression (e.g., Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & 
Pedersen, 2006), a wealth of different research strategies are required and need to be 
integrated in order to provide more solid answers on which pathogenic mechanisms 
should be targeted in order to more successfully treat depression (Koster et al., 2015).   
CRITICISM AND DEPRESSION 
Looking back at our protagonist Edward, it is clear that a strong trigger of his 
negative affect and negative self-referential thinking is interpersonal criticism. In 
everyday life this can be critique from your superior, getting negative feedback from a 
reviewer, or even harsh words in a fight with your girlfriend. Of course, the question is: 
“did interpersonal criticism lead to depression in the case of Edward?”, and more 
specifically, “which internal processes are involved?”. 
Research has linked the coping with criticism to poor clinical outcomes in patients 
with such disorders as depression, alcohol dependence, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
and panic disorder and OCD (O’Farrell, Hooley, Fals-Stewart, Cutter, 1998; Tarrier, 
Sommerfield, Pilgrim, 1999; Chambless, Steketee, 1999). Although nobody likes to be 
criticized, for some people receiving criticism is especially problematic. Various studies 
have demonstrated the link between depression and sensitivity to criticism (e.g., 
Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Hooley et al., 2009). Hooley and colleagues (2009) found that 




criticism did not normalize. That is, when individuals who have recovered from 
depression are exposed to criticism, they specifically demonstrate decreased reactivity 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is a key region related to cognitive 
control processes, compared to never-depressed individuals (Hooley, Gruber, Scott, 
Hiller, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2005; Hooley et al., 2009). Moreover, people who have had 
past episodes of depression are much more likely to relapse or show a recurrence of 
symptoms after recovery if they live in family environments that are characterized by 
high levels of criticism (Hooley, Orley & Teasdale, 1986; Vaughn & Leff, 1976). 
 Neuroimaging studies have indicated that a functional balance between ventral 
(ventral anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) and dorsal compartments in the brain (dorsal 
ACC and DLPFC) is necessary for maintaining homeostatic emotional control 
(Seminowicz et al., 2004; Johnstone et al., 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Wager et al., 
2008). As such, many studies suggest that the DLPFC initiates emotion regulation by 
causing inhibition of the amygdala, a subcortical area involved in  emotion processing 
(e.g., Siegle et al., 2007). Furthermore, being criticized is a distressing experience and 
activates self-conscious emotions (e.g., feeling hurt) and self-referential thinking 
(rumination), which need to be regulated to prevent maladaptive emotional responses 
to occur (e.g. Vanderhasselt, Remue, Ng, Mueller & De Raedt, 2015). Although these 
repetitive thoughts do not necessarily have unconstructive consequences (Watkins, 
2008), depression vulnerable individuals have the tendency to focus their thoughts on 
negative information and self-referential content. It is therefore crucial to understand 
the mechanisms underlying the effects of critisism on self-evaluative ruminative 
thoughts, in order to prevent them from becoming unintentional and unconstructive, 
particularly in individuals who demonstrate a tendency to ruminate in everyday life.  
LINK DEPRESSION AND CRITICISM: RUMINATION 
Prior research has demonstrated that some of the most potent forms of stress are 
interpersonal and self-referential (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004) - such as interpersonal 
criticism - a finding reflected in the self-focused content of rumination (Nolen-
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Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Moreover, depression is associated with 
rumination about negative self-relevant information (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
According to the response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008), rumination is a mode of responding to distress that involves repetitively and 
passively focusing on symptoms of distress and on the possible causes and 
consequences of these symptoms. More specifically, it involves engaging in repetitive 
negative thinking about the self, emotions, and causes or consequences of emotions 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al. 2008). Self-referential processing is the evaluation of 
information in relation to an individual’s own mental concept of themselves (Christoff 
et al. 2011), while rumination is a form of self-referential processing, which is the 
process of relating information to the self (Nejad et al., 2013). The hypothesized 
mechanism is that individuals, when ruminating, focus on possible causes and 
consequences of their depressive feelings without engaging in active problem solving 
(Kuster et al., 2012). Thus, although the individual might assume he or she is getting 
closer to a solution by thoroughly thinking through his or her problem, rumination 
frequently impedes a solution because the individual remains passive (Nolen-Hoeksema 
et al., 2008). The content of ruminative thought in depressed people is typically 
negative in valence, similar to the automatic thoughts, schemas, and negative cognitive 
styles that have been studied extensively by cognitive theorists (e.g., Beck & Haigh, 
2014). In addition, rumination is correlated with a variety of maladaptive cognitive 
styles, including negative inferential or attributional styles (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002), 
perfectionism (Flett, Madorsky, Hewitt, & Heisel, 2002), dysfunctional attitudes 
(Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999), hopelessness (Robinson & Alloy, 2003), 
pessimism (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), self-criticism (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, 
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001), low mastery (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Jackson, 2001), dependency (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001), 
sociotropy (Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999), neediness (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001), and neuroticism (Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, 
& Sham, 2003) even after controlling for levels of depression (Lam et al., 2003; Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1999; Roberts, Gilboa, & 




 Importantly, rumination has been put forward as one of the most important 
underlying vulnerability factors for depression. Numerous prospective studies have 
documented that a ruminative response style predicts increases in depression (Abela, 
Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 
1993; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; see also Rood, Roelofs, Bögels, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schouten, 2009) and rumination is associated with depressive symptoms (Treynor et al. 
2003) and prospectively with the onset (Nolen-Hoeksema 2000), severity (Just and Alloy 
1997; Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 1991) and duration (Nolen-Hoeksema 2000) of 
depression. A meta-analysis by Mor and Winquist (2002), which summarized 
correlational and experimental data on the relation between self-focused attention and 
negative affect, confirmed the strong association between rumination and depression 
and suggested a reciprocal causal relation between the constructs. However, 
throughout the manuscript we will often refer to self-referential processing, thinking 
and thoughts as well as rumination. We clarify that we conceptualize rumination 
throughout this dissertation as self-referential thinking, that is, negatively thinking 
about oneself.  
The ability to control ruminative thought is associated with recovery from 
depression (Kuehner and Weber 1999; Schmaling et al. 2002). Rumination is also 
associated with cognitive vulnerability, which is a central concept in cognitive theories 
of depression. This cognitive vulnerability idea suggests that negative cognitive factors 
emerge during stressful situations, and that cognitive reactivity, i.e., the ease with 
which particular patterns of negative thinking are reactivated in response to negative 
events, is critical for the onset, relapse, and recurrence of depression (Scher, Ingram, 
Segal, 2005). Moreover, rumination is also associated with cognitive reactivity, one of 
the crucial predictors of recurrent depression, even when depression levels were 
statistically controlled (Moulds et al. 2008). Even though most studies consider 
ruminative thinking as a trait characteristic, self-referent thoughts fluctuate 
continuously (especially in healthy individuals) and might provide valuable information 
to understand the development of a stable trait. To capture the effects of rumination, it 
may be crucial to include exposure to personally-relevant emotional stimuli that are 
consistent with the challenges an individual encounters in the real world (Davidson,  
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2010) and that are likely to evoke ruminative thoughts (self-referential thoughts). Prior 
research has demonstrated that the most potent forms of stress are interpersonal and 
self-referent (Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004), a finding reflected in the self-focused 
content of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
LINK DEPRESSION AND CRITICISM: SELF-ESTEEM 
With this in mind, with regard to our protagonist Edward we can ask the question: 
“Can we link the interpersonal criticism to Edwards’ self-views?”. Research has shown 
that the social context is an important aspect of the self as it relates to emotions 
(Hofmann, 2014). When you are criticized, the most common effect is that it can easily 
negatively self-views. Moreover, research has shown the detrimental impact of criticism 
on cognitive processing and thinking styles, such as rumination (e.g., Saffrey & 
Ehrenberg, 2007; Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna, Metcalf, & Dimidjian, 2015), and 
subsequently its effect on self-esteem (e.g. Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko, & Eccleston, 
2009). However, only cross-sectional evidence on the relation between rumination and 
self-esteem is available, suggesting that self-esteem is negatively correlated with 
rumination (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002, 2007; Joireman, 2004; Luyckx et al., 2008). 
Nonetheless, longitudinal or experimental study designs are required to draw 
conclusions about the direct link between rumination and self-esteem. 
Although healthy individuals can regulate (i.e. cognitive control) criticism-induced 
thoughts and emotions to protect their self-esteem (and maintain emotional well-
being), depressed patients, according to the cognitive theories of depression, show low 
self-esteem. Moreover, depression is associated with an increased attention to the self 
(Mor and Winquist, 2002), as well as with rumination about negative self-relevant 
information (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Hence, when individuals are confronted 
with a stressor (e.g., criticism of their superior) this may lead to self-referential 
rumination and subsequently affect their self-esteem, which in turn, contributes to 
depressive affect (Oatley & Bolton, 1985; Roberts & Monroe, 1999). In addition, 




thinking about themselves (for the relation between self-esteem and negative affect, 
see Orth, Robins, & Widaman, 2011; Watson, Suls, & Haig, 2002) and consequently 
might be motivated to suppress self-related thoughts, which has the ironic effect of 
increasing ruminative tendencies (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000). 
Importantly, a growing body of research suggests that low self-esteem is a risk 
factor for the development of depression (e.g., Kernis et al., 1998; Orth, Robins, & 
Roberts, 2008; Orth, Robins, Trzesniewski, Maes, & Schmitt, 2009; Roberts & Monroe, 
1992; Sowislo & Orth, 2013). In these studies, which used longitudinal designs and 
controlled for prior levels of the constructs, low self-esteem prospectively predicted 
changes in the level of depression. Overall, the evidence supports the vulnerability 
model, which states that low self-esteem is a diathesis exerting causal influence in the 
onset and maintenance of depression (e.g., Beck, 1967; Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin, & 
Abramson, 1993). An alternative model of the relation between self-esteem and 
depression is the scar model, which states that low self-esteem is an outcome rather 
than a cause of depression, because episodes of depression may leave permanent scars 
in the self-concept of the individual (cf. Coyne, Gallo, Klinkman, & Calarco, 1998; Rohde, 
Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 1990; Shahar & Davidson, 2003; for an overview of the scar and 
vulnerability model, see Zeigler-Hill, 2011). It is important to note that the vulnerability 
model and the scar model are not mutually exclusive because both processes (i.e., low 
self-esteem contributing to depression and depression eroding self-esteem) might 
operate simultaneously. Yet, in the extant literature – which is based on longitudinal 
studies, many of which used large samples and advanced statistical approaches (such as 
latent variable modeling), thereby increasing the validity of the conclusions (e.g., Orth 
et al., 2008; Orth, Robins, Trzesniewski, Maes, & Schmitt, 2009; Shahar & Henrich, 
2010) - speaks against the scar model  (cf. Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2004; Orth 
et al., 2008; Orth, Robins, & Meier, 2009; Orth, Robins, Trzesniewski, et al., 2009; 
Sowislo & Orth, 2013; but see Shahar & Davidson, 2003). 
Although it is generally assumed that depressed individuals have lower positive self-
esteem than non-depressed individuals, in recent years several studies have 
investigated the implicit positivity bias in (remitted) depressed patients and healthy 
controls (e.g. De Raedt, Schacht, Franck & De Houwer, 2006). Interestingly, although 
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depressed and non-depressed people differ with respect to their explicit self-esteem 
they demonstrate surprisingly similar levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem (De Raedt 
et al., 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Risch et al., 2010; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). De Raedt 
and colleagues (De Raedt et al., 2006) compared implicit self-esteem in a group of 
depressed participants relative to healthy controls using three separate paradigms: the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT), Name Letter Preference Task (NLPT), and the Extrinsic 
Affective Simon Task (EAST). Across all three measures evidence for similar levels of 
positive implicit self-esteem was obtained for both groups. Some studies have even 
reported higher levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem in formerly depressed relative to 
never-depressed participants (Gemar et al., 2001; Franck, De Raedt, De Houwer, et al., 
2008). In an attempt to explain these surprising findings, De Raedt and colleagues (De 
Raedt et al., 2006) argued that the IAT and other measures of implicit self-esteem may 
have captured actual self-esteem in non-depressed participants but ideal self-esteem in 
depressed participants. Whereas actual self-esteem refers to feelings of self-worth or 
the global evaluation of the current self (Buhrmeister, Blanton, & Swann, 2011), ideal 
self-esteem is considered to be a global representation of the attributes a person would 
like to possess (see Higgins, 1987). However, the question remains of how to accurately 
capture these concepts, i.e., both the actual and the ideal self? 
HOW TO CAPTURE THE SELF: IMPLICIT MEASURE 
Within the cognitive models of depression, negative self-schemas are thought to 
bias information processing in an automatic, repetitive and difficult to control manner 
(Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Moreover, according to Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of 
depression, negative beliefs about the self are not just a symptom of depression but 
play a critical causal role in its etiology (see also Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin, & Abramson, 
1993). These negative cognitions about the self are also argued to play a significant role 
in the maintenance and recurrence of depressive episodes (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998; Williams, 1997). Interestingly, however, much work on self-esteem and its 




a variety of response biases such as social desirability and self-presentation. Many 
cognitive models of depression also assume that self-related schemata are not always 
consciously accessible and thus cannot always be verbally reported upon (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Young, 1994). Consequently, it is questionable whether the use 
of self-report measures may provide meaningful information about such schemata. To 
overcome these limitations, a number of alternative procedures have recently emerged 
that reduce the participant’s ability to control their responses and operate in such a 
way that they do not depend on introspective access to the psychological content of 
interest. Whereas self-report measures of self-esteem can be classified as explicit 
measures that capture non-automatic instances of self-evaluation (e.g., self-evaluations 
that occur when participants have ample time and resources to reflect or have the 
intention to evaluate the self), implicit self-esteem measures can be thought of as 
measures that register more spontaneous, automatic self-evaluations (e.g., self-
evaluations that occur quickly or when participants do not have the intention to 
evaluate the self; see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). For this 
reason, a distinction is drawn between the underlying schema processes that are not 
accessible and the products of such processes that are accessible within the conscious 
mind as opinions, inferences and interpretations (Ingram & Wisnicki, 1991). Hence, 
given recent research suggesting that implicit and explicit measures may assess 
different components of cognitive processes (Beevers, 2005; Haeffel et al., 2007), and 
that implicit measures may better predict distress and psychopathology than explicit 
measures (e.g., Nock & Banaji, 2007), it is important to investigate these underlying 
processes with implicit measures, and which tap into both actual and ideal-self 
constructs. 
THE DEPRESSED BRAIN: NEUROBIOLOGICAL CIRCUITRY 
In the last decade research into the neurobiological underpinnings of depression  
has accumulated an abundance of information consistently pointing to specific 
circuitries underlying deficient cognitive processes. Depression has been conceptualized 
  General Introduction 
21 
 
as a failure to recruit prefrontal top-down cognitive control to regulate emotion 
producing subcortical limbic activity (Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008). In a meta-
analysis of Fitzgerald, Laird, Maller, and Daskalakis (2008) evidence was found for the 
involvement of two neurocircuits in major depressive disorder. One network includes 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and dorsal (d) regions of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). These regions, among other regions which are implicated in 
attentional and cognitive control, are characterized by reduced activity during resting 
state, and return to normal after successful treatment. A second network is centered on 
the medial prefrontal cortex and ventral subcortical regions such as the amygdala, 
which is hyperactive to emotional stimuli during depressive episodes, and also returns 
to normal after treatment (Fitzgerald et al., 2008). The amygdala is activated when 
people are confronted with emotionally challenging events (Zald, 2003), and is tightly 
connected to the ventral ACC. The ACC can be conceived as a bridge between 
subcortical emotion processing and prefrontal cognitive control, because it integrates 
signals from its ventral and dorsal parts (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). The dorsal ACC 
sends signals to the DLPFC to enhance cognitive control (Hopfinger, Buonocore, & 
Mangun, 2000; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000) and studies suggest that 
the DLPFC initiates control over emotions by inhibition of the amygdala via other brain 
regions (Siegle, Thompson, Carter, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2007).  
In the framework of De Raedt and Koster (2010), the authors proposed that 
prolonged processing of self-referential material such as rumination, after the 
activation of negative schemas when confronted with stressors, is caused by impaired 
activity in dorsal prefrontal areas, mediated by the serotonergic system which is under 
control of the Hypothalamic Pituitary Adrenal (HPA) axis. The HPA axis – the hallmark of 
the stress response – stimulates the release of stress hormones (corticosteroids), and 
becomes increasingly impaired after periods of hypercortisolism during depressive 
episodes (Van Praag, De Kloet & van Os, 2004), which means that it becomes more 
reactive to stressors (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Interestingly, it has been shown that 
mood repairing psychological processes such as reappraisal of negative information are 
related to recruitment of the same dorsal areas. Healthy individuals who tend to use 
reappraisal to overcome negative affect in daily life were behaviorally faster and 




information (compared to inhibiting a positive in favor of a negative response) 
(Vanderhasselt, Baeken, Van Schuerbeek, Luypaert, & De Raedt, 2013a).  
Individuals with a history of depression react differently to negative interpersonal 
criticism as compared to healthy individuals. At the level of neural systems, in line with 
the abovementioned account, they show a stronger activation of the amygdala, and a 
reduced activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) (Hooley et al., 2009). These anomalies in the cortical-limbic system are 
related to difficulties in emotion regulation, and are associated with vulnerability to 
depression (De Raedt & Koster, 2010). It has even been demonstrated that the number 
of earlier depressive episodes correlates with decreased prefrontal control 
(Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2009), which is in accordance with the crucial role of the 
prefrontal cortex in the regulation of attentional control for negative stimuli (Leyman, 
De Raedt, Vanderhasselt & Baeken, 2009) and the inhibition of the amygdala (De Raedt 
et al., 2010).  
Cognitive and neural phenomena can be modulated to increase the ability to 
regulate momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts during a period of idleness, a 
process closely linked to the ruminative thinking style. This interplay between biological 
and cognitive factors is in line with a theoretical framework of De Raedt & Koster 
(2010), which states that cognitive control processes play a central and causal role in 
the relation between prefrontal neural activation and rumination. By using an 
experimental method that involves neurostimulation of the DLPFC to temporarily 
enhance its activity, one goes beyond correlational deduction and moves on to causal 
inferences. This is an important next step for building and refining our understanding of 
the neural bases of rumination and self-referential thinking in depression. 
THE DEPRESSED BRAIN: NON-INVASIVE BRAIN STIMULATION 
Hence, in recent years the development and evolution of non-invasive brain 
stimulation (NIBS) techniques (e.g., repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, rTMS; 
transcranial Direct Current Stimulation, tDCS) has substantially increased over the last 
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decades. NIBS is a unique experimental tool that allow researchers to non-invasively 
study the cortex in healthy and diseased states (Barker et al., 1985). Multiple sessions 
of neurostimulation are frequently used in the treatment of psychiatric disorders such 
as depression (e.g., Burt et al., 2002; Mitchell & Loo, 2006; O’Reardon et al., 2007; 
Boggio et al., 2008; George et al., 2010). These techniques are also used to investigate 
neural conductions and connections in the human brain, and are of considerable 
interest for researchers interested in understanding the basic neurophysiology of mood 
disorders (Paus et al., 2001; Pascual-Leone et al., 2002). Importantly, stimulation of the 
DLPFC with rTMS and tDCS has been shown to produce similar effects in different 
neural circuitries (Fregni et al., 2008a), neurotransmitter systems (Keck et al., 2002; 
Nitsche et al., 2006; Strafella et al., 2001), and the treatment of psychiatric diseases (for 
a review see Miniussi et al., 2008; George et al., 2009; and George & Aston-Jones, 
2010). However, in patient populations these treatment studies are based on multiple 
rTMS or tDCS sessions. Nonetheless, investigating the effects of a single session of rTMS 
and tDCS in experimental research holds important implications. Due to their rather 
easy application, both modalities have been used to experimentally examine prefrontal 
cognitive and emotional control. Given that effects on cognition (e.g. information 
processing) within a study could be (partly) explained by changes in mood it is crucial to 
scrutinize possible effects of neurostimulation on mood. In addition, it allows 
researchers to experimentally test hypotheses, and shift away from the correlational 
deduction, allowing them to non-invasively study the cortex in both healthy and 
diseased states. 
Interestingly, in many previous studies it could already be demonstrated that 
neurostimulation of the left DLPFC enhances cognitive processes, both for non-
emotional (e.g., Fregni et al., 2005; Leite, Carvalho, Fregni, & Goncalves, 2011; 
Mulquiney, Hoy, Daskalakis, & Fitzgerald, 2011) as emotional processes (Boggio et al., 
2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013). More specifically, anodal tDCS of the prefrontal 
cortex has been found to reduce state rumination via a beneficial change in working 
memory processes for emotional information (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013b) and also 
causally reduce other depressive symptoms (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2013). Cognitive 
control, or the lack of it, seems to also be an important factor in determining the degree 




applying neurostimulation over the DLPFC we can experimentally manipulate cognitive 
control and investigate its possible beneficial effects on cognitive and neurobiological 
processes. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES OF THE DISSERTATION 
The aim of the current Ph.D. project was to unravel how the link between criticism 
and ruminative processes affects self-esteem, focusing on both behavioral and 
neurobiological processes. To investigate this mechanism, we explored whether the 
effect of an experimental manipulation of the prefrontal cortex on self-esteem is 
mediated by rumination before and after criticism. Although we start from the premise 
that these underlying mechanisms are important in depression, it was crucial to start 
testing our causal hypotheses in healthy individuals, without the possible interference 
of the depressed mood state on the mechanisms under study. We focused on three 
levels of measurement. First, we investigated the effects of neurostimulation on 
rumination and self-esteem using self-report. Second we used implicit measures to 
index actual and ideal self-esteem, and third, we assessed the neurobiological 
correlates of this process.  However, in order to answer these questions, we started 
with developing and testing several methods and prerequisites. First, we started with 
the development of a  task to measure self-esteem in an implicit way, focusing on both 
actual and ideal self. In a second study, we replicated the findings of this first study with 
more stringent criteria as well as a methodologically fine-tuned design. Next, we 
conducted a systematic review to elucidate whether a single neurostimulation session 
would have an effect on mood in healthy participants, since mood effects might 
confound any effects found on cognitive processes. Thereafter, we investigated if a 
single placebo controlled neurostimulation session can influence the physiological 
stress response (using heart rate variability) during criticism. Finally, we applied a 
placebo controlled session of transcranial direct current stimulation in the fMRI 
scanner, to test the possible impact of neurostimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex on the underlying neurobiological processes of rumination (regional brain 
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activity and functional connectivity) before and after an experimental induction of 
criticism and subsequently their effect on implicit self-esteem (using the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure). .  
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
As our aim was  to investigate different levels of self-esteem, we first explored in 
Chapter 2 the measurement of self-esteem in an implicit way. Building further on the 
implicit positivity bias towards the self in depression, and the idea forwarded by De 
Raedt et al. (2006) that the IAT effects and other implicit (associative) measures of self-
esteem might not reflect actual self-esteem but ideal self-esteem, we aimed at 
differentiating self-esteem in two separate conceptualizations by introducing 
propositions: “I am” versus “I want to be”. Therefore, we developed a new self-esteem 
task (based on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, IRAP, Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2006) to measure both actual and ideal-self in an implicit way and analyzed if we 
can find differences in responding between participants with sub-clinical depression 
(dysphorics) and healthy participants (non-dyphorics). 
In Chapter 3, we followed up on the robust findings of our first study and aimed to 
replicate these results with more stringent criteria, as well as a methodologically fine-
tuned design. Whereas De Raedt et al. (2006) used different associative implicit 
measures (e.g. the IAT), and we (Chapter 2) used a propositional implicit measure (the 
IRAP), we chose to administer both measures in this follow up study. This allowed us to 
compare both implicit measures within different groups and analyze both within and 
between group effects. 
In Chapter 4, in anticipation of the use of neurostimulation as an experimental tool 
in our next studies, we first focused on the accrued interest in non-invasive brain 
stimulation (i.e., rTMS and tDCS) research and conducted a systematic review of the 
impact of a single neurostimulation (i.e., rTMS & tDCS) on mood in healthy individuals. 
Given our interest in underlying cognitive processes (e.g., rumination, self-referential 




single neurostimulation session would have an effect on mood in healthy participants, 
since mood effects might confound any effects found on cognitive processes. 
In Chapter 5, we investigated if a single, placebo-controlled neurostimulation 
session can influence the physiological stress response (using heart rate and heart rate 
variability) during criticism. We targeted both left and right DLPFC and compared both 
groups of healthy participants on their physiological response to criticism. The 
manipulation of both left and right DLPFC with rTMS allows us to experimentally 
investigate the causal role of the DLPFC in coping with criticism. 
In Chapter 6, we looked at the underlying neurobiological processes of rumination 
and self-referential processing (regional brain activity and functional connectivity) when 
healthy participants are confronted with criticism. This could further our understanding 
on the underlying neurobiological correlates of reactivity to criticism and might guide us 
in improving the treatment of depression. 
In Chapter 7, building on the findings of our previous studies and given the influence 
of tDCS on cognitive processes related to rumination (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013b), we 
explored (under fMRI – online design), the effects of a single tDCS session on 
rumination before and after criticism, and subsequently on self-esteem (actual and 
ideal) in healthy individuals, since the influence of clinical depression on the brain might 
not allow any conclusion with regard to the underlying mechanisms 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides an integrated overview and general discussion of our  
main findings. In addition, theoretical and clinical implications, limitations and 
guidelines for future research are outlined.   
 
It should be noted that this dissertation consists of several research papers, which 
have been accepted or submitted for publication. Since each of the chapters is a self-
contained manuscript, which should be able to stand on its own, the text of some of the 
chapters may partially overlap. 
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SELF-ESTEEM REVISITED: PERFORMANCE 
ON THE IMPLICIT RELATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE AS A MEASURE 




Although depression is characterised by low self-esteem as measured by 
questionnaires, research using implicit measures of self-esteem has failed to reveal the 
expected differences between depressed and non-depressed individuals. In this study, 
we used an implicit measure which enables the differentiation of ideal self- and actual 
self-esteem, through the introduction of propositions: ‘‘I am’’ versus ‘‘I want to be’’. We 
measured implicit relational associations about actual and ideal self in low (N27) versus 
high dysphoric (N29) undergraduates. Our data revealed that dysphoric individuals have 
a higher ideal self-esteem, and lower actual self-esteem in comparison to healthy 
participants. The results underscore the need to go beyond simple associations and 
suggest that the use of individualspecific propositions could enhance our understanding 
of the implicit measurement of self-esteem. Furthermore, these results underscore the 
importance of actual versus ideal self-discrepancy theories, which might guide the 
content of therapeutic interventions. 
                                                 
1
 Based on Remue, J., De Houwer, J., Barnes-Holmes, D., Vanderhasselt, M.-A., & De Raedt, R. (2013). 
Self-esteem revisited: Performance on the implicit relational assessment procedure as a measure of self- 











Self-esteem is one of the most extensively investigated constructs across various 
areas of psychology. One area of investigation in which its relevance seems almost self-
evident is research on depression. It is generally assumed that depressed individuals 
have less positive self-esteem than non-depressed individuals. Moreover, negative self-
schemata are central to the cognitive theory of depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 
1979; Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Research with self-esteem questionnaires such as 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965) supports this idea (e.g., 
Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998, for a review).  
Recently, however, results with so-called implicit measures of self-esteem have 
failed to reveal the expected differences in self-esteem between depressed and non-
depressed people (e.g., Risch et al., 2010). This research is of high importance for the 
analysis and treatment of human psychopathology because, within cognitive therapy 
models, it is assumed that crucial dysfunctional schemata are not always consciously 
accessible and thus cannot be reported per se (Beck et al., 1979; Young, 1994). 
Whereas questionnaire self-esteem measures typically register non-automatic (e.g., 
deliberative) evaluations of the self, implicit self-esteem measures are designed to 
capture more automatic (e.g., unintentional) evaluations of the self (De Houwer, Teige-
Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). For instance, De Raedt, Schacht, Franck, and De 
Houwer (2006) used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as an implicit measure of self-
esteem. They asked participants to categorize words that appeared on a computer 
screen as referring to “me” (e.g., own name), “not-me” (e.g., other name), “negative” 
(e.g., evil) or “positive” (e.g., happy) by pressing one of two keys. During a consistent 
block of trials, the same key was pressed for “me” and “positive” words and the other 
key was pressed for “not-me” and “negative” words. During an inconsistent block, the 
first key was assigned to “me” and “negative” words and the second key to “not-me” 
and “positive” words. Intriguingly, both depressed and non-depressed participants were 
faster in the consistent than in the inconsistent block, a result that is typically taken to 
reflect positive self-esteem (but see Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). Whereas De Raedt et al. 




(2006) found a similar IAT effect in depressed and non-depressed participants, some 
studies even revealed a larger advantage on consistent versus inconsistent trials in 
formerly depressed than never-depressed participants (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & 
Kennedy, 2001, Franck, De Raedt & De Houwer, 2008). This suggests even more positive 
implicit self-esteem in individuals who are vulnerable to depression. 
As a possible solution to this conundrum, De Raedt et al. (2006) proposed that IAT 
effects and other implicit measures of self-esteem might not reflect actual self-esteem 
but ideal self-esteem. The ideal self can be defined as a representation of the attributes 
a person would like to have. Zentner and Renaud (2007) have argued that (1) the ideal 
self functions as an incentive for future behavior, a self “to be approached or avoided” 
(Cross & Markus, 1991), and (2) that the ideal self is an evaluator of actual self-esteem. 
Moreover, numerous studies have provided compelling evidence for the role of 
discrepancies between ideal and actual views of the self in relation to depressive 
disorders (e.g., Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert & Hill-Barlow, 
1998). Implicit self-esteem measures such as the IAT might not be able to distinguish 
between actual and ideal self-esteem. The self-esteem IAT and other currently available 
implicit self-esteem measures were designed to assess the association between the 
concepts “self” and “positive” or “negative” without taking into account the way in 
which those concepts are associated. Whereas actual and ideal self-esteem can both be 
conceptualized as involving an association between the concepts “self” and “positive” 
or “negative”, the way in which these concepts are related must differ for the 
representation of the actual self (e.g., I AM positive or negative) and ideal self (e.g., I 
WANT TO BE positive or  negative). In other words, actual and ideal self involve the 
same associations but different propositions (i.e., informational units that also specify 
how concepts are related). Therefore, in order to distinguish actual and ideal self at the 
implicit level, we need an implicit measure that can capture propositional information. 
For this purpose, we used a self-esteem variant of the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). 
The IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) is a relatively new measure that is specifically 
designed to capture how objects are related to each other. In our study we used two 





the ideal self IRAP (with the two sample stimuli: “I WANT TO BE” or “I DON’T WANT TO 
BE”). 
Although these particular versions of the self-esteem IRAP have not been used 
before, many studies confirm that the IRAP provides a valid measure of how 
participants automatically relate various kinds of objects (see Drake et al., 2010, for a 
review). Assuming that the ease with which individuals automatically relate certain 
objects in certain ways is mediated by propositional knowledge in memory (see Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011, for an in depth discussion), one can thus argue 
that performance on the IRAP provides an implicit measure of propositional knowledge. 
Importantly, propositional knowledge, whether it is deemed to be consciously 
accessible or not, is the basic material targeted  in cognitive therapies. The self-esteem 
IRAP that we used in this study may be able to differentiate between ideal self and 
actual self in that it does not merely capture the association between the concepts 
“self” and “positive” or “negative”, but the way in which these concepts are related 
(i.e., I AM versus I WANT TO BE). According to the ideas of De Raedt et al. (2006), one 
can therefore predict that depressed individuals would show higher implicit ideal self-
esteem and lower actual self-esteem than non-depressed individuals. As a first test of 
this hypothesis, we examined dysphoric and non-dysphoric students. Dysphoric 
students have been shown to be prone to depression (e.g. Ingram & Siegle, 2009), and 
can thus be considered as a clinical analogue sample. In line with previous findings that 
depression might be related to discrepancies between ideal and actual views of the self 
(e.g., Moretti & Higgins, 1999; Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert & Hill-Barlow, 1998), we  
hypothesized that dysphoric students would display more positive ideal self-esteem 




In this experiment, 72 undergraduates participated in return for course credits. 
They were recruited by means of an on-line participant panel system after completing 




the BDI-II-NL (van der Does, 2002) as a screening measure. Upon invitation for the 
experiment, they completed the BDI-II-NL again. Based on the attrition data based on 
task requirements, our final sample consisted of 56 participants (see below for detailed 
information). 
Using the cut-off score that is recommended in the BDI-II-NL manual, the final 
sample was divided into  a low BDI group (≤13) consisting of 27 undergraduates (21 
women and 6 men) aged between 18 and 30 years (M = 20.56, SD = 2.41) and a high 
BDI group  (≥14) of 29 undergraduates (26 women and 3 men) aged between 18 and 30 
years (M = 19.52, SD = 2.26). Assignment to BDI groups was based on the BDI score 
during the actual test session. By design, the high BDI group had significantly higher 
BDI-II-NL scores during test (M = 22,1 SD = 8,4) compared to the low BDI group (M = 5.8, 
SD = 4,2), t(54)=9.10, p<.001. Age did not differ significantly between groups (t < 1). 
Note that BDI scores during test were not distributed normally  (Shapiro-Wilk = .935; p< 
.005) simply because we invited participants with an extremely high or low BDI score 
during screening. We therefore used BDI as a dichotomous variable rather than a 
continuous variable in the analyses.  
Materials 
Questionnaire measures. The BDI-II, a 21 item self-report inventory, was used to 
measure the severity of depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996). The Dutch translation 
of the BDI-II has shown high internal consistency: Chronbach’s α of .92 for a patient 
population and .88 for a healthy control group. Also, the validity index satisfies general 
psychometric criteria (van der Does, 2002).  
IRAP Self-Esteem Measures. On each trial of our self-esteem IRAP, participants 
were presented with a sample stimulus on the top of a computer screen and a target 
stimulus in the middle of the screen (see Figure 1). The sample stimulus always referred 
to the self, the target stimulus was always a positive or negative word. Importantly, the 
self-related sample stimuli contained relational information. More specifically, in our 
study we used two almost similar IRAPs, that is, the actual self IRAP (with the two 
sample stimuli: “I AM”, “I AM NOT”), and the ideal self IRAP (with the two sample 





specifics we will focus on the actual self IRAP, however the ideal self IRAP is exactly the 
same, except for the sample stimuli “I WANT TO BE” and “I DON’T WANT TO BE”. 
In the actual self IRAP participants would, for instance, see the sample stimulus “I 
AM” together with the word “HAPPY”. Participants were asked to press a “correct” key 
or a “false” key based on the specific combination of sample and target stimuli. These 
response assignments were varied between blocks. In the consistent block, participants 
were asked to press “correct” whenever the sample-target combination expressed self-
positivity (i.e., I AM + positive, I AM NOT + negative) and “false” whenever the sample-
target combination expressed self-negativity (i.e., I AM + negative, IAM NOT + positive). 
In the inconsistent block, the correct response was required for sample-target 
combinations that expressed self-negativity whereas the false response was required 
for sample-target combinations that expressed self-positivity. The idea behind the IRAP 
is that participants will perform better when the required response assignments are in 
line with how participants typically relate the objects under investigation. 
 
Figure 1. Examples of the four trial types employed in the actual self-esteem IRAP: one for each 
combination of the two sample stimuli (“I am” or “ I am not”) with the two types of target stimuli (self-
positive or self-negative evaluative words). The ideal self-esteem IRAP was similar except the two samples 
were “I want to be” versus “I don’t want to be”. 




The order of the two IRAP tasks was counterbalanced across participants. The task 
was implemented using the IRAP software provided by Barnes-Holmes 
(http://irapresearch.org/downloads-and-training, version 2008). In line with previous 
IRAP studies (for a review see Drake et al., 2010), participants were required to 
complete a maximum of four pairs of practice blocks and then two test blocks, with 
each block containing 24 trials. To rule out order effects, all participants commenced 
with a block of consistent trials (confirm self-positive and deny self-negative relations) 
and thereafter completed a block of inconsistent trials. Before starting the task, an 
instruction-screen was shown which explained these two blocks (i.e., consistent and 
inconsistent). Further, the key-assignment was explained. As in previous IRAP studies, 
the function of the keys changed randomly from trial to trial. Hence, on some trials, the 
left key was used to indicate “correct” and the right key to indicate “false” whereas the 
reverse was true on other trials. When a response was not in line with the instructions, 
a red X appeared and participants were asked to press the appropriate key as quickly as 
possible. In each block, the sample stimuli appeared once with each of the 12 target 
stimuli (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Stimulus response combinations (of the sample stimuli with the 12 self-evaluative words) 
deemed consistent in the self-esteem IRAP.  
 
Note. By implication all other stimulus response combinations are deemed inconsistent. 
On each trial, all stimuli appeared simultaneously on screen. If the response was in 
line with the instructions, this response was followed by a blank screen for 400ms after 
which the next trial was presented. If the response was not in line with instructions, a 





continue to the 400ms intertrial interval, the participant was required to emit the 
appropriate response. When the participant had completed all 24 IRAP trials, the screen 
cleared and two types of feedback were presented for that block: the percentage of 
correct responses and the median response latency. Between each block of trials the 
following instructions were presented on screen: “Important: during the next phase the 
previously correct and wrong answers are reversed. This is part of the experiment. 
Please try to make as few errors as possible – in other words, avoid the red X”. Before 
each test block, the following message also appeared: “This is a test. Go fast; making a 
few errors is okay.” In line with previous IRAP studies (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-
Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010), the data from participants who failed to achieve at 
least 80% accuracy or a mean latency under 2500ms during the test blocks were 
excluded from the analyses. In our study, the data of 16 participants (9 with low BDI 
scores and 7 with high BDI scores) were ignored because of this reason, thus leading to 
a final sample of 56 participants. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical for both groups. Upon arrival, participants read and 
signed a consent form and were randomly assigned an identification number to 
preserve their confidentiality and anonymity. Once the participants were seated, the 
experimenter stated that it was important to answer quickly and accurately throughout 
the procedure. Next the IRAP task was started. After the participants finished both IRAP 




The raw IRAP data comprise of response latencies, defined as the time in 
milliseconds from the onset of a trial to the first emission of the appropriate response 
for that trial. These raw data were transformed using the D-IRAP algorithm (see Barnes-




Holmes, et al., 2010), which is derived from the D-algorithm developed by Greenwald, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003) for the IAT. Important for our analysis, two compound D-IRAP 
scores were then calculated, that is, D-IRAP (pos) and D-IRAP (neg). The D-IRAP (pos) is 
calculated based on all trials with positive targets, and D-IRAP (neg) is calculated based 
on all trials with negative targets. Finally, a total D-IRAP score was calculated by 
averaging the D-IRAP (pos) and D-IRAP (neg) scores (see Vahey et al., 2009, for a 
detailed description of how such scores are calculated). A D-IRAP score reflects the 
difference in response latency between consistent and inconsistent blocks; therefore a 
D-IRAP score that is significantly different from zero indicates that there was, in fact, a 
significant difference between response latencies in consistent versus inconsistent 
blocks. A higher D-IRAP score indicates a higher (i.e., more positive) level of self-esteem 
(actual self-esteem on one IRAP and ideal self-esteem on the other IRAP). In the current 
study, the total D-IRAP score was the crucial dependent variable, but it was deemed 
important to start the analyses with D-IRAP (pos) and D-IRAP (neg) as a factor, to 
exclude the possibility that the valance of the words influenced the effects. 
Split-Half Reliability. 
To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, two split-half reliability scores 
were calculated, one for Actual Self IRAP and one for the Ideal Self IRAP. In each case, 
two scores were calculated, one for odd trials and the second for even trials, and these 
were obtained in the same way as for the overall D-IRAP  score, except that the D-
algorithm was applied separately to all odd trials and even trials. Interestingly, while the 
split-half correlations between odd and even scores, applying Spearman-Brown 
corrections, proved significant for the Ideal-Self IRAP, r = .492, n = 32, p < .001, they 
were less so for the Actual-Self IRAP, r = .221, n = 56, p < .10. Given that a shortened 
version of the IRAP was used we refrain from making any strong conclusions about the 







The D-IRAP scores for each participant were entered into a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA 
with Group (low versus high BDI) as the between-participants variable and D-IRAP 
Effect-Type (D-IRAP pos and D-IRAP neg) and Condition (Actual-Self versus Ideal-Self) as 
the within-participants variables. The results showed a main effect for the D-IRAP 
Effect-Type, F(1, 54) = 4.71, p=.034, but not for Condition, F(1, 54) = .08, p=.778. Most 
importantly, a highly significant interaction between Group and Condition was observed 
F(1, 54) = 15.48, p <.001. Because no significant interaction was found with Effect-Type, 
we continued all our analyses with the total D-IRAP score. To test our specific 
hypothesis on group differences between ideal self-esteem and actual self-esteem, we 
followed-up the Group X Condition interaction using independent one-tailed t-tests 
with the total D-IRAP effects. We found a significant group difference for both the 
Actual-Self-Condition, t(54) = 3.07, p <.01, d =.82, and the Ideal-Self-Condition, t(54) = 
1.68, p <.05, d =.45, indicating lower actual self-esteem and higher ideal self-esteem in 
the dysphoric group relative to the non-dysphoric group. To test our hypothesis about 
possible differences between ideal and actual self-esteem within each group, we 
performed one-tailed paired sample t-tests for the total D-IRAP effects. For the Low BDI 
group the D-IRAP score for the Self-Condition was significantly higher than the D-IRAP 
score for the Ideal-Self-Condition, t(26) = 3.65, p <.001, d =.72 (actual self-esteem: M 
=.45, SD =.39; ideal self-esteem: M =.16, SD =.41). For the High BDI group the D-IRAP 
score for the Self-Condition was significantly lower than the D-IRAP score for the Ideal-
Self-Condition, t(28) = 2.17, p =.02, d =.54 (actual self-esteem: M =.12, SD =.41; ideal 
self-esteem: M =.35, SD =.44) (see Table 2). The results of the current study were thus 









Table 2. Comparison of mean D-scores for both the Actual Self and Ideal Self IRAP between the low 
and high BDI group. 
Note. For Low BDI group N=27; for High BDI group N=29. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study was designed to explore whether dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
individuals differ with regard to the valence of their ideal self and/or actual self. Based 
on the study by De Raedt et al. (2006), who proposed that higher self-esteem as 
measured with the IAT in depressed individuals could be indicative of associations 
related to ideal self instead of actual self-esteem, we used the IRAP procedure that 
allowed us to distinguish between ideal and actual self-esteem. In line with this idea, 
we found that the dysphoric (high BDI) group scored lower on actual self-esteem and 
higher on the index of ideal-self-esteem in comparison to the low BDI group. The D-
IRAP total scores also showed that low dysphoric individuals have more positive actual 
self-esteem as compared to ideal self-esteem. 
Hence, our results build further on previous research on self-esteem in depression 
(e.g. De Raedt et al., 2006), by demonstrating that dysphorics have more positive ideal 
self-esteem, while non-dysphorics have a higher actual self-esteem. The self-esteem 
IRAPs in this study differentiated between ideal self and actual self, by not simply 
capturing the association between the concepts “self” and “positive” or “negative”, but 
by elaborating on the way in which these concepts are related (i.e., I AM versus I WANT 
TO BE).  By using the IRAP (and its use of propositions) we went beyond the results of 
De Raedt et al. (2006), with results suggesting that the IAT in their study might have 
Group Low BDI Group High BDI Group 
Actual Self 
IRAP 
.45 (SD=.39) .12 (SD=.41) 
Ideal Self 
IRAP 





measured ideal self-esteem in depressed, and actual self-esteem in non-depressed 
individuals.  
This could explain why De Raedt and co-workers  (2006) found similar positive self-
esteem for depressed and non-depressed groups using the IAT. There is, however, still 
the question of why the IAT would measure different aspects of implicit self-esteem in 
depressed versus non-depressed individuals. A possible explanation is that the IAT does 
not restrict the way concepts or labels are interpreted, and that this interpretation 
varies across clinical conditions. More specifically, depressed individuals might 
conceptualize the IAT labels as “I WANT TO BE GOOD/BAD” whereas non-depressed 
individuals might interpret them as “I AM GOOD/BAD”.  The idea that each individual 
might interpret – or proportionalize – concepts or labels in a different way is crucially 
important for future research using association tasks such as the IAT.  
This study was the first to go beyond the unilateral associative character of the 
abundance of IAT-research, by differentiating between actual self-esteem and ideal 
self-esteem through the introduction of labels that specify the way in which concepts 
are to be related. The results underscore the need to go beyond simple associations 
and suggest that individual–specific propositions could be co-activated during implicit 
tasks. Because we showed that implicit measurements of propositions are possible, we 
argue that these automatically activated propositions should become a point of interest 
in future experimental and clinical research investigating self-esteem in depression. The 
use of propositions in implicit measures might be the start of a new avenue for future 
research, to further unravel how a concept is processed in different populations (e.g., “I 
HAVE TO BE” + “positive”/”negative”). 
Further fine-graining the self-esteem concept may have clinical implications. 
Because implicit measures have been shown to predict distress and psychopathology 
(e.g. Franck, De Raedt & De Houwer, 2007 ), these results further clarify the importance 
of actual versus ideal self-discrepancy theories, which might hold promise to refine 
therapeutic interventions. 
With regard to the modest split-half reliability measures of both IRAPs, a lower 
internal consistency might be an implication of using a shortened version of the IRAP 
with only two test blocks. Hence, in future research, more test blocks might be used  to 
address this issue. Furthermore, as stated by Hughes & Barnes-Holmes (in press), future 




research should continue to benchmark the validity and reliability of the task against 
well-established alternatives such as the IAT. Thus, more conclusions about reliability 
could be drawn when future IRAP studies would consistently report these reliability 
measures.  
A limitation to the present research is that we did not use a patient population. 
However, dysphoric students have been shown to be prone to depression (e.g. Ingram 
& Siegle, 2009), and can thus be considered as a clinical analogue sample. Nevertheless, 
our findings can stimulate further research to replicate these findings in different 
populations (e.g., remitted depressed, MDD, etc.), to further elucidate the role of self-
esteem in depression. Secondly, given that 22% of the participants were excluded 
based on our criterion that they had to reach an accuracy of 80% before starting the 
actual task, it might be advisable in future studies to lower this threshold to 70%. Note, 
however, that an accuracy criterion of 80% has been used  in most earlier IRAP studies 
in which healthy undergraduates participated (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). 
To summarize, the results of this study suggest that dysphoric individuals, who are 
prone to depression, have a focus on ideal-self-esteem, and lower actual self-esteem, in 
comparison to healthy participants. Future research should take into account 
propositions in implicit measures of self-esteem, incorporating ideal self in the research 
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TO BE OR WANT TO BE: THE ROLE OF 
ACTUAL VERSUS IDEAL SELF IN IMPLICIT 
SELF-ESTEEM1 
ABSTRACT 
A growing body of work suggests that both depressed and non-depressed 
individuals display implicit positivity towards the self. In the current study, we examined 
whether this positivity can be underpinned by two qualitatively distinct propositions 
related to actual (‘I am good’) or ideal (‘I want to be good’) self-esteem. Dysphoric and 
non-dysphoric participants completed a self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT) as 
well an Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) targeting their actual self-
esteem and an IRAP targeting ideal self-esteem. Both groups demonstrated similar and 
positive IAT effects. A more complex picture emerged with regard to the IRAP effects. 
Whereas non-dysphorics did not differ in their actual and ideal self-esteem, their 
dysphoric counterparts demonstrated lower actual than ideal self-esteem. Our results 
suggest that closer attention to the role of propositional processes in implicit measures 
may unlock novel insight into the relationship between implicit self-esteem and 
depression. 
                                                 
1
 Based on Remue, J., Hughes, S., De Houwer, J., & De Raedt, R. (2014). To Be or Want to Be: 











Self-esteem has been extensively investigated by researchers from a wide variety of 
theoretical persuasions and currently represents a key explanatory construct in many 
areas of psychological science, including health psychology (Taylor & Brown), 1988, 
social psychology (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger & Vohs, 2003; Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt & Schimel, 2004) and clinical psychology (Crocker & Park, 
2004). Within the latter domain, negative self-schemas are thought to bias information 
processing in an automatic, repetitive and difficult to control manner (Clark, Beck & 
Alford, 1999). These negative cognitions about the self are also argued to play a 
significant role in the maintenance and recurrence of depressive episodes (e.g., Ingram, 
Miranda, & Segal, 1998; Williams, 1997). Interestingly, however, much work on self-
esteem and its relationship to depression has employed self-report measures which are 
susceptible to a variety of response biases such as social desirability and self-
presentation. Many cognitive models of depression also assume that self-related 
schemata are not always consciously accessible and thus cannot always be verbally 
reported upon (Beck et al., 1979; Young, 1994). Consequently, it is questionable 
whether the use of self-report measures may provide meaningful information about 
such schemata. To overcome these limitations, a number of alternative procedures 
have recently emerged that reduce the participant’s ability to control their responses 
and operate in such a way that they do not depend on introspective access to the 
psychological content of interest. Whereas self-report measures of self-esteem can be 
classified as explicit measures that capture non-automatic instances of self-evaluation 
(e.g., self-evaluations that occur when participants have ample time and resources to 
reflect or have the intention to evaluate the self), implicit self-esteem measures can be 
thought of as measures that register more spontaneous, automatic self-evaluations 
(e.g., self-evaluations that occur quickly or when participants do not have the intention 
to evaluate the self; see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009).  
  




Interestingly, a growing literature suggests that although depressed and non-
depressed people differ with respect to their explicit self-esteem they demonstrate 
surprisingly similar levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem (De Raedt, Schacht, Franck & 
De Houwer, 2006; Greenwald et al., 2002; Risch, Buba, Birk, Morina, Steffens & 
Stangier, 2010; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). Consider, for example, the work of De Raedt 
and colleagues (2006) who compared implicit self-esteem in a group of depressed 
participants relative to healthy controls using three separate paradigms: the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT), Name Letter Preference Task (NLPT), and the Extrinsic Affective 
Simon Task (EAST). Across all three measures evidence for similar levels of positive 
implicit self-esteem was obtained for both groups. Some studies have even reported 
higher levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem in formerly depressed relative to never-
depressed participants (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001; Franck, De Raedt & De 
Houwer, 2008a).  
In an attempt to explain these surprising findings, De Raedt and colleagues (2006) 
argued that the IAT and other measures of implicit self-esteem may have captured 
actual self-esteem in non-depressed participants but ideal self-esteem in depressed 
participants. Whereas actual self-esteem refers to feelings of self-worth or the global 
evaluation of the current self (Buhrmester, Blanton & Swann, 2011), ideal self-esteem is 
considered to be a global representation of the attributes a person would like to 
possess (see Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt & De Raedt, 2013). 
Numerous studies have provided compelling evidence for the role of discrepancies 
between ideal and actual self in depressive disorders (e.g., Moretti & Higgins, 1999; 
Tangney, Niedenthal, Covert, & Barlow, 1998). One way to conceptualize actual and 
ideal self-esteem is in terms of the type of relation between the self and positive and 
negative valence. One could argue that both actual and ideal self-esteem involve such a 
relation but differ in the way that these concepts are related. Whereas actual self-
esteem refers to current beliefs about the self (i.e., I am good / bad), ideal self-esteem 
would reflect beliefs about the desired future self (i.e., I want to be good / bad). These 
beliefs are propositional in nature because, unlike associations, they contain 
information about how concepts are related (see Lagnado et al., 2007, for an excellent 





De Raedt and colleagues’ (2006) hypothesis certainly seems plausible given implicit 
measures are usually designed to assess whether one set of concepts (e.g., ‘self’ and 
‘other’) is somehow related to a second set of concepts (e.g., ‘positive’ or ‘negative’) 
without regard to the way in which those concepts are related. To illustrate, consider a 
typical self-esteem IAT. During a first test phase, participants categorize items related to 
the self (e.g., the first name of the participant) and positive words (e.g., HAPPY) using 
one response key and items related to someone else (e.g., the first name of another 
participant) and negative words (e.g., INCOMPETENT) using another response key. 
During a second test phase, response mappings are reversed so that self-related items 
and negative words are assigned to the first key whereas other-related items and 
positive words are assigned to the second key. The difference in how well someone 
performs during the first relative to the second phase is considered to provide an 
overall measure of how readily this person associates the concept “self” with positive or 
negative valence. However, an IAT effect does not reveal how a person relates those 
concepts. For some individuals, the IAT score might reflect the extent to which 
someone believes that he or she is good (i.e., actual self-esteem) whereas for other 
individuals, the same score might reflect that he or she wants to be good (i.e., ideal self-
esteem).  
With this idea in mind, Remue and colleagues (2013) set out to distinguish actual 
and ideal implicit self-esteem using a relatively new procedure known as the Implicit 
Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). The IRAP stems 
from an intellectual tradition known as Contextual Behavioral Science (Hayes, Barnes-
Holmes, & Wilson, 2012) and a functional account of human language and cognition 
known as Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). Unlike 
many other implicit measures, the IRAP was specifically designed to capture how 
objects, stimuli and events are automatically related to one another (i.e., what RFT 
researchers refer to as ‘brief and immediate relational responses’; see Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, Vahey, 2012). If we 
assume that the ease with which people automatically relate stimuli is mediated by 
propositional knowledge in memory (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011  
for an in-depth discussion), it could be argued that performance on the IRAP provides 
an implicit measure of propositional knowledge. In order to test this assumption, 




Remue et al. exposed a group of dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants to two 
separate IRAPs: one designed to assess actual and another to assess ideal self-esteem. 
Consistent with their predictions, two contrasting patterns of implicit self-esteem 
emerged, with dysphoric participants showing evidence of lower actual and higher ideal 
self-esteem relative to their non-dysphoric counterparts who showed evidence of 
higher actual and lower ideal self-esteem compared to the former group. These results 
tentatively suggest that the implicit measures used by De Raedt and colleagues (2006) 
may have assessed ideal self-esteem in the dysphoric group and actual self-esteem in 
the non-dysphoric group.  
The present study set out to extend the work of De Raedt and colleagues (2006) and 
Remue and colleagues (2013) in several ways. Within the context of self-esteem, we 
examined whether implicit measures that are designed to capture associations may in 
fact reflect the operation of qualitatively distinct sets of propositions. Whereas De 
Raedt and colleagues only used an IAT and Remue et al. only used IRAPs, we asked our 
participants to complete both a self-esteem IAT and two separate IRAPs, one targeting 
actual (‘I am’) and another targeting ideal self-evaluations (‘I want to be’). Moreover, 
we pre-selected participants who reported either high scores (i.e., dysphoric group) or 
low scores (i.e., non-dysphoric group) on an index of depressive symptoms during an 
earlier screening study. Based on the ideas of De Raedt and colleagues (2006), we 
expected contrasting patterns of implicit self-esteem as a function of the task employed 
and group tested. Although we expected dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants to 
produce similar (positive) scores on the self-esteem IAT, we anticipated that they would 
diverge in their respective IRAP performances, with the former group showing stronger 
ideal relative to the actual implicit self-esteem and the latter group showing stronger 
actual relative to ideal self-esteem. Furthermore, based on the idea the IAT might 
capture different aspects of self-esteem in dysphoric than in non-dysphoric 
participants, we expected that the IAT would correlate most strongly with the ideal self-
esteem IRAP in the dysphoric group but with the actual self-esteem IRAP in the non-
dysphoric group. In addition, we included a number of questionnaires to investigate 
whether a discrepancy between actual and ideal self-esteem would also emerge at the 
explicit level. Our goal here was to explore how implicit and explicit self-esteem interact 





Finally, it is worth noting that the current study provided us with an opportunity to 
address three methodological issues that arose in our earlier work. First, Remue and 
colleagues (2013) employed a shortened version of the IRAP containing two (rather 
than the standard of six) test blocks which may have adversely affected the reliability of 
the observed effects (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In order to circumvent this 
concern, and facilitate a direct comparison between our results and those observed 
elsewhere in the literature, the current study included a standard (six-block) version of 
the IRAP. Second, while Remue and colleagues (2013) required participants to respond 
with both speed (2500ms) and accuracy (80%) during the IRAP, recent evidence 
suggests that introducing even stricter mastery criteria could lead to more robust IRAP 
scores (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). Hence, we opted for a more stringent set of latency 
criteria than before. Third and finally, although many of the stimuli used in Remue and 
colleagues were related to self-esteem several were more directly relevant to 
depression in general (e.g., “Happy”, “Sad”). Unlike the IAT in which the definition of 
the categories (e.g. ‘Me” and ‘Worth’) appears to be more important than the 
individual stimuli used (e.g. ‘Peter’ and ‘Successful’) (De Houwer, 2001), it is crucial that 
stimuli directly relevant to the domain of interest be employed in the IRAP (see 
Nicholson, Dempsey & Barnes-Holmes, in press for a discussion). Therefore in the 
current study we only included items that were directly related to self-esteem. 
METHOD 
Ethics statement 
Participants gave their written informed consent and received either credit or 
€10 for their participation. The study was approved by the ethics committee of Ghent 
University. The investigation was conducted in full accordance with the principles 
expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 





Sixty-four students participated in the current study. Prior to the study, they 
were screened for depressive symptomatology using the BDI-II-NL (van der Does, 2002). 
These same participants completed the BDI-II-NL for a second time upon arriving at the 
laboratory for the actual test session. Both BDI-II-NL (pretest and test) scores correlated 
highly, and were based on the same high/low classifications. Using the recommended 
cut-off score from the BDI-II-NL manual, the final sample was divided into two groups: a 
low BDI group (≤ 13) consisting of 35 students (30 women and 5 men) ranging from 18 
to 30 years (M = 21, SD = 2.84) and a high BDI group (≥ 14) consisting of 29 students (25 
women and 4 men) ranging from 18 and 25 years (M = 19.38, SD = 2.06). Assignment to 
BDI groups was based on the BDI score during the second (test) session. By design, the 
high BDI group had significantly higher scores during test (M = 21.93, SD = 8.36) 
compared to the low group (M = 4.8, SD = 3.72), t(62) = 10.91, p < .0012. 
Materials 
Beck depression inventory (BDI-II-NL). The BDI-II-NL, a 21 item self-report 
inventory, was used to measure the severity of depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 
1996). The Dutch translation of the BDI-II has shown high internal consistency: 
Cronbach’s α of .92 for a patient population and .88 for a healthy control group. Also, 
the validity index satisfies general psychometric criteria (van der Does, 2002). 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale (RSES, Rosenberg, 1965; Dutch translation by Franck, 
De Raedt, Barbez, & Rosseel, 2008b). This self-report scale measures global feelings of 
self-worth or self-acceptance and is widely used because of its proven validity and test-
retest reliability. It consists of 10 items where participants have to state whether they 
totally agree, agree, disagree or totally disagree with the presented statement. The 
overall score represents the degree of global self-esteem, with higher scores indicating 
higher self-esteem. 
                                                 
2
 Note that, by design, BDI scores during the test session were not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk = 
.892; p < .001) due to the fact that we invited participants with extremely high or low BDI scores during 
initial screening. We therefore used BDI as a dichotomous rather than continuous variable in our analyses 





Semantic differentials. Participants were presented with the same twelve target 
stimuli as used in the IRAP and IAT (six positive and six negative) and asked to evaluate 
each of them using a five-point scale ranging from 0 (Totally Disagree) to 4 (Totally 
Agree). Each word was rated twice, once with respect to actual self-evaluations (e.g., ‘I 
am successful’) and once with respect to ideal self-evaluations (‘I want to be 
successful’). In this way we sought to acquire two broad measures of self-esteem, one 
related to self-reported actual (SR Actual) and a second related to self-reported ideal 
(SR Ideal) self-esteem. Finally, participants were given a number of additional 
questionnaires related to their psychological flexibility and rumination. However, all of 
these served exploratory purposes and will not be discussed further.  
IAT. During the IAT, the words ‘Me’ and ‘Not Me’ served as the target category 
labels and the words ‘Worth’ and ‘Worthless’ served as the attribute category labels. Six 
positively valenced (the Dutch words for confident, nice, successful, important, 
intelligent, competent and pleasant) and six negatively valenced Dutch adjectives 
(insecure, inferior, failure, worthless, useless and stupid) served as attribute stimuli. The 
participant’s first name and surname, place of residence and nationality were used as 
stimuli for the target category ‘Me’. The first name and surname of another participant 
were used as two items for the target category ‘Not me’ while a fabricated (non-
Belgian) place of residence and nationality were used as two additional items in that 
same category. 
Prior to the onset of the IAT, participants were informed that a series of words 
would appear one-by-one in the middle of the screen and that their task was to 
categorize those stimuli as quickly and accurately as possible. They were also informed 
that the category labels ‘Me’ and ‘Not Me’ as well as ‘Worth’ and ‘Worthless’ would 
appear on the upper left and right sides of the screen and that stimuli presented in the 
middle of the screen should be assigned to these categories by pressing either the E 
(left response) or the I key (right response) on an AZERTY keyboard. Each trial started 
with the presentation of a fixation cross for 200ms in the middle of the screen followed 
immediately by a target or attribute stimulus. If the participant categorized a word 
correctly - by selecting the appropriate key for that block of trials - the stimulus 
disappeared from the screen and the next trial began. In contrast, an incorrect response 
resulted in the presentation of a red ‘X’ which remained on-screen until the correct key 




was pressed. Overall, each participant completed seven blocks of trials. During the first 
block of 20 practice trials they were requires to sort the self- or other-related words 
into their respective categories, with ‘Me’ assigned to the left (‘E’) key and ‘Not Me’ 
with the right (‘I’) key. On the second block of 20 practice trials participants had to 
assign positively valenced stimuli to the ‘Worth’ category using the left key and 
negative stimuli to the ‘Worthless’ category using the right key. Blocks 3 (20 trials) and 
4 (40 trials) involved a combined assignment of target and attribute stimuli to their 
respective categories. Specifically, participants categorized ‘Me’ and positive words 
using the left key and ‘Not Me’ and negative words using the right key. The fifth block of 
20 trials reversed the key assignments for self- and other-related items, with ‘Me’ now 
assigned to the right key and ‘Not Me’ with the left key. Finally, the sixth block (20 
trials) and seventh block (40 trials) required participants to categorize ‘Me’ and 
negative words with the right key and ‘Not Me’ and positive words with the left key. 
The order of the critical test blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
The location of the picture cued the location of the target correctly on 50% of the 
trials (valid trials) and incorrectly on the other 50% (invalid trials). Participants were 
informed that the location of the cue was not predictive for the target location. All the 
pictures were presented randomly with an equal number of presentations and trial type 
(valid versus invalid). Using long cue presentations, people can be faster at responding 
to invalid trials in comparison to valid trials. This effect is known as the inhibition of 
return (IOR) effect (Posner & Cohen, 1984) and results from inhibition of the previously 
attended location in favor of the unattended location. 
To control for response strategies (for example focussing on only one fplaceholder 
during the experiment), 24 trials were inserted in which the fixation cross was briefly 
(150ms) replaced by an arrow. Participants had to indicate if this arrow pointed left or 
right. Three participants were removed from analysis due to their mistakes (more than 
50%) on these arrow trials.  
IRAP. The IRAP is a computerized latency-based measure which requires 
participants to respond quickly and accurately to stimuli in ways that are deemed 
consistent or inconsistent with their prior learning history. Specifically, half of the IRAP 
trials require participants to respond in ways that are consistent with their (assumed) 





inconsistent with that same history. For instance, participants might be asked to 
respond “True” to the statement “I want to be Good” on half of the trials but to 
respond “False” on the other half. The difference in time taken to respond on 
consistent relative to inconsistent trials - defined as the IRAP effect - is assumed to 
provide an index of the strength or probability of the targeted relations. Reliability 
estimates differ substantially between studies, ranging from values as low as .23 to 
values as high as .81 (for more on the measure and its psychometric properties see 
Golijani-Moghaddam, Hart, & Dawson, 2013; Gawronski, & De Houwer, 2014).  
In the current study, each IRAP involved a minimum of two and a maximum of six 
practice blocks followed by a fixed set of six test blocks. Each block consisted of 24 trials 
that presented one of two self-related label stimuli (e.g., ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’) in the 
presence of one of two types of target stimuli (positive or negative words drawn from 
the same set as the IAT) and required participants to emit one of two relational 
responses (‘True’ or ‘False’). In this way, the IRAP was comprised of four different types 
of trials (or “trial-types”: Self-Positive; Self-Not Positive, Self-Negative and Self-Not 
Negative; see Figure 1). Trials were presented in a quasi-random order so that each of 





















Figure 1. Examples of the four trial-types used in the actual self-esteem IRAP. On each trial, a label 
stimulus (e.g., ‘I am’ or ‘I am not’), a target stimulus (e.g., ‘Successful’ or ‘Incompetent’) and two 
relational response options (True and False) were shown on the screen. Note: the ideal and actual self 
IRAPs were identical in all regards except for their respective label stimuli (‘I want to be’ and ‘I don’t want 
to be’ versus ‘I am’ and ‘I am not’ respectively). 
 
 
Prior to the IRAP participants were informed that they would complete a word 
categorization procedure that required them to follow a general rule for responding. 
Specifically, on one set of blocks they were presented with the message “Please 
respond AS IF I am positive and I am not negative” (self-positive block), while on the 
alternative set of blocks they were presented with the message “Please respond AS IF I 
am negative and I am not positive” (self-negative block). Stated more precisely, a 
correct response during self-positive blocks required participants to select ‘True’ when 
‘I Am’ appeared with a positive target stimulus (e.g., ‘Intelligent’) or when ‘I Am Not’ 
appeared with a negative target (e.g., ‘Stupid’). At the same time, participants were also 
required to choose ‘False’ when ‘I Am’ appeared with a negative word or when ‘I Am 





required during self-negative blocks. The general rule for responding was alternated 
across each IRAP block to form three successive pairs of test blocks.  
The IRAP commenced with a pair of practice blocks. Participants progressed from 
the practice to the test blocks when they met accuracy (at least 80% accuracy) and 
latency criteria (median latency of less than 2000ms) on a successive pair of practice 
blocks. Failure to meet these criteria resulted in re-exposure to another pair of practice 
blocks until participants either achieved the mastery criteria or a maximum of three 
pairs of practice block were completed. Failure to satisfy task requirements following 
three pairs of practice blocks resulted in participants being thanked, debriefed and 
dismissed (in the current study one participant failed to complete both IRAPs, another 
three failed the actual self IRAP while six more did not satisfy those same criteria during 
the ideal self IRAP). When the above criteria were met, a fixed set of three pairs of test 
blocks were then administered. Finally, it is worth noting that the actual and ideal self 
IRAPs differed only with respect to their self-related label stimuli. That is, while the 
actual self IRAP required participants to respond to valenced target stimuli using the 
terms ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’ the ideal self IRAP required participants respond to the same 
stimuli in terms of ‘I Want To Be’ or ‘I Don’t Want To Be’. 
Procedure 
Upon arriving at the laboratory participants were welcomed by the researcher, 
asked to read and sign statements of consent and seated in front of a computer from 
which they received all instructions. They were informed that they would complete a 
number of questionnaires as well as computer based tasks - and given the sensitive 
nature of the study - that they would be randomly assigned an identification number in 
order to preserve their confidentiality and anonymity. Thereafter, participants 
completed the various self-report measures, an IAT and two IRAPs. The order of 
questionnaires and implicit measures as well as the order of the two IRAPs were 
counterbalanced across participants. The IAT was always administered prior to the two 
IRAPs. Overall, the experiment lasted about 60 minutes. 






Counterbalancing the order of the two IRAPs as well as evaluative measures 
(questionnaires and implicit measures) did not produce any main or interaction effects. 
Consequently, data were collapsed across both factors.  
Implicit Measures 
 IAT. Following the recommendations of Greenwald and colleagues (2003), 
response latency data from the IAT was prepared using the D1 scoring algorithm. This 
transformation resulted in one IAT score for each participant, reflecting the difference 
in mean response latency between consistent and inconsistent blocks divided by the 
overall variation in those latencies. Scores were calculated so that positive values 
reflected a relatively higher positive self-esteem bias whereas negative values indicated 
the opposite. When IAT scores from the dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups were 
submitted to an independent samples t-test no significant difference emerged, t(62) = 
.81, p = .42. Consistent with our predictions, dysphoric (M = .59, SD = .47) and non-
dysphoric groups (M = .68, SD = .35) both demonstrated similar and robust levels of 
positive implicit self-esteem. 
 IRAP. Response latency data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using an 
adaptation of Greenwald et al.’s (2003) D algorithm (for details of this data 
transformation see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). For each IRAP, we calculated a single 
overall D-IRAP score - one for the actual self IRAP and a second for the ideal self IRAP. 
These values were calculated so that higher scores reflected higher levels of (actual or 
ideal) self-esteem. When submitted to a 2 (BDI Group) x 2 (IRAP-Type; Actual vs. Ideal) 
mixed-models ANOVA, a main effect for IRAP-Type, F(1, 52) = 14.72, p <.001, η2partial = 
.22, as well as a two-way interaction between IRAP-Type and BDI Group was obtained, 
F(1, 52) = 5.29, p =.03, η2partial = .09. This crucial interaction effect reveals a stronger 





(M = .21, SD = .29) than in non-dysphoric participants (M = .05, SD = .19). To explore this 
interaction, we compared BDI groups for each IRAP separately as well as both IRAPs for 
each group separately. The first set of analyses did not reveal differences between the 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric groups in terms of their respective IRAP performances (all 
ps > .2). The second set of analysis did not reveal a difference between scores on the 
actual (M = .11, SD = .27) and ideal (M = .16, SD = .24) IRAPs for non-dysphorics (p > .2) 
but did reveal more positive scores on the ideal self (M = .23, SD = .24) relative to the 
actual self IRAP (M = .02, SD = .22) for dysphoric participants, t(25) = 3.6, p =.001, d = 
.93 (see Figure 2)3. 
Figure 2. Mean D-IRAP scores as a function of IRAP-Type (actual vs. ideal) and BDI group (high vs. low). A 
positive value indicates a pro self-esteem bias and a negative score indicates the opposite. 
 
                                                 
3
 To assess the internal consistency of the IRAP, two split-half reliability scores were calculated, one for 
the actual self IRAP and one for the ideal self IRAP. In each case, two scores were calculated, one for odd 
trials and the second for even trials, and these were obtained in the same way as for the overall D-IRAP 
score, except that the D-algorithm was applied separately to all odd trials and even trials. The split-half 
correlations between odd and even scores, applying Spearman-Brown corrections, for the Actual-Self 
IRAP was (r = .53) and Ideal-Self IRAP was (r = .45). These split-half reliabilities were based on all 
participants who completed both IRAPs. The IAT’s internal consistency (r = .96) was based on a 
Spearman-Brown corrected split-half correlation, the split-halves being derived from alternating pairs of 
trials in both critical blocks 





Consistent with our predictions, we found that dysphoric participants (M = 13.0, SD 
= 3.0) showed significantly lower self-esteem scores on the Rosenberg scale relative to 
their non-dysphoric counterparts (M = 20.6, SD = 3.5), t(62) = 9.11 , p < .001, d = 2.29. 
When actual and ideal-self evaluations were submitted to a 2 (Self: Actual vs. Ideal) x 2 
(BDI Group) mixed models ANOVA, a main effect for BDI Group, F(1, 62) = 48.13, p < 
.001, η2partial = .44, and a two-way interaction between Self and BDI Group was 
obtained, F(1, 62) = 50.99, p < .001, η2partial = .45. This reveals that dysphoric participants 
showed significantly higher self-discrepancy scores (M = 19.83, SD = 6.60) than their 
non-dysphoric counterparts (M = 9.91, SD = 4.45). To explore this interaction, we 
compared BDI groups for each self-evaluation separately as well as both self-
evaluations for each group separately. The first set of analyses revealed that non-
dysphoric participants (M = 35.14, SD = 4.72) reported significantly higher actual self-
evaluations than their dysphoric counterparts (M = 24.24, SD = 6.03), t(62) = 8.11, p < 
.001. Dysphoric (M = 44.07, SD = .34) and non-dysphoric individuals (M = 45.06, SD = 
2.89) showed similar and high levels of ideal-self evaluations (p = .22). The second set of 
analysis revealed a significant difference between actual and ideal self-evaluations for 




 Implicit-explicit correlations. In the non-dysphoric group, the IAT and ideal self-
evaluations (SR Ideal) correlated positively, r = 0.43, n = 35, p = .009, while a marginally 
significant positive correlation appeared between the IAT and actual self-evaluations 
(SR Actual), r = 0.30, n = 35, p = .077. However, no significant correlations emerged 
between the actual and ideal IRAPs and any of the explicit measures. With respect to 
the dysphoric group, no significant correlations emerged between the IAT and the 
various explicit measures. However, the actual (but not the ideal self IRAP) correlated 
positively with self-esteem (RSES), r = 0.42, n = 28, p = .027, and actual self-evaluations 





 Implicit-Implicit correlations. A series of correlations within dysphoric and non-
dysphoric participants were used to determine whether IAT and IRAP effects were 
related but none of the tests proved significant (see Tables 1 and 2): IAT with actual self 
IRAP (all ps > .3); IAT with ideal self IRAP, (all ps > .6). A significant correlation did 
emerge between the actual and ideal self IRAPs for the non-dysphoric, r = .70, n = 28, p 
< .001, but not the dysphoric group (p = .51)4 
Explicits. In the non-dysphoric group, we found a significant positive correlation 
between self-esteem (RSES) and actual (SR Actual), r = 0.56, n = 35, p = .001. Finally, 
actual (SR Actual) and ideal (SR Ideal) self-esteem correlated positively, r = 0.40, n = 35, 
p = .019. With respect to the dysphoric group, self-esteem (RSES) and actual self-
evaluations (SR Actual) correlated positively, r = 0.71, n = 29, p < .001 (see Tables 1 and 
2). 
Table 1. Correlation matrix of explicit and implicit self-esteem scores for the low BDI group. 








IAT       
Actual IRAP .20      
Ideal IRAP .10 .70**     
RSES -.03 -.23 .05    
SR Actual .30 .04 .05 .55**   
SR Ideal .43* .17 .20 .01 .40*  
       
Note. RSES = Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; SE Actual = Self-reported actual self-esteem; SR Ideal 
= Self-reported ideal self-esteem. * = p < .05 ** = p < .001.  
Table 2. Correlation matrix of explicit and implicit self-esteem scores for the high BDI group 








IAT       
Actual IRAP .02      
Ideal IRAP .03 .13     
RSES .28 .42* -.01    
SR Actual .20 .53* -.06 .71**   
SR Ideal .09 -.31 .06 .00 .11 
       
Note. RSES = Rosenberg Self-esteem Scale; SE Actual = Self-reported actual self-esteem; SR Ideal 
= Self-reported ideal self-esteem. * = p < .05 ** = p < .001.  
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 Although participants were pre-selected because they had high or low scores on the BDI during a 
screening study, a number of individuals nevertheless revealed BDI scores around the cut-off point during 
the actual test session. When a more stringent cut-off value was employed to create the non-dysphoric 
(scores from 0-9) and dysphoric groups (scores from 16-64) an almost identical set of findings emerged.    





Accumulating evidence suggests that although depressed and non-depressed people 
differ with respect to their explicit self-esteem they demonstrate surprisingly similar 
levels of (positive) implicit self-esteem esteem (e.g., Gemar et al., 2001, Greenwald et 
al., 2002; Franck et al., 2008a; Risch et al., 2010; Yamaguchi et al., 2007). In an attempt 
to explain these surprising findings, it has been argued that the IAT and other implicit 
measures capture actual self-esteem in non-depressed participants but ideal self-
esteem in depressed participants (De Raedt et al., 2006; Remue et al., 2013). In the 
current study we put this assumption to the test. In particular, we examined whether 
implicit measures designed to capture associations between the self and valenced 
stimuli (IAT) actually reflect the operation of qualitatively distinct sets of self-related 
propositions (IRAP). Whereas De Raedt and colleagues (2006) only used an IAT and 
Remue et al. (2013) only used IRAPs, we asked participants to complete both a self-
esteem IAT and two separate IRAPs, one targeting actual (‘I am’) and another targeting 
ideal self-evaluations (‘I want to be’). Based on previous work, we expected to observe 
three outcomes. First, dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants should produce similar 
(positive) scores on the self-esteem IAT. Second, those same participants should diverge 
in their respective IRAP performances, with dysphorics showing stronger ideal relative 
to the actual self-esteem and non-dysphorics stronger actual relative to ideal self-
esteem. Third, performance on the actual-self IRAP (in the non-dysphoric group) and 
performance on the ideal-self IRAP (in the dysphoric group) should differentially 
correlate with the IAT.  
Consistent with our first prediction, we found that dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
participants were relatively quicker to categorize self-related words with positive 
compared to negative stimuli on the IAT. This finding is also consistent with work 
elsewhere in the literature on the near universal positivity towards the self (Yamaguchi 
et al., 2007) that seems to emerge regardless of current or former depressive 
symptomatology (Gemar et al., 2001; Franck et al., 2008a). At the same time, our 
results extend beyond this early work. As indicated by the significant interaction 
between IRAP type and group, dysphoric participants showed a greater discrepancy 





counterparts. This result replicates the crucial finding of Remue and colleagues (2013). 
However, several caveats should be noted. First, although the interaction between IRAP 
type and group was significant, several of the simple main effects involved in this 
interaction did not reach conventional levels of significance. Whereas dysphorics did 
show higher scores on the ideal self-esteem IRAP than on the actual self-esteem IRAP, 
non-dysphorics did not score differently on the two IRAPs. Hence, we did not replicate 
the finding of Remue et al. that non-dysphorics have a higher score on the actual self-
esteem IRAP than on the ideal self-esteem IRAP. Unlike Remue et al., we also did not 
observe significant differences between groups in their performance on each of the 
IRAPs. Finally, and contrary to our third prediction, we did not observe a contrasting 
pattern of correlations between the IAT and IRAP as a function of depressive 
symptomatology.  
Although our main goal was to investigate differences between different types of 
implicit self-esteem, we also included a number of questionnaires in order to 
investigate explicit self-esteem, and its relationship with implicit self-esteem. We found 
that dysphoric participants produced significantly lower scores on the Rosenberg scale 
relative to non-dysphoric participants. However, when actual and ideal-self evaluations 
were compared, a more complex picture emerged. Both groups displayed higher levels 
of ideal relative to actual-self evaluations, with the dysphoric group producing 
significantly lower actual-self scores than their non-dysphoric peers. Following the 
discrepancy theory of (Higgins, 1987) which states that the discrepancy between the 
actual and ideal self is a cognitive risk factor for depression, and consistent with 
previous work in this area (e.g., Stevens, Holmberg, Lovejoy, & Pittman, 2014), 
individuals suffering from higher levels of self-reported depressive symptomatology 
displayed greater discrepancies between their ideal and actual self-evaluations than 
those who did not report such symptoms. Note that discrepancy theory is supported 
not only by the effects that we observed on the explicit measures but also by the 
differences between groups in actual-ideal self-esteem discrepancy on the implicit 
measures.  
We also found that implicit and explicit self-esteem correlated with one another in 
different ways as a function of depressive symptomatology. For instance, actual and 
ideal-self evaluations in the non-dysphoric condition tended to correlate regardless of 




the measure used. That is, explicit measures of ‘actual’ self-esteem correlated with 
explicit ‘ideal’ self-esteem while both explicit measures correlated with performance on 
the IAT in the non-dysphoric group. However, no correlations emerged between actual 
and ideal self-evaluations on either the explicit or implicit measures for participants in 
the dysphoric group. 
Based on the above, an important next step is to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding of how self-related cognitions impact implicit and explicit self-esteem. In 
conducting this work several points are worth noting. First, the research presented here 
(as well as in Remue et al., 2013) utilized a normative sample of students that varied in 
their respective levels of self-reported depressive symptomatology. It remains to be 
seen whether a sample of clinically depressed, remitted or recovered participants 
would also show evidence of elevated ideal and diminished actual self-evaluations. 
Second, it may be that other implicit propositions such as those related to people’s 
personal expectations (e.g., ‘I should be’ or ‘I need to be’), how they compare 
themselves to others (e.g., ‘I am good but others are better’) or perceived failures (e.g., 
‘I’m not good enough’) are even more important for predicting behavior. With this in 
mind, research could examine whether IRAPs targeting other types of propositional 
knowledge provide even better diagnostic and predictive information about clinical and 
non-clinical populations. Third, while the current study assessed propositions related to 
actual and ideal self-esteem separately via two IRAPs, it may be that juxtaposing one 
set of propositions (e.g., ‘I am good’) with another (e.g., ‘I need to be better’) within a 
single IRAP would enable us to determine how the assessment context influences the 
activation of different propositions and their respective influence on one another. It 
may be that activating two sets of propositions within rather than across measurement 
contexts could magnify discrepancies between actual and ideal self-evaluations.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to test the idea that a single IAT might 
actually reflect different implicit beliefs in different people. More specifically, the fact 
that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals reveal similarly high scores on IAT it might 
be due to the fact that the IAT reflects (high) ideal self-esteem in dysphorics and (high) 
actual-self esteem in non-dysphorics. Based on this idea, we predicted that IAT scores 
should correlate primarily with ideal self-esteem IRAP scores in dysphorics but with 





such  pattern of correlations. Although these null findings might indicate that the IAT 
does not capture different beliefs in different groups, it is also possible other factors 
came into play. First, IRAPs scores were somewhat unreliable which reduces changes of 
finding meaningful correlations. Second, counterbalancing of the order of the three 
tasks and administrating those three task within a single session could have increased 
error variance.  
Finally, in replicating the work of Remue and colleagues (2013), we implemented a 
number of methodological refinements that sought to strengthen the arguments 
forwarded in that earlier paper (e.g., we used a traditional six-block variant of the IRAP, 
more stringent mastery criteria and stimulus selection). In their paper, a number of 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants (22%) failed to complete an IRAP and they 
may have done so for entirely different reasons, with the former failing due to a lack of 
motivation and the latter due to an inability to respond quickly and accurately to 
certain propositions (or even vice-versa). The modifications implemented in the current 
study appear to be successful insofar attrition rates (14%) were lower than those 
reported by Remue et al. and other studies elsewhere in the IRAP literature (see 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In addition, the split-half reliability estimates obtained 
in the current study proved to be relatively higher then to those seen in Remue et al. 
and elsewhere in the literature.  
 Although we did observe a significant interaction between group and IRAP type, 
other effects failed to reach significance (e.g., lack of group difference on the IAT and 
the two IRAPs). In part, these null effects could be due to a lack of power because of the 
relatively small sample. We therefore recommend that replications of our findings - 
especially those comparing clinical and healthy populations - incorporate power 
analyses to ensure that an adequate sample size is employed so that statistically 
reliable inferences can be drawn. The lack of power could also explain why we failed to 
replicate the observation of Remue et al. that non-dysphorics score higher on the actual 
self-esteem IRAP than on the ideal self-esteem IRAP, as well as the observation that 
both groups differed in their performance on each of the IRAPs. Nevertheless, future 
work could explore whether differences in the number of IRAP blocks, stimuli 
employed, mastery criteria used or other procedural properties contribute to the 
inconsistencies observed between the results of our study and the results of Remue et 




al. For instance, we always exposed participants to an IAT before the two IRAPs, which 
may have influenced the expression of self-related evaluations on the IRAP. Future 
work could counterbalance these measures to assess potential carry-over effects 
between measures.  
To summarize, our results indicate that dysphoric and non-dysphoric individuals 
experience implicit positivity towards the self. Most importantly, dysphoric participants 
revealed a stronger discrepancy between actual and ideal self-esteem as indexed by 
IRAPs compared to non-dysphoric participants. This finding not only supports the 
theoretical position that the discrepancy between actual and ideal self-esteem is 
related to dysphoria but also demonstrates the added value of using implicit measures 
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DOES A SINGLE NEUROSTIMULATION 
SESSION REALLY AFFECT MOOD IN 




Non-invasive neurostimulation or neuromodulation techniques such as repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation 
(tDCS) were welcomed as promising tools for investigating cognitive and mood 
processes in healthy participants as well as in patients suffering from neuropsychiatric 
conditions. Due to their rather easy application, both modalities have been used to 
experimentally examine prefrontal cognitive and emotional control. However, it 
remains unclear whether a single session of such stimulation may affect the mood of 
participants in a healthy state. We provide a systematic review of studies reporting the 
effects of a single session of rTMS or tDCS (…-2014) on self-reported mood in healthy 
participants. Although early studies reported significant effects on self-reported mood 
in healthy participants, more recent work investigating mood effects after a single 
rTMS/tDCS session has failed to find any significant changes in self-reported mood. 
Therefore it appears that a single session of rTMS/tDCS has no impact on mood in the 
healthy state.   
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 Based on Remue, J., Baeken, C., & De Raedt, R. (2016). Does a single neurostimulation session really 










TABLE 1. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REVIEW. 
ABBREVIATIONS  
TMS TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC STIMULATION 
RTMS REPETITIVE TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC STIMULATION 
TDCS TRANSCRANIAL DIRECT CURRENT STIMULATION 
(L/R) PFC (LEFT/RIGHT) PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
DLPFC DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
LF/HF LOW-FREQUENCY/HIGH-FREQUENCY 
EEG ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM 
HPA HYPOTHALAMIC–PITUITARY–ADRENAL AXIS 
M/F MALE/FEMALE 
APB ABDUCTOR POLLICIS BREVIS 
ADM ABDUCTOR DIGITI MINIMI 
MDLPFC MID-DORSOLATERAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
VAS VISUAL ANALOG SCALE 
PANAS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCHEDULE 
NIMH NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH MOOD 
SCALE 
POMS PROFILE OF MOOD STATES 
UMACL UNIVERSITY OF WALES INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY (UWIST) MOOD ADJECTIVE CHECKLIST 
SACL STRESS AROUSAL CHECKLIST 
EWL EIGENSCHAFTSWOERTLISTE 
SUDS SUBJECTIVE UNITS OF DISTRESS 
(F)MRI (FUNCTIONAL) MAGNETIC ESONANCE IMAGING 
 






Since the introduction of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) as non-invasive tools for examining motor cortex 
functioning, the application of neurostimulation has substantially increased over the 
last several decades. Multiple sessions of neurostimulation are frequently used in the 
treatment of psychiatric disorders such as depression (e.g., Burt et al., 2002; Mitchell & 
Loo, 2006; O’Reardon et al., 2007; Boggio et al., 2008; George et al., 2010). These 
techniques are also used to investigate neural conductions and connections in the 
human brain, and are of considerable interest for researchers interested in 
understanding the basic neurophysiology of mood in healthy participants (Paus et al., 
2001; Pascual-Leone et al., 2002). Non-invasive neurostimulation techniques have also 
been used to investigate specific cognitive functions of the prefrontal cortex in healthy 
participants. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) plays an important role in the neuronal 
networks involved in emotion processing (which is lateralized in the PFC) and mood 
regulation (Nitsche et al., 2012). Given that prefrontal regions have been associated 
extensively with cognitive and emotional regulatory processes (Cerqueira et al., 2008; 
Damasio, 2000; Davidson et al., 2002), it is crucial to know whether the reported effects 
of neurostimulation cannot be attributed to mood changes. Therefore, in this review, 
we offer a systematic overview of studies reporting the effects of a single session of 
repetitive TMS and tDCS on self-reported mood in healthy participants (for a more 
elaborate review on the techniques, mechanisms of action, and safety of TMS and tDCS, 
see George & Aston-Jones, 2010).  
TMS involves delivering a brief magnetic pulse to the scalp through a coil. The 
magnetic field penetrates the brain and induces an electric field in the underlying 
region of the cerebral cortex (Barker et al., 1985). An electrical field of sufficient 
intensity will depolarize cortical neurons generating action potentials and can either 
activate or suppress motor, sensory, or cognitive functions, depending on the brain 
location and parameters of its delivery (George & Belmaker, 2007). Several studies have 
shown that rTMS is a safe technique when recommended guidelines are followed (Rossi 





minutes (e.g., Tsuji & Rothwell, 2002; Peinemann et al., 2004). Importantly, it has been 
suggested that activation of the left DLPFC or deactivation of the right DLPFC might 
have a positive impact on mood and emotion in clinically depressed individuals 
(Mitchell & Loo, 2006). Indeed, rTMS has been shown to alter aspects of cortical 
excitability and cortical inhibition (Chen & Seitz, 2001). Low-frequency (LF)-rTMS (≤ 1 
Hz) is considered to ‘inhibit’ cortical regional activity, while high-frequency (HF)-rTMS (≥ 
1 Hz) ‘activates’ cortical areas (Chen et al., 1997; Maeda, Keenan, Tormos, Topka, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000a). It should be acknowledged that there is  inter-individual 
variability in these inhibitory/excitatory effects. Although, most research on inter-
individual variability has focused on the motor cortex  (e.g., Maeda, Keenan, Tormos, 
Topka, & Pascual-Leone, 2000b). Future research should expand their focus on other 
stimulation target sites. Early research in this area found that HF-rTMS applied to the 
left prefrontal cortex had a negative effect on mood in healthy volunteers (George et 
al., 1996; Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997). However, these studies were 
often characterized by small sample sizes while the effects obtained were limited and 
inconsistent, and perhaps most importantly, not sham-controlled. The presence of a 
sham (placebo) condition is used to try and ensure that changes in performance can be 
ascribed to TMS effects upon a specific brain area (for a more in depth discussion on 
the different sham conditions used in neurostimulation research, see Sandrini, Umilta, 
& Rusconi, 2011). Therefore, a more comprehensive overview is needed to establish 
whether a single session of rTMS affects mood in healthy participants. 
In recent years another neuromodulation tool (transcranial Direct Current 
Stimulation; tDCS), has received increased interest. tDCS is the application of a weak 
electrical direct current that flows between two electrodes (i.e. patches placed on the 
scalp). The current enters the brain from the anode, travels through the brain tissue 
towards the cathode, which has the ability to modulate spontaneous firing rates of the 
cortical neurons by depolarizing or hyperpolarizing the neural resting membrane 
potential. Anodal tDCS enhances while cathodal tDCS reduces cortical excitability 
(Priori, 2003; Nitsche et al., 2009). Research has shown that 10 minutes of stimulation 
can produce neural and behavioral effects that last for up to 40 minutes (Lang et al., 
2004). Furthermore, tDCS modulates excitability in the motor, visual, and prefrontal 
cortex and differs from other noninvasive brain stimulation techniques such as TMS, 




since it does not induce neuronal firing by suprathreshold neuronal membrane 
depolarization, but rather modulates spontaneous neuronal network activity (Nitsche et 
al., 2008; Priori et al., 2009). Hence, the term Neuromodulation is often used. For the 
readability of this paper and given its common use in the literature we will refer to 
Neurostimulation for both techniques. The effects of tDCS depend on the polarity of the 
electric current such that anodal stimulation increases brain activity and excitability 
while cathodal stimulation reduces it. Although tDCS electrical fields are relatively non-
focal, electrode positioning is critical. TDCS studies usually use one anode and one 
cathode electrode placed over the scalp to modulate a particular area of the central 
nervous system. However, a reference electrode is sometimes positioned on the 
shoulder, arm or leg. Electrode positioning is usually determined according to the 
International EEG 10-20 System (for a review of tDCS studies exploring different brain 
areas see Utz et al. 2010). In this review, several terms used to describe tDCS 
placements of the electrodes (i.e., “montages”) need to be discussed: next to the active 
electrode (which can be anodal or cathodal depending on the study question), 
researchers in the field also use the terms ‘‘reference’’ electrode to refer to the 
‘‘neutral’’ electrode. However, the term ‘‘reference’’ electrode may also be 
problematic, because the ‘‘reference’’ electrode is not physiologically inert and can 
contribute to activity modulation as well. This could be a potential confound depending 
on the research question under investigation. Nonetheless, researchers use the above 
terms to highlight that they are operating based on the assumption that one electrode 
is being explored as the “stimulating” whereas the other is the “reference” (for a 
detailed discussion on the parameters of stimulation see Brunoni et al., 2012). The most 
applied montage of the electrodes used in research on depression is bilateral 
stimulation at frontolateral locations [F3 and F4 of the international EEG 10/20 system 
(Jasper, 1958)]. In anodal stimulation of the left prefrontal cortex, the anode placed 
over F3 (left prefrontal) and the cathode/anode over F4 (right prefrontal). This montage 
is often referred to as bifrontal tDCS or bilateral tDCS. However, this terminology is not 
always used consistently in the neurostimulation literature. Bifrontal refers to the 
positioning of two anodal electrodes on frontal regions (F3 & F4) and two cathode 
electrodes over the left and right mastoids, while bilateral refers to “anode and cathode 





in detail the specific montages used in tDCS studies (for an overview on electrode 
placements and subsequent effects see Nitsche et al., 2008). TDCS is a safe method in 
humans as shown by neuro-psychological testing (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005; Fregni et al., 
2006), electroencephalogram assessment (e.g., Iyer et al., 2005), neuroimaging studies 
(e.g., Nitsche et al., 2004) and brain metabolites evaluation (e.g. Nitsche & Paulus, 
2001) (for a more elaborate review on the techniques, mechanisms of action, and 
safety, see George & Aston-Jones, 2010; or a state of the art overview, see Nitsche et 
al., 2008). 
Importantly, although rTMS and tDCS are subject to different mechanisms of 
action – rTMS induces brief pulses of electric current of a relatively high intensity, 
whereas tDCS induces a continuous electric current of low intensity – stimulation of the 
PFC with rTMS and tDCS has been shown to produce similar effects in different neural 
circuitries (Fregni et al., 2008a), neurotransmitter systems (Keck et al., 2002; Nitsche et 
al., 2006; Strafella et al., 2001), and the treatment of psychiatric diseases (for a review 
see Miniussi et al., 2008; George et al., 2009; and George & Aston-Jones, 2010). 
However, in patient populations these treatment studies are based on multiple rTMS or 
tDCS sessions. Nonetheless, investigating the effects of a single session of rTMS and 
tDCS in experimental research holds important implications. Given that effects on 
cognition (e.g. information processing) within a study could be (partly) explained by 
changes in mood it is crucial to scrutinize possible effects of neurostimulation on mood. 
Since an abundance of research has shown the impact of mood on cognition (e.g., 
Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013), knowledge on  
the effect of neurostimulation on mood is crucial for understanding the effects on 
cognition in rTMS and tDCS research in healthy participants. Nevertheless, until now no 
unequivocal answer has been offered on this matter and the last review on this topic 
was conducted over 15 years ago (Mosimann, Rihs, Engeler, Fisch, & Schlaepfer, 2000). 
Based on the growing interest in and publication of rTMS and tDCS research (in healthy 
participants) over the last decade, an updated review on this topic seems warranted. 
Therefore, the aim of the present review is to provide a systematic overview of both 
rTMS and tDCS studies assessing the impact of one non-invasive stimulation session 
over the PFC on subjective self-reported mood of healthy participants. Moreover, we 
outline all possible stimulation sites and sides (left versus right (DL)PFC), as well as the 




frequency (HF vs LF), electrode placement, stimulation parameters, and mood 
measurement. Finally, it is important to note that the aim of this review is to not only 
focuse on studies which emphasize the possible impact of neurostimulation on mood as 
a primary hypothesis, but to also examine studies which reported mood effects as 
secondary to the main research question. Consequently, we can incorporate more 
easily null-findings, which otherwise might not have been published, to give a more 




Articles for inclusion were identified by conducting a systematic literature search 
in the databases PubMed and Web of Science in the period between January 1955 and 
December 2014. The search criteria were ‘transcranial’, ‘prefrontal’, and ‘healthy’. 
Based on this combination of terms we identified 627 hits. After careful consideration 
(title and abstract), we focused on studies with one session of stimulation targeting the 
prefrontal cortex, healthy participants, including all parameters and outcome 
measurements, which led to around 125 studies that appeared suitable. Review papers 
on topics related to neurostimulation and the references in the described studies were 
used for a renewed search for further inclusion in our systematic review. This led to 
further inclusions of 15 studies bringing the total to 140. We then refined (full text) this 
list further by only including studies that focused on the PFC as stimulation site, healthy 
participants, and that provided a clear description of all parameters and mood 
measurements. This resulted in the exclusion of 106 studies. The majority of these 
studies were excluded because of their different focus and their inadequate description 
of the mood measurements. Although we initially opted to only include studies which 
were sham-controlled, a review of all studies revealed that some of these non-sham-
controlled studies were relevant to this particular question of mood effects in the past 
(e.g., George et al., 1996; Pascual-Leone et al., 1996). Of the 9 studies that are not 
sham-controlled, 4 of them showed mood effects after neurostimulation (Pascual-
Leone et al., 1996; George et al., 1996; Padberg et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2004). 





neurophysiology of mood generation and modulation, they have been frequently 
referenced and cited as evidence of possible effects. Therefore, we chose to also 
include non-sham-controlled studies in this review, even though sham-control is 
particularly important in rTMS/tDCS studies to control for the marked non-specific 
effects of the procedure, such as discomfort and noise. Furthermore, one study (Nedjat, 
Folkerts, Michael & Arolt, 1998) that has frequently been cited in many rTMS studies on 
mood in healthy participants is based on an abstract published in 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology (after 1999 known as Clinical 
Neurophysiology). After contact with one of the authors, it appeared the study was 
never published in full, however, the reference (of the abstract) was cited for the first 
time in the review of Mosimann, et al. (2000). Since then, Nedjat et al. (1998) has been 
frequently cited, but fails to address the stimulation parameters, sex of the participants 
and clear description of the experiment. Therefore, we chose to exclude this study. 
Finally, we took into account that some publications might (partially) use the same 
sample to test different hypotheses based on the identical authors and dates. Hence, 
we contacted all authors that might meet these criteria and excluded one study that 
used a sample which included participants who overlapped with another study (both 
studies tested different hypotheses but the absence of mood effects were reported in 
both). In conclusion, all studies (n = 30) fulfilling our predefined selection criteria were 
taken into account and evaluated according to their possible impact on mood. The 
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Description of the studies 
The identified publications consisted of 30 studies, of which 13 were tDCS and 
17 were rTMS studies. The studies comprise 16 papers which focused on mood effects 
of prefrontal non-invasive stimulation as a primary hypothesis, while in the other 14 
studies mood changes were measured as a secondary outcome. Of these latter 14, two 
studies investigated the effect of HF-rTMS on sleep: Cohrs et al (1998) and Marshall et 
al. (2004). In two other studies, Fregni et al. (2008a; 2008b) looked into the effect of 
modulation of the prefrontal cortex with tDCS on food and smoking craving. In Iyer et 
al. (2004), the authors studied safety and cognitive effects of frontal tDCS. Brunoni and 
colleagues (2013) investigated polarity and valence dependent effect of tDCS on heart 
rate variability and salivary cortisol. Related to this, Baeken et al. (2014) looked at the 
effect of rTMS on the HPA-sensitivity after critical feedback. Vanderhasselt et al. (2013) 
and McIntire et al. (2014) studied cognitive effects of tDCS. The 5 other studies 
investigated the effects of prefrontal cortex stimulation on different emotional 
processing hypotheses, that is, on selective attention to threat (d'Alfonso et al., 2000), 
baseline state anxiety sensitivity (Baeken et al., 2011a), approach and withdrawal 
related emotional neuronal processes (Baeken et al., 2011b), negative emotional 
processing (Peña-Gómez et al., 2011), emotional state and processing (Nitsche et al., 
2012). The characteristics of the included participants, stimulation protocols, mood 
ratings and outcomes of all identified studies assessing the influence of 
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NIMH 





Dearing et al. 
(1997) 
9 (4F) YES 
(45°/90° 
RPFC) 
rTMS L + R PFC 20 Hz (HF) 2s 58s 800 80% VAS * rTMS over L 
PFC decreases 
Happiness 
Cohrs et al. 
(1998) 
12 (M) YES (90° 
Vertex) 




20 Hz (HF) 0.25s 8s 800 120% VAS * No modulation 
effect of HF 
rTMS over L + 








10 (F) NO rTMS L + R PFC 0.6 Hz (LF) * * * 130% POMS * No modulation 
effect LF rTMS 




25 (M) YES (90° 
LPFC) 
rTMS Left PFC 20 Hz (HF) 2s 30s 1600 100% VAS * No modulation 
effect of HF 
rTMS over L 
PFC on mood 
Habel et al. 
(2001) 
18 (9F) YES (?) Single pulse 
TMS 
L + R Frontal 
Cortex 
0.5 Hz (LF) * * 60 130% PANAS * No modulation 
effect of LF 
TMS over L + R 
FC on mood 
Padberg et al. 
(2001) 
9 (4F) NO rTMS L + R DLPFC 10 Hz (HF) 5s >30s 500 110% VAS YES Mood 
decreased for 
both L + R 
DLPFC 
Grisaru et al. 
(2001) 
18 (11F) YES rTMS L + R PFC 1 Hz (LF) * * 500 110% VAS * No modulation 
effect LF rTMS 
over L + R PFC 





Jenkins et al. 
(2002) 






YES No modulation 
effect LF rTMS 
over L + R PFC 
on mood 




(F) & 1 
Hz group 
5 (F) 
NO rTMS L + R DLPFC 10 Hz (HF) & 
1 Hz (LF) 




YES 10 Hz rTMS 
over L DLPFC 
decreased 
affect & vitality 
Baeken et al. 
(2006) 





effect HF rTMS 






Baeken et al. 
(2008) 
L: 20 (F) 
R: 27 (F) 
YES rTMS L + R DLPFC 10 Hz (HF) 3.9s 26.1s 1560 110% VAS / 
POMS / 
PANAS 
YES No modulation 
effect HF rTMS 
over L + R 
DLPFC on 
mood 
Hoy et al. 
(2010) 
10 (6F) YES rTMS L DLPFC 5 Hz (HF) 10s 20s 900 120% VAS YES No modulation 
effect HF rTMS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood after 
affective 
priming 
Baeken et al. 
(2011) 
24 (F) YES rTMS R DLPFC 10 Hz (HF) 3.9s 26.1s 1560 110% POMS YES No modulation 
effect HF rTMS 
over R DLPFC 
on mood 
Baeken et al. 
(2011) 
20 (F) YES rTMS L DLPFC 10 Hz (HF) 3.9s 26.1s 1560 110% POMS YES No modulation 
effect HF rTMS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 




Baeken et al. 
(2014) 
30 (F) YES rTMS L DLPFC 20 Hz (HF) 1.9s 12.1s 1560 110% VAS * No modulation 
effect HF rTMS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 
Marshall et al. 
(2004) 






















YES tDCS L PFC 1mA & 2mA 20min During exp 




VAS * No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over LPFC on 
mood 
Fregni et al. 
(2008a) 
24 (11F) YES tDCS Bilateral (L + 
R PFC) 




VAS YES No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over Bifrontal 





Fregni et al. 
(2008b) 
23 (21F) YES tDCS Bilateral (L + 
R PFC) 
2 mA 20min NO task during 
tDCS 




VAS * No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over Bifrontal 
areas on mood 
Koenings et al. 
(2009) 
















areas on mood 
Tadini et al. 
(2011) 




VAS * No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 
Peña-Gómez 
et al. (2011) 









YES No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 









YES tDCS L DLPFC 1 mA 20 min 
& 10 
min 
NO task during 
tDCS in exp1 A 
face 
recognition 




VAS /  * No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 
Plazier et al. 
(2012) 
17 (M) YES tDCS Bilateral (L + 
R DLPFC) &  
Bioccipital (L 
+ R occipital 
area) 














over Bifrontal + 
Bioccipital 
areas on mood 
Brunoni et al. 
(2013) 
20 (17F) YES tDCS Bilateral (L + 
R DLPFC)  
 







VAS * No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over Bifrontal 
areas on mood 
Vanderhasselt 
et al. (2013) 




PANAS * No modulation 
effect tDCS 






Morgan et al. 
(2014) 
18 (9F) NO tDCS Bilateral (L + 
R DLPFC) 






with an area of 
9 cm² 
PANAS YES Negative affect 
decreased 
after tDCS (due 
to “nervous” 
item) 
McIntire et al. 
(2014) 
30 (8F) YES tDCS L DLPFC 2 mA 30min NO task during 
tDCS 







* No modulation 
effect tDCS 
over L DLPFC 
on mood 
Notes.* not reported 
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Mood effects of non-invasive stimulation of the prefrontal cortex  
In our review search only 6 studies reported changes in mood after stimulation, 
suggesting inconsistent results. Among these studies there are 5 rTMS and 1 tDCS 
studies. In their pilot study on the effects of HF- rTMS of the PFC on mood in 10 healthy 
volunteers, Pascual-Leone and colleagues (1996) found a significant increase in self-
ratings of sadness and a significant decrease in self-ratings of happiness immediately 
after rTMS of the left DLPFC, as compared with right prefrontal and midfrontal 
stimulation. That same year George et al. (1996) investigated possible mood effects 
after HF-rTMS of the PFC in 10 healthy participants. Based on the comparison of five 
stimulation sites (left DLPFC, right DLPFC, midfrontal cortex, occipital cortex and 
cerebellum), results showed that the comparison of left and right DLPFC stimulation 
revealed significant differences between the hemispheres, with decreased happiness 
after left and decreased sadness after right prefrontal rTMS. However, both Pascual-
Leone et al. and George et al. studies were not sham-controlled. One year later in the 
study of Dearing et al. (1997), a significant decrease of happiness and a non-significant 
increase of sadness was found after left compared with right prefrontal HF-rTMS in 9 
healthy participants. However, these findings are based on comparison between left 
versus right side stimulation and not active versus sham stimulation. In Padberg et al. 
(2001) mood scores worsened for both left side as right side PFC stimulation and no 
significant differences were detected between left and right prefrontal HF-rTMS in 9 
healthy participants. Finally, Barrett et al. (2004) found in a small sample of 10 female 
volunteers, a decreased negative affect after one session of active HF-rTMS applied 
over the left mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, again no sham condition was 
included in the studies of Padberg et al. (2001) or Barrett et al. (2004). 
The only study that found significant results of the effect of tDCS of the PFC on 
mood effects in healthy participants is Marshall et al. (2004). In this study the authors 
investigated in 30 healthy participants the effects of bifrontal anodal tDCS (electrodes 
were applied bilaterally at frontolateral locations (F3 and F4 of the international EEG 
10/20 system) during a period of sleep, in order to look at the possible effects on 
declarative memory. Results showed signs of improved mood after tDCS in both the 
sleep as in the wake experiments. Importantly however, this result was never replicated 





Helgadóttir, Mölle, Born, 2006). In sum, of the 6 studies that found changes in mood, 5 
of them found worsened mood after HF-rTMS over the left PFC (Pascual-Leone et al., 
1996; George et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 
2004), while Marshall et al. (2004) found an improvement in mood after bifrontal tDCS.  
 
Overall effects of stimulation type on mood  
 Sample Size and Gender 
The sample sizes in all studies varied greatly (for a detailed overview see Table 
2). Small samples (≤12) were used in eight studies, medium samples (>12 & < 30) in 15 
studies, and 7 studies used larger samples (≥30). Looking at the studies that recorded a 
significant effect of stimulation on mood (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; George et al., 
1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 
2004), all except Marshall et al. used small sample sizes, more specifically, 10 or 9 
participants in total. Marshall et al. used a sample of 30 healthy participants. 
Given the gender division in all of these studies, we can conclude that 12 studies 
used a homogenous sample. Of these 12 studies, four used an all-male (Cohrs et al., 
1998; Mosimann et al., 2000; Marshall et al., 2004; Plazier et al., 2012) and eight an all-
female sample (D’Alfonso et al., 2000; Barrett et al., 2004; Baeken et al., 2006; Baeken 
et al., 2008; Baeken et al., 2011a; Baeken et al., 2011b; Peña-Gómez et al., 2011; 
Baeken et al., 2014). In the other 18 studies a more heterogeneous sample was used 
(see Table 2). Looking at the studies that reported a mood effect, four out of six used a 
mixed sample (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996, 6M/4F; George et al., 1996, 6M/4F; Dearing 
et al., 1997, 5M/4F; Padberg et al., 2001, 5M/4F) while Barrett et al. (2004) and 
Marshall et al. (2004) used an all-female (10) and all-male (30) sample respectively. No 












Table 3. Conditions, localization and stimulation timing 









Pascual-Leone et al. 
(1996) 
 
- R PFC (2X) 
- L PFC (2X) 















Mood effect of Left 
vs Right / Midfrontal 
George et al. (1996) - L PFC 













Mood effect of Left 
vs Right PFC 
Dearing et al. (1997) - L PFC 
- R PFC 
- Sham R PFC 
(45°) 






Mood effect Left vs 
Right PFC 
Cohrs et al. (1998) - L PFC 
- R PFC 
- L Inferior 
Parietal 












No mood effects 





D’Alfonso et al. 
(2000) 
- L PFC 
- R PFC 




No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Mosimann et al. 
(2000) 
- L PFC 
- sham (90°) 





No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Habel et al. (2001) - R FC (F7) 
or 
- L FC (F8) 
or 











No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Padberg et al. (2001) - L DLPFC 
- R DLPFC 






Mood effect pre vs 
post for both L and 
R DLPFC (no 
significant 
difference between 
L and R) 
Grisaru et al. (2001) - L PFC 
- R PFC 
- sham L PFC 
- sham R PFC 
5cm rule 4 days (?) Crossover 
design: Random 
No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Jenkins et al. (2002) - L PFC 
- R PFC 




No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Barrett et al. (2004) - L MDLFC 
(DLPFC) 
- R MDLFC 
(DLPFC) 





Mood effect L 
MDLFC pre-post vs R 
MDLFC 




Baeken et al. (2006) - L DLPFC 









No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Baeken et al. (2008) - L DLPFC 
- R DLPFC 









No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 











No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 










No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 










No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 









No mood effects 
(although increase 
of negative mood in 
both conditions, no 
difference active vs 
sham) 
Marshall et al. 
(2004) 
- Anode L DLPFC 
(F3) & R DLPFC 
(F4) / cathode L 






2 days (7 days 
apart) 
Crossover design Mood effect pre vs 






Iyer et al. (2004) - Anodal L DLPFC 
(F3) / cathode R 
Supraorbital 
- Cathodal L 















No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Fregni et al. (2008a) - Anodal L DLPFC 
/ cathode R 
DLPFC 
- Cathodal L 












No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Fregni et al. (2008b) - Anodal L DLPFC 
/ cathode R 
DLPFC 
- Cathodal L 












No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Koenings et al. 
(2009) 
- Anodal L 
Orbitofrontal 
(Fp1) / cathode R  
Orbitofrontal  
(Fp2) / reference 
electrode non-
dominant arm 
- Cathodal  L  
Orbitofrontal  
(Fp1) / anode R  
Orbitofrontal  









Crossover design No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 








- Cathodal  L 


















No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Peña-Gómez et al. 
(2011) 
- Anodal L DLPFC 











No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Nitsche et al. (2012) - Anodal L DLPFC 
(F3) / cathode 
contralateral 
orbit 
- Cathodal  L 













No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Plazier et al. (2012) - Andodal L 
DLPFC / cathode 
R DLPFC 
- Cathodal L 









No mood effects 












Brunoni et al. (2013) - Andodal L 
DLPFC / cathode 
R DLPFC 
- Cathodal L 













No mood effects 
(active vs sham) 
Vanderhasselt et al. 
(2013) 













No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
Morgan et al. (2014) - Andodal L 
DLPFC / cathode 
R DLPFC 
- Cathodal L 











No mood effects 
(pre vs post & active 
vs sham) 
McIntire et al. 
(2014) 
- Anodal L DLPFC 
/ cathode 
contralateral 
biceps + placebo 
coffee 
- sham + coffee 













No mood effects 
(active vs sham) 




Conditions and Stimulation timing 
In Table 3 we provide an overview of all conditions, stimulation days and order, 
as well as the comparison of mood effects (e.g., left versus right PFC; or pre- versus 
post-stimulation). Looking at the conditions of the 6 studies that reported mood effects 
several conclusions can be drawn. First, only two studies were sham-controlled 
(Dearing et al., 1997; Marshall et al., 2004), but only in Marshall et al. the mood effects 
are based on a comparison of pre-post mood comparison for active tDCS versus sham 
tDCS. Although the study of Dearing and colleagues is sham-controlled, their mood 
effects are only based on left compared to right PFC stimulation, and not active versus 
sham. Second, although all 6 studies compare left versus right PFC stimulation, the 
location of the exact stimulation sites differ. In four studies (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; 
George et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001) the left and right PFC was 
targeted and located 5 cm anterior and in a parasagittal plane from the abductor 
pollicis brevis (APB) site. However in Barrett et al. (2004) the left and right mid-
dorsolateral frontal cortex were targeted (importantly, according to Barrett et al. the 
MDLPFC refers to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). Marshall and colleagues are the 
first to use the international EEG 10/20 system that is F3 and F4. It is interesting to see 
that although all 6 studies target the same areas, opposite mood effects are found. In 
the rTMS-studies (where left versus right PFC stimulation is compared) a decrease in 
positive mood is reported after left versus right PFC. However, in Marshall et al. an 
increase in positive mood is found after anodal tDCS over left DLPFC, yet, this is based 
on comparison between active versus sham tDCS. The effects in the rTMS studies 
cannot be compared to a possible sham group, and therefore should be viewed in this 
light. With regard to Marshall et al., it is important to reiterate that this result was not 
replicated in subsequent work by the authors (Kirov, Weiss, Siebner, Born, & Marshall, 
2009; Marshall, Helgadóttir, Mölle, Born, 2006). Several other tDCS studies in this 
review used the same stimulation sites (Fregni et al., 2008a; 2008b; Plazier et al., 2012; 
Brunoni et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2014) and did not find any mood effect. Third, when 
looking at the stimulation days, three studies (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 
1997; Padberg et al., 2001) stimulated all different conditions on one day, with 20 to 30 
min in between stimulation sessions. As such, possible carry-over effects may have 







Most of the studies (18) used visual analog scales (VAS; McCormack et al., 1988) 
to measure mood changes. Five of these studies combined a VAS with another 
questionnaire, (George et al. (1996) also used a Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson & Clark, 1988) and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
mood scale); Baeken et al. (2006) and McIntire et al. (2014) both used the VAS and the 
Profile of Mood States (POMS; Shacham, 1983); Baeken et al. (2008) and McIntire et al. 
(2014) used the VAS, POMS, and PANAS; Peña-Gomez et al. (2011) used a VAS and 
PANAS. The remaining studies (12) all used different questionnaires, either the PANAS 
(Watson & Clark, 1988), the UWIST Mood Adjective Checklist (UMACL) (Matthews, 
Jones & Chamberlain, 1990), the SAI (measure of stress and arousal) (MacKay, Cox, 
Burrows, & Lazzerini, 1978), the Befindlichkeitsskala (von Zerssen, Strian, & Schwarz, 
1974), the Affect Questionnaire (in Barrett et al., 2004), the Vitality Scale (Ryan & 
Frederick, 1997), the Eigenschaftswoertliste (EWL, in Marshall et al., 2004), and finally 
the Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS, in Plazier et al., 2012) (for an overview see Table 
2). Of the six studies who found mood effects, three studies (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; 
Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001) found significant mood changes on a VAS by 
comparing left versus right PFC stimulation. In Dearing et al. (1997) a significant 
decrease in happiness and a non-significant increase in sadness were found after left 
compared with right prefrontal HF-rTMS. In Padberg et al. (2001) mood scores 
worsened for both left and right side PFC stimulation, and no significant differences 
were detected between left and right prefrontal HF-rTMS. In George et al. (1996), VAS 
assessed mood changes were not observed, and mood effects were apparent only with 
the modified version of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) mood scale, 
which includes explicit questions about sadness and happiness. George et al. claimed 
the VAS not sensitive to mood change; however, he found significant effects with the 
self-rating scales (NIMH). In Pascual-Leone et al. (1996) the participants did not 
experience a clinically detectable mood change, although their analogue scale ratings 
differed. It is possible, in spite of the results in George et al. (1996) that scales designed 
to detect mood change do not usually capture the discrete changes caused by rTMS. In 
the two studies that found effects but did not use VAS, Barrett et al. (2004) found a 




decreased affect after 10 Hz rTMS over the left DLPFC, measured with the PANAS, and a 
decrease in vitality, measured with the Vitality scale. Marshall et al. (2004) investigated 
the effects of bifrontal anodal tDCS during a period of sleep, in order to look at the 
possible effects on declarative memory. Results measured with a PANAS showed signs 
of improved mood after tDCS in both the sleep as in the wake experiments.  
In sum, in three studies mood changes were found with the VAS (Pascual-Leone 
et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001), while three other studies found 
mood changes using the PANAS (George et al., 1996; Barrett et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 
2004). No systematic differences between the two measures can be found.  
 
Time of mood measurement  
Regardless of what self-reported mood measurement was used, the time of 
administration differed across studies. Therefore a short outline clarifying possible 
differences in task administration seems warranted. In most studies mood 
measurement was administered immediately before (baseline) and after stimulation 
(rTMS/tDCS) sessions, that is, 19 studies applied this parsimonious setup (Pascual-Leone 
et al., 1996; d’Alfonso et al., 2000; Habel et al., 2001; Padberg et al., 2001; Jenkins et al., 
2004; Marshall et al., 2004 Iyer et al., 2004; Baeken et al., 2006; Baeken et al., 2008; 
Koenings et al., 2009; Hoy et al., 2010; Baeken et al., 2011a; Baeken et al., 2011b; Peña-
Gómez et al., 2011; Nitsche et al., 2012; Plazier et al., 2012; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; 
Baeken et al., 2014). Of the other 11 studies, the majority (10) used protocols where 
mood measurements were not immediately administered before and/or after 
stimulation. In George et al. (1996) baseline mood measurement was performed 
between 7:00 and 9:00 A.M., while after stimulation participants reported their 
subjective mood at different rating points (30, 60, 90, and 180 min after stimulation). In 
Mosimann et al. (2000), the baseline VAS was administered just before and only 20min 
after stimulation. Grisaru and colleagues (2001) administered VASs 5min before and 5, 
30 and 240 min after stimulation sessions. In both studies of Fregni et al. (2008a; 
2008b) the procedure was different from previous studies, in that (1) mood evaluations 
were made at baseline, (2) next food (Fregni et al., 2008a) and smoking craving (Fregni 
et al., 2008b) exposure, (3) after which participants were assessed on food/smoking 





finally step 1 again. In Tadini et al. (2012) both between baseline mood measurement 
and the start of tDCS, as well as, between the end of tDCS and the post-stimulation 
mood measurement, 15min of EEG recording was performed. In Brunoni et al. (2013) 
two mood measurements with the VAS were administered, however, only after tDCS 
was started, hence, no pre-post measurement was made, and the null-findings are thus 
based on comparing active vs. sham stimulation. In Morgan et al. (2014), the PANAS 
was used before and after stimulation, but between the measurement of mood and the 
stimulation session, participants received an encoding phase (pre-stimulation) and a 
retrieval phase (post-stimulation) for the memory task. Finally, McIntire et al. (2014) 
administered the VAS several times during the testing phase (two hours separated), and 
only before the last measurement participants receive their experimental treatment. 
With regard to the remaining two studies a different approach was adopted. In 
the study of Dearing et al. (1998) only one post measurement of mood with a VAS was 
registered. As such, the inference that rTMS over the LPFC decreases happiness is based 
on the comparison between mood registrations of the L versus R PFC stimulation. 
Therefore, conclusions of mood effects in this study should take this aberrant 
measurement into account. Similar setups can be found in Cohrs et al. (1998), where a 
VAS was only registered immediately after stimulation of the different target locations 
(L PFC; R PFC; right inferior parietal; left inferior parietal; midoccipital), and possible 
mood effects were calculated by comparing the VAS after an active stimulation session 
with a VAS of the sham (vertex) stimulation session. However, in this study no mood 
effects could be registered. Furthermore, it seems important to note that in Habel et al. 
(2001) a learned helplessness task preceded the mood measurement before and after 
single pulse TMS. The authors report that a negative mood change was induced (based 
on the comparison of mood measurement before and after the learned helplessness), 
however, no variations in mood were found prior to and following TMS treatment.  
To summarize, in the six studies that found mood effects, four studies used an 
immediate pre-post measurement of mood (Pascual-Leone, et al. 1996; Padberg et al., 
2001; Barrett et al., 2004; Marshall et al., 2004), while in George et al. (1996) there was 
more time between mood measurements (baseline and 30, 60, 90, and 180 min after 
stimulation). Finally, in Dearing et al. (1997) only one mood measurement was used. 
However, no clear differential explanation related to the timing of mood measurement 




can be given that would explain these results. To specifically understand and describe 
the relevant parameters of the two neurostimulation techniques, we discuss them 




Apart from the previous excluded studies (Schaller et al., 2012; Motohashi et al., 
2013; Gaudeau-Bosma et al., 2013) all studies used single session stimulation (for a full 
overview of the stimulation parameters see Table 2). For the frequencies, 5 studies 
used low frequencies ranging between  0.5 Hz and 1 Hz (d’Alfonso et al., 2000; Habel et 
al., 2001; Grisaru et al., 2001; Jenkins et al., 2002; Barrett et al., 2004), and 13 studies 
used high frequencies ranging between 5 Hz and 20 Hz (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; 
George et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Cohrs et al., 1998; Mosimann et al., 2000; 
Padberg et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2004; Baeken et al., 2006; Baeken et al., 2008; Hoy 
et al., 2010; Baeken et al., 2011a; 2011b; 2014). With regard to the motor threshold, 
the percentage applied ranged between 80% and 130%. Further, there is a notable 
difference between intertrain intervals used, ranging from 0.25s over 5-10s up to about 
60s. Furthermore, with regard to studies using Low-Frequency (5), ranging from 0.5 Hz 
– 1 Hz, there were no registered mood changes (d’Alfonso et al., 2000; Habel et al., 
2001; Grisaru et al., 2001; Jenkins et al., 2002; Barrett et al., 2004, which used both HF 
and LF).  
To conclude, in consideration of all rTMS-studies which reported significant 
mood outcomes (5), the studies were all HF-studies, but varied in the frequencies used, 
that is, 5 Hz (George et al., 1996), 10 Hz (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; Padberg et al., 
2001; Barrett et al., 2004) and 20Hz (Dearing et al., 1997). Based on these same 
frequencies (5-20 Hz) 7 studies did not report any significant changes in mood (Cohrs et 
al., 1998; Mosimann et al., 2000; Baeken et al., 2006; Baeken et al., 2008; Hoy et al., 
2010; Baeken et al., 2011a; Baeken et al., 2011b) (for a detailed overview see Table 2). 
 
Localization of the stimulation site 
The localization of the stimulation site is crucial to the montage of the rTMS 





To summarize, in 9 studies the localization parameters were based on the 5cm rule in 
combination with the motor cortex site (i.e., motor threshold of the APB and ADM). In 3 
studies localization was based on 10/20 international system for EEG. Finally, in 5 
studies (Baeken et al., 2006; 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) the position of the coil was 
anatomically determined using MRI non-stereotactic guidance. Taking into account all 
TMS studies which reported significant mood changes, all of them used the 5cm rule in 
combination with the motor cortex site (i.e., motor threshold of the APB and ADM). 
 
Left versus right side stimulation 
Overall, 5 studies targeted only the left PFC (Mosimann et al., 2000; Baeken et 
al., 2006; Hoy et al., 2010; Baeken et al., 2011b; 2014), one study focused only on the 
right DLPFC (Baeken et al., 2011a), while 11 studies targeted both left and right (DL)PFC. 
As mentioned before of the 5 TMS studies that found changes in mood, 5 of them 
found a decrease in mood after HF-rTMS over the left PFC but not in right PFC (Pascual-
Leone et al., 1996; George et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 1997; Padberg et al., 2001; 
Barrett et al., 2004). No significant results were found targeting the right PFC. 
 
tDCS 
Stimulation parameters & localization of electrodes 
Of all tDCS studies (13), six stimulated bilateral (F3 and F4) (Fregni et al., 2008a; 
Fregni et al., 2008b; Koenings et al., 2009; Plazier et al., 2012; Brunoni et al., 2013; 
Morgan et al., 2014) with Koenings et al. (2009) using Fp1 and Fp2 for the active 
electrodes. Marshall et al., (2004) used a bifrontal stimulation setup. Six studies 
targeted only the left (DL)PFC (Iyer et al., 2004; Tadini et al., 2011; Peña-Gómez et al., 
2011; Nitsche et al., 2012; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; McIntire et al., 2014) (for an 
overview of all stimulation parameters (including electrode sizes) see Table 2; for all 
conditions and localization details see Table 3). Marshall et al. (2004) used electrodes of 
35 cm² and applied bilateral stimulation at frontolateral locations [F3 and F4 of the 
international EEG 10/20 system and at the mastoids for the reference electrodes]. 
Anodal tDCS (i.e., positive polarity at both frontal sites) was applied intermittently 
(15sec on, 15sec off; current density, 0.26mA/cm²) over a period of 30 min. In the 
placebo control session, the electrodes were applied as in the stimulation sessions, but 




the stimulator remained off. Stimulation was not felt by the subjects. Iyer et al. (2004) 
used electrodes of 25 cm² and applied frontal stimulation over the left prefrontal 
cortex, where the anodal electrode was placed over the left DLPFC (F3) and the cathode 
over the right supraorbital location and vice versa in the other condition. During three 
separate experiments, they stimulated with a current of 1mA (experiments 1 & 2) and 
2mA (exp. 3) with 20min of stimulation. For sham, the electrodes were placed in the 
same locations and the current was delivered for 10sec, so that the participants felt the 
initial itching sensation associated with turning on the device, but received no current 
stimulation for the rest of the stimulation period. Fregni et al. (2008a) used electrodes 
of 35 cm². Three different types of setup were applied; (1) anodal left DLPFC (F3) and 
cathodal right DLPFC (F4) ; (2) ) anodal right DLPFC (F4) and cathodal left DLPFC (F3) (3) 
sham stimulation of DLPFC, with the electrodes placed at the same positions as in active 
stimulation, but the stimulator turned off after 30sec of stimulation. Therefore, the 
participants felt the initial itching sensation associated with turning on the device, but 
received no current stimulation for the rest of the stimulation period. Research shows 
that this sham condition is a reliable blinding procedure (e.g. Gandiga, Hummel, & 
Cohen, 2006). A constant current of 2 mA intensity was applied for 20min. In Fregni et 
al. (2008b) the same setup was used as in Fregni et al. (2008a), with the only difference 
that for the cathode electrodes (for the anode electrode, the 35 cm² where used) a 
100cm² electrode was used. This electrode montage was set to perform a functional 
monopolar anodal stimulation of the DLPFC without relevant shifting excitability of the 
contralateral DLPFC by the cathodal, reference electrode (Fregni et al., 2008b found 
that this large electrode induces fewer effects on cortical activity, M.A.N., unpublished 
data, 2005). Also here a constant current of 2 mA intensity was applied for 20min. 
Koenings et al. (2009) used electrodes of 25 cm². Participants underwent three sessions 
of tDCS (one anodal, one cathodal, and one sham). The two active electrodes were 
placed at positions Fp1 and Fp2 of the 10/20 International system. The reference 
electrode was placed on the non-dominant arm. For sham stimulation, the electrodes 
were placed at the same positions as for active stimulation, but stimulation was turned 
on for only 30sec. In Tadini et al. (2011) 35 cm² electrodes were used. Electrodes were 
held in place with an EEG cap, and were placed on the F3 DLPFC or on the contralateral 





according to the experiment number. That is, in experiment 1, the anode electrode was 
placed on the left DLPFC and the cathode on the contralateral supraorbital area. tDCS 
was delivered in 3 trains of 10 minutes (with a 15min interval between each train when 
EEG was recorded). The intensity of stimulation was 1 mA (trains 1 and 3) and 2 mA 
(train 2). For Experiment 2 the electrodes were switched, while the other parameters 
were the same as Experiment 1. In Experiment 3 intermittent anodal DC stimulation 
was used, with a frequency of 1 Hz (current was ‘ON’ for 0.5sec and ‘OFF’ for 0.5sec), 
again all other parameters (including intensity) were the same as Experiment 1. For 
sham tDCS, the electrodes were placed at the same positions as for active stimulation 
but stimulation was turned on for only 30sec. Peña-Gómez et al. (2011) used electrodes 
of 35 cm². The anode electrode was positioned on F3 and the cathode electrode was 
positioned over the C4 (right motor cortex) using the 10/20 International system. Active 
tDCS consisted of a constant current of 1mA applied for 20min. For sham tDCS, the 
electrodes were placed at the same positions as for active stimulation but stimulation 
was turned on for only 30sec. Nitsche et al. (2012) used electrodes of 35 cm². In 
Experiment 1, tDCS of 1mA was delivered for 20min, in Experiment2 for 10min. The 
anode electrode was placed over the left DLPFC (F3) and the cathode electrode above 
the contralateral orbit in both experiments. In Experiment 2 the reason of the 10min 
stimulation duration, can be ascribed to the simultaneous use of a facial recognition 
task. Plazier et al. (2012) used electrodes of 35 cm². Participants underwent three 
sessions of bilateral stimulation (cathode left, anode right; cathode right, anode left; 
and sham stimulation) and three sessions of bioccipital stimulation (cathode left, anode 
right, cathode right/anode left, and sham stimulation). For the bilateral stimulation 
sets, the electrodes were positioned over the left and right DLPFC, consistent with F3 
and F4 in the 10/20 International system. For the bioccipital stimulation, the electrodes 
were positioned over the left and right occipital area, 2cm lateral of the inion, 
consistent with O1 and O2 in the 10/20 International system. Finally, for the sham 
condition, the cathode was placed at the left side and the anode at the right side at the 
frontal or occipital area respectively. Active tDCS consisted of a current of 1.5mA for 
20min. Sham stimulation only lasted 10sec before turning off. In Brunoni et al. (2013) 
35 cm² electrodes were used. Participants underwent three sessions of bilateral 
stimulation (cathode left, anode right; cathode right; anode left; and sham stimulation), 




with the electrodes positioned over the left (F3) and right (F4) DLPFC. Active tDCS 
consisted of a current of 1.5mA for 33min. Sham stimulation only lasted 30sec before 
turning off. Vanderhasselt et al. (2013) used 35 cm² electrodes and used a single session 
of anodal tDCS (sham controlled), with the anode over the left DLPFC (F3) and the 
cathode over the contra lateral supraorbital area. A constant current of 2 mA with 
20sec of ramp up was applied for 20min. For sham stimulation the same montage was 
used, however the current was ramped down after 20 sec. In Morgan et al. (2014) 35 
cm² electrodes were used. Participants underwent two sessions of bilateral stimulation 
(cathode left, anode right; cathode right; anode left), with the electrodes positioned 
over the left (F3) and right (F4) DLPFC. tDCS was applied at an intensity of 1 mA for 12 
minutes (with ramp up and down of 12 sec at beginning and end of stimulation). Finally, 
in McIntire et al. (2014) used a custom set of electrodes as described with both the 
anode and cathode consist of a separate array of 5 EEG electrodes (for detailed 
description see McIntire et al., 2014). Thirty participants were randomly assigned into 
the three stimulation sessions: anodal tDCS over the left DLPFC in combination with 
placebo caffeine chewing gum; sham tDCS with caffeine gum; and sham tDCS with 
placebo caffeine gum. For the active tDCS the anode was located at F3 while the 
cathode was placed over the contralateral bicep. tDCS was applied at 2 mA for 30min, 
while in the sham tDCS lasted only 30sec. 
Summing up, stimulation intensity varied from 1 mA (Iyer et al., 2004; Tadini et 
al., 2011; Peña-Gómez et al., 2011; Nitsche et al., 2012; Plazier et al., 2012; Morgan et 
al., 2014) over 1.5 mA (Brunoni et al., 2013) and 2 mA (Iyer et al., 2004; Fregni et al., 
2008a, 2008b; Tadini et al., 2011; Vanderhasselt et al., 2013; McIntire et al., 2014) to 
2.5 mA (Koenings et al., 2009). Nine studies used 35 cm² electrodes (Marshall et al., 
2004; Fregni et al., 2008a; Fregni et al., 2008b; Tadini et al., 2011; Peña-Gómez et al., 
2011; Nitsche et al., 2012; Plazier et al., 2012 ; Brunoni et al., 2013 ; Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013) while Iyer et al. (2004) and Koenings et al. (2009) used 25 cm² electrodes. 
Fregni et al. (2008b) used for the cathode electrodes a 100cm² electrode. Finally, 
Morgan et al. (2014) used circular electrodes with an area of 9 cm² and McIntire et al. 






When looking at the one study which reported a mood effect (Marshall et al., 
2004), some differences from all other studies can be found. While Marshall targeted 
the same areas of the PFC (F3 and F4), the setup was different in that two anodal 
electrodes (one on F3 and one on F4) and two cathode electrodes (over the left and 
right mastoids) were used. Second, this study was the only one to apply intermittent 
stimulation (15sec on, 15sec off) over a period of 30 min. Importantly, however, this 





In the current review 30 studies were included, of which 24 reported no changes 
in mood. Based on our extensive review several points are worth noting. First, there is 
the crucial impact of localization when conducting neurostimulation research. All rTMS 
studies which reported significant mood changes used the 5cm rule in combination with 
the motor cortex site (i.e., motor threshold of the APB and ADM). In early studies this 
rule was used to place the TMS coil roughly over the prefrontal cortex (e.g., George et 
al., 1996; Cohrs et al., 1998; d’Alfonso et al., 2000). However, as the location of the 
motor strip and skull size varies between individuals, this simple rule results in a large 
variation of actual location on the scalp. Importantly, in the 5 studies of Baeken and 
colleagues (2006; 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) the position of the coil was anatomically 
determined using MRI non-stereotactic guidance (Peleman et al., 2010), and no mood 
effects emerged. Hence, given the anatomical brain differences between participants, 
the importance of the localization of the stimulation site by determining the correct 
anatomical localization of the specific stimulation site under MRI guidance seems an 
important avenue for any rTMS or tDCS study. However, although there is an increased 
use of neuronavigation in neurostimulation research, no study has yet been able to 
clearly report a better outcome of stimulation after MRI guided localization (e.g. in the 
treatment of MDD). Future research is needed to investigate whether the effects of 
neurostimulation would be improved by using neuronavigation with MRI. Furthermore, 
there is a need for a correct localization method to target the DLPFC when MRI is not 




available (See Mir-Moghtadaei et al. 2015 and Rusjan et al 2010). Therefore, there 
might be a greater need for more individual localization, for instance, using MRI non-
stereotactic guidance. It also seems important to highlight the study of Sparing et al. 
(2008) where the impact of different localization strategies was investigated by 
comparing the accuracy of five different localization strategies. Three approaches were 
based on information of either anatomical or functional MRI while the remaining two 
strategies relied either on standard cranial landmarks (i.e, the International 10-20 EEG 
system) or a standardized function guided procedure (i.e., the spatial relationship 
between the left and right M1-Hand). The findings suggest that highest precision can be 
achieved with fMRI-guided stimulation (accurate within millimeters) (for an in depth 
discussion see Sparing et al., 2008). In addition, in Herwig et al. (2001), the precision of 
the 5cm rule in combination with the motor cortex site has proven questionable. By 
using sterotaxy for evaluation, the final location of the coil relative to the underlying 
cortical structures was found to be quite variable (the coil was not placed over the 
DLPFC as intended in 7 out of 22 subjects). Therefore, in order to accurately target the 
(left or right) DLPFC, taking into account individual anatomical brain differences, the 
precise stimulation site and position of the coil should be determined using MRI non-
stereotactic guidance (Peleman et al., 2010). In line with this and given that all studies 
with mood effects used the latter strategy, while all studies with fMRI-guided 
stimulation found no effects, the argument of specific localization might have interfered 
with the results. 
Second, there is the possible difference in neurostimulation technique. Although 
they differ in their mechanisms, it has been shown that the stimulation of the PFC with 
rTMS and tDCS produces similar effects in different neural circuitries (Fregni et al., 
2008a), neurotransmitter systems (Keck et al., 2002; Nitsche et al., 2006; Strafella et al., 
2001), and the treatment of psychiatric diseases (for a review see Miniussi et al., 2008; 
George et al., 2009; and George & Aston-Jones, 2010). Furthermore, both have shown 
positive outcomes in the treatment of depression. However, in patient populations 
these treatment studies are based on multiple rTMS or tDCS sessions. With this in mind, 
two studies investigating mood effects as a primary objective (Motohashi et al., 2013; 
Schaller et al., 2011) and one study as a secondary objective (Gaudeau-Bosma et al., 





used 9 sessions spread over 9 days of stimulation (HF-rTMS over left DLPFC), and 
claimed to find an effect on mood. In this study the authors found improved mood after 
left DLPFC rTMS, but only observed by changes in BDI scores and not in VAS scores. 
However, Wise and Streiner (2012) discussed in a Letter to the Editor many concerns on 
the relevance of the results in Schaller et al. (2011), based on expressed issues with the 
sample, methodology and presentation of the results (see Wise & Streiner, 2012). In 
contrast, Gaudeau-Bosma and colleagues (2013) used 10 sessions over 10 days of 
stimulation (HF-rTMS over left DLPFC) and did not find any effect of neurostimulation 
on mood (mood analyses based on delta scores – after rTMS minus before rTMS -  of 
BDI and Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, HDRS). In Motohashi et al. (2013) the 
authors investigated mood and cognitive functioning following repeated tDCS that is 4 
sessions a day, over 3 stimulation days. The results showed that repeated intervention 
with anodal tDCS over left DLPFC did not change mood (and cognitive function) in 
healthy subjects. Nonetheless, one could wonder whether multiple sessions in healthy 
participants might produce mood effects (as seen in rTMS treatment studies with 
depressed populations). In short, when looking at the question of influencing mood, 
nothing in this review indicates that the different neurostimulation techniques (tDCS 
versus rTMS) can corroborate the mood effects reported. 
Five rTMS-studies found indications for a decrease in positive mood after HF-
rTMS over the left PFC (Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; George et al., 1996; Dearing et al., 
1997; Padberg et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 2004) and one tDCS study (Marshall et al., 
2004) found an improvement in positive mood after bifrontal tDCS. However, taken all 
findings into account, the argument that a single neurostimulation session would affect 
mood is solely based on studies with several shortcomings. More specifically, in Pascal-
Leone et al. (1996) a small sample size was used (10), there was no sham condition, all 
stimulation sessions where on one day (with 30min between them) and the mood 
results were based on left versus right side comparison (and not active versus sham). 
George et al. (1996) used only 10 participants, did not include a sham condition, only 
found mood changes with the MINH mood scale (but not with the VAS or PANAS), and 
based their results on comparing left versus right side mood comparison (and not active 
versus sham). Dearing et al. (1997) has a sample size of nine, stimulated all sites on one 
day (with 20min between them) and based their mood effects on comparison of left 




versus right PFC (and not active versus sham). In Padberg et al. (2001) only nine 
participants were used, there was no sham condition, all sites were stimulated on the 
same day (with 30min between them) and the mood effects were based on pre versus 
post mood measurement for both left and right PFC (with no significant difference 
between left and right). In the study of Barrett et al. (2004), the group that reported 
mood effects consisted only of five participants and these effects were based on pre-
post left versus right comparison (and not active versus sham). Finally, Marshall et al. 
(2004) used a different setup of their electrode placements (with 4 electrodes, two 
anodal on the bifrontal areas and two on the mastoids) and in addition, stimulated 
intermittently (15sec on, 15sec off).  Importantly however, this result was never 
replicated in subsequent work (Kirov, Weiss, Siebner, Born, & Marshall, 2009; Marshall, 
Helgadóttir, Mölle, Born, 2006). 
Drawing upon these studies and the shortcomings described, we can conclude 
that when a study controls for them (Baeken et al., 2006; 2008; 2011a; 2011b; 2014), 
that is, by using a single blind sham controlled, counterbalanced, crossover design, a 
larger uniform sample, stimulation of one single region per session with a time interval 
of one week in order to exclude interaction effects with previous stimulation, brain 
imaging to determine the exact target of stimulation, and comparing pre versus post 
mood measurement (with several well validated mood scales, Baeken et al., 2008) 
between active and sham stimulation, these findings cannot be replicated. Hence, their 
non-finding underscores our claim that a single session of rTMS/tDCS does not 
influence subjective mood in healthy participants.  
Although not the scope of the review, one can speculate on the underlying 
neurobiological brain mechanisms how stimulating the DLPFC can affect mood 
processes. When clinically depressed, neurobiological data support the choice of the 
DLPFC as a valid rTMS target site to intervene with the neuronal pathways deregulated 
in major depression. The observed changes in a depression related neurocircuitry seem 
to agree with other successful treatment modalities, such as pharmacological 
antidepressant treatment and electroconvulsive therapy (Baeken & De Raedt, 2011). 
Theoretically, also in healthy subjects the rTMS application is thought to result in 
changes in neuronal activity in the stimulated area (DLPFC), which through cortico-





amygdala hyperactivity, resulting in CRH decreases and ultimately in decreased salivary 
cortisol concentrations, returning to the initial homeostasis (Baeken et al., 2010, 2014). 
Importantly, these influences were only detectable in healthy individuals only when 
being stressed, or when individual anxiety levels were taken into account. But also in 
these studies no rTMS effects on subjective mood were detected (Baeken et al., 2009, 
2011, 2014). Also in depressed patients no subjective mood effects were detected after 
one stimulation session, whereas neurobiological effects were already present (Baeken 
et al., 2009). It seems important to mention that, although studies using many different 
dosages are included in our overview, there are currently no studies directly examining 
whether different dosages of stimulation (i.e. pulses, frequencies, inter train interval 
etc.) could affect mood, which might be an interesting avenue for future research. 
With regard to inter-individual variability, a recent study of Wiethoff and 
colleagues (2014) showed that after 2mA anodal tDCS over the motor cortex 75% of 
individuals showed the expected facilitation, while 25% showed inhibition. In the 
cathodal tDCS condition the proportions were 60:40 (facilitation: inhibition). Hence, it 
seems that the direction of the effects is more consistent after anodal than cathodal 
stimulation. However, it is important to mention that in this study 2 mA is used, with a 
large bipolar cephalic montage and the primary motor cortex as target size. Therefore, 
the results of this study may not apply equally to all paradigms. In addition, a recent 
study of Lopez-Alonso and colleagues (2015) investigated the intra-individual variability 
after anodal tDCS over the motor cortex in two separate sessions and found a fair 
reliability (60% responded in each of the two sessions) and 78% of the responders to 
the first tDCS session displayed the same response (increase in cortical excitability) in 
the second session. Although  the studies included in our review all target the PFC and 
use anodal tDCS, there is need for more research on the inter-individual variability on 
cortical excitability after tDCS on the PFC (for a discussion on intra and inter-individual 
variability after tDCS see Horvath, Carter, & Forte, 2014). 
Finally, it seems important to note that we did not perform a meta-analysis, 
even though this is the best way to answer the research question of this paper. 
However, after careful consideration the authors felt that the best approach with the 
current data was to perform a systematic review. This decision was based on the 
unresponsiveness of several authors to obtain crucial data, if excluding 




methodologically questionable studies our study pool would be too limited, and the 
large heterogeneity of the studies on several levels (stimulation parameters, time and 
mood measurement, etc.). In addition, and most importantly, no methodologically 
sound study reported significant effects, therefore the result of a meta-analysis would 
not be different from our findings. 
In sum, by excluding the possible influence of mood effects after a single 
neurostimulation session, we can underscore that studies with cognitive/emotional 
effects in healthy subjects after a single neurostimulation session are not affected by 
mood changes. More than a decade ago Mosimann et al. (2000) pointed out that 
neurostimulation studies should fulfil several methodological requirements: a sham-
controlled setup, larger sample sizes, and strictly one single stimulation region per 
session in order to exclude interaction effects with previous stimulation, to determine 
possible effects on mood in healthy participants. Fifteen years later, we reiterate these 
guidelines and feel confident that when we take the aforementioned methodological 
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THE EFFECT OF A SINGLE HF-RTMS 
SESSION OVER THE LEFT DLPFC ON THE 
PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS RESPONSE AS 
MEASURED BY HEART RATE VARIABILITY
1 
ABSTRACT 
Previous research has demonstrated that prefrontal activity is related to control 
over stress responses. However, the causal mechanisms are not well understood. In this 
study we investigated the possible influence of brain stimulation on the physiological 
stress response system. Since an increased stress response is known to precipitate 
psychiatric disorders, further inquiry can have important clinical implications. In 38 
healthy, right-handed female participants, we examined the effects of a single sham-
controlled high-frequency (HF) repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) 
session over the left (N=19) and right (N=19) dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) on 
the autonomic nervous system stress response, as measured by Heart Rate Variability 
(HRV). Stress was transiently induced through evaluative negative feedbacks. Although 
the induction procedure was efficient in increasing self-reported distress in all groups 
and conditions, only after real HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC the physiological stress 
response was diminished, as indicated by a significant increase in HRV. No effects were 
found in the sham or right side stimulation condition. These findings demonstrate that 
increasing brain activity by HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC can help attenuating 
physiological stress reactions. Our results are indicative of the positive effects of rTMS 
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on stress resilience and underscore the possible benefit of HF-rTMS as a transdiagnostic 
intervention. Finally, the results also show that effects only occur when stimulating the 
left DLPFC, which is in line with the therapeutic effects of HF-rTMS in affective 
disorders. 
  





Stressful situations are part of everyday life, but only a select population of 
individuals develops stress-related pathologies. Although stress is a broad construct, in 
this study we define it as a state of apprehension, accompanied by negative affect and 
autonomic arousal, close to the concept of state anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1983). 
According to the reactivity hypothesis, frequent elevated physiological responses during 
stressful events lead to changes in physiological balance, triggering several pathogenic 
pathways (Pieper, Brosschot, van der Leeden, & Thayer, 2007). Previous research has 
shown that confrontation with stressful situations is known to precipitate psychiatric 
disorders such as major depressive disorder (MDD) (Wood, Walker, Valentino, & 
Bhatnagar, 2010). In Waugh and Koster (2015) the authors described resilience as a 
dynamic process that may be deficient in people in remission from depression, rather 
than as a static personal quality that is unattainable to people who have experienced 
psychopathology. Moreover, depression is associated with multiple indicators of 
physiological dysregulation, including potentially diminished levels of cardiac vagal 
control (Rottenberg, Clift, Bolden, & Salomon, 2007), affecting stress-related responses 
to environmental experiences (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011).  
Anatomically, sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous 
system dually innervate the myocardium. Functionally, parasympathetic inputs provide 
constant, although fluctuating, inhibitory control of heart rate (HR) via direct 
innervation of the heart by the vagus nerve (for a more in depth discussion on cardiac 
vagal control see Cyranowski et al., 2011). Stressor-induced suppression of cardiac 
parasympathetic activity (Gianaros et al., 2005) has been documented in a growing 
number of studies investigating heart rate variability (HRV) as an indirect measure of 
parasympathetic (vagal) control over time-related variations in heart rate (e.g., 
Berntson et al., 1997). Heart rate variability is a noninvasive, simple, and frequently 
used measure of autonomic influences on heart rate. Evidence indicates that HRV 
indices of sympathetic and parasympathetic activation pattern reflect biomarkers not 





Sloan, Korten, & Myers, 1991). High HRV has been associated with greater behavioral 
adaptability and is related to adaptive recovery from stress (Thayer & Lane, 2009). 
Moreover, decreases of HRV have been related to worry (Pieper et al., 2007). Hence, 
we focus on HRV as a measure of stress responsiveness, which is one of the important 
physiological parameters in the context of the interplay between physiological and 
psychological phenomena (Wheat & Larkin, 2010). Interestingly, depression is 
associated with elevated heart rate and reduced heart rate variability, which are known 
risk factors for cardiac morbidity and mortality that may explain the increased risk 
associated with depression (Carney, Freedland, & Veith, 2005; Thayer & Lane, 2007; 
Tsuji et al., 1996). Interestingly, the ventral mPFC has been linked to higher-order 
contextual control over stress responses, providing a conceptual link with the cognitive 
generation and regulation of stress responses in humans (Wager et al., 2009). In human 
imaging studies, the dorsal cingulate/mPFC has been linked consistently with stress-
induced increases in HR, blood pressure (e.g., Gianeros et al., 2004; 2008; Critchley et 
al., 2003) and cortisol (Eisenberger, Taylor, Gable, Hilmert, & Lieberman, 2007).  
Thus, experimental manipulation is necessary to increase our insight in the possible 
causal relationship between brain functioning and the stress response. In contemporary 
brain research, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has evolved as a 
well-established brain stimulation tool, becoming a mainstay of cognitive neuroscience 
in a variety of applications (for a review see Guse, Falkai, & Wobrock, 2010). rTMS is a 
non-invasive method of neuronal depolarization of specific areas of the human brain 
that can alter cortical excitability (George et al., 2003). “Low frequency” (LF) TMS is 
defined by  rates ≤ 1Hz, and “high-frequency” (HF) by those ≥ 1Hz (up to 30 or more 
Hz). (Rossi & Rossini, 2004). Low-frequency rTMS is capable of temporally decreasing 
cortical excitability after stimulation, whereas high-frequency rTMS increases it (Post & 
Keck, 2001). It emerged as a new technology that holds promise for investigating the 
relationship between attentional control and emotion processing (Vanderhasselt, De 
Raedt, Leyman, & Baeken, 2009), insight into the pathophysiology of a variety of stress-
related mental disorders (Akirav & Maroun, 2007). In addition, the effects of rTMS on 
neurophysiology is well understood (for an in depth discussion on neurostimulation and 
neurophysiological effects see Hoogendam et al., 2010; Rossi et al., 2009; Sandrini et 
al., 2011). 




The left DLPFC has been implicated in the modulation of negative emotions and is a 
cortical target for rTMS treatment of depression (Borckardt et al., 2011), but it remains 
unclear whether HF-rTMS over this area can affect stress responsiveness. To test causal 
hypotheses, neurostimulation techniques might be very valuable. Unfortunately, with 
the currently used superficial coils it is impossible to directly target the vmPFC using 
rTMS. Previous research on the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) system has shown 
that stimulating the left DLPFC indirectly influences cortisol secretion. Here, as well as in 
animal studies (Keck, 2003), it can be concluded that the neurobiological effects 
following DLPFC stimulation were established via indirect multimodal pathways (e.g., 
Baeken et al., 2009; 2010, 2014a), affecting implicated subcortical and vmPFC 
structures. 
In the present study, we aimed to go beyond previous -although limited- stress 
response and brain stimulation research, by using a single sham controlled HF-rTMS 
session over the left and right DLPFC as a method to temporally influence stress 
responsiveness of healthy people. Although treatment protocols for psychiatric 
disorders such as depression typically involve HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC (De Raedt, 
Vanderhassent & Baeken, in press), given the absence of conclusive data on 
lateralization regarding the physiological stress response, we decided to include right 
and left stimulation groups. To induce stress, we used a performance feedback task, i.e. 
the Critical Feedback Task (adapted from Rossi & Pourtois, 2012a), which makes use of 
negative feedbacks referring to participants’ task-performance. Moreover, difficult 
cognitive tasks have been shown in numerous studies to elicit cardio-acceleration 
(reduced HRV), which is often mediated by decreased parasympathetic cardiac activity 
(e.g., Berntson et al., 1994). Hence, we assessed whether the stress response after 
negative feedback can be decreased by means of a single HF-rTMS session over the 
DLPFC. We hypothesized that, compared to sham stimulation; participants would 
exhibit higher HRV, as sign of lower stress response, immediately after a single HF-rTMS 
session over the DLPFC. In line with the observation that decreased left DLPFC activity 
has been implicated in the modulation of negative emotions, and the beneficial effect 
of left-sided stimulation in depression, we mainly anticipated effects after real 







The left side stimulation sample consisted of 23 healthy, right-handed females2 
recruited among undergraduates. This population may be particularly relevant because 
stress-related disorders such as depression occur twice as often in women as in men 
(Kessler, McGonagle, Swartz, Blazer, & Nelson, 1993). We excluded one participant 
based on a high score on the BDI-II (> 30), and three participants were not included due 
to technical problems. The final left side stimulation sample had a mean age of 21.84 
(SD = 2.95). The right side stimulation sample consisted of 19 healthy, right-handed 
females with a mean age of 21.74 (SD = 1.76). For both groups current and past 
psychiatric (both Axis I and Axis II) disorders were excluded using the Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). No drugs were allowed, except 
birth-control pills. The ethics committee of the University Hospital of the Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel (UZBrussel) approved the study. All participants gave written 
informed consent and were financially compensated. A part of the participants in this 
study also participated in a larger project investigating the influence of HF-rTMS on 
different neurocognitive (neuroimaging) and genetic markers, and on the Hypothalamic 
Pituitary Adrenal Axis (Baeken et al., 2014a).  
Questionnaire measures.  
The BDI-II, a 21 item self-report inventory, was used to measure the severity of 
depressive symptoms (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 1996). In addition, before and after 
the experiment anxiety was assessed using the state version of the STAI (Van der Ploeg, 
1982). Mood state was further measured using six visual analogue scales (VAS) 
measuring how tired, energetic, angry, tension, depressed and cheerful participants 
were feeling “at this moment”. The VAS is a 10 cm line, with endpoints from “not at all” 
                                                 
2
 For our study we chose to only included women because of the homogeneity of our data: including men 
would require doubling the sample size, to seriously consider gender as a factor in our design. 




to “very much”. Total Mood scores3 were measured for each time point, where all six 
VASs were compounded in one score (from 0 to 10, in mm). The logic for pulling 
together all of our VAS scores in one compound measure is based on the Total Mood 
Disturbance Score index (TMDS, NcNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1992), which is calculated 
by compounding the scales of the Profile of Mood States (POMS), including the Fatigue 
and the Vigor subscales (Vigor reverse-scored). We have explicitly chosen this strategy 
because in the literature it has been shown that this specific compound measure 
(TMDS) is highly correlated with State anxiety, capturing its fluctuations over time even 
better than the simple “tension” score (Bolmont & Abraini, 2013). Interestingly, this 
correlation with state anxiety is even higher during stress. 
 
Critical Feedback Task (CFT).  
The Critical Feedback Task is a mental counting task where participants receive 
bogus negative feedback on their performance at the completion of each test-block. 
This paradigm was successfully used before with the aim of inducing state anxiety and 
distress (for details, see Rossi & Pourtois, 2012a, 2013, 2014; Baeken et al., 2014a). The 
on-screen instructions told the participants that this task measured perceptual learning 
abilities and sustained attention, reflecting general intelligence. The task was divided 
into a practice block and three test blocks, in which participants were asked to covertly 
count the number of deviant lines in a stream of standard lines, reporting this number 
at the end of each block. The standard lines were always tilted 35°, while the target 
lines had a different in-plane orientation. The angular difference between standards 
                                                 
3
 The logic for pulling together all of our VAS scores in one compound measure is based on the Total 
Mood Disturbance Score of the Profile Of Mood States (POMS) (TMDS, McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 
1992), which is calculated by compounding the subscales including the Tired and the Vigor subscales (it is 
important to know that our VAS subscales are based on the POMS subscales). We have explicitly chosen 
this strategy because in the literature it has been shown that this specific compound measure (TMDS) is 
highly correlated with State anxiety, capturing its fluctuations over time even better than the simple 
“tension” score (Bolmont & Abraini, 2001). Interestingly, the correlation with state anxiety is even higher 
during stress. Therefore, being particularly interested in the concepts of stress and state anxiety, we 
preferred to stick to a validated procedure (that is, calculating the TMDS including fatigue and vigor), 
instead of creating a new compound score that had not been validated before in the literature. As a side 
note, given that anxiety has been related to processing efficiency impairments (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 
2007), maintaining performance in the face of negative evaluations requires additional mental effort, 





and targets was manipulated in order to create variation in perceptual load: one block 
was difficult (standard-target difference = 3° of angle), one was intermediate (standard-
target difference = 5°) and one was easy (standard-target difference = 10°). Participants 
always started with the difficult block (unknown to them) and were informed by a cover 
story that after each block they would receive feedback on their performance, 
comparing them to a group of peers. Moreover, they were led to think that the 
difficulty of the subsequent block would depend on their performance on the current 
one (in a staircase design). However, the given feedback was in fact unrelated to 
performance (it was always negative), and the following block was always easier, to 
maintain motivation despite the elicitation of failure feelings and stress. Every feedback 
consisted of a neutral face with a text balloon, stating that they performed below 
average as compared to the other participants. A pseudo-randomly generated 
scatterplot showed their own performance against the scores of the previous (alleged) 
participants. Since the targets were difficult to notice during the task, this brought a 
high uncertainty on one’s own performance, making it very likely for participants to 
believe that their performance was evaluated negatively. Moreover, the use of a direct 
comparison with other participants has been shown to be mostly effective in inducing 
stress/anxiety (Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004). 
Cardiac activity: Heart rate variability 
Heart rate was measured per beat with a telemetric heart rate monitor (Polar 
S810). The heart rate data were transmitted to a personal computer. Measurement 
errors were filtered with the Polar Precision Performance Software for Windows. The 
filter was set at a moderate filter power and a minimum protection zone of 6 beats per 
minute (Cottyn, De Clerq, Pannier, Crombez, & Lenoir, 2006). The resolution of a POLAR 
Vantage NV heart rate monitor, which is analogous to the S810 but with lower memory 
capacity, was studied in Kinnunen and Heikkilä (1998). The data were further analyzed 
with software (Kubios; Biosignal Analysis and Medical Imaging Group, Department of 
Physics, University of Kuopio, Kuipio, Finland) specifically designed for advanced HRV 
analysis. Artifacts were filtered on a medium level with the Kubios software (Tarvainen, 




Niskanen, Lipponen, Ranta-aho, & Karjalainen, 2014). HRV can be described either by 
frequency or time domain indices. We used RMSSD (the root mean square successive 
difference of normal-to-normal intervals, in ms) as an index of HRV. RMSSD primarily 
reflects parasympathetically mediated short-term changes in heart rate and is one of 
the time domain indices recommended by a task force report on HRV measurement 
(Task Force, 1996) and has demonstrated to decrease as an effect of stress as well as 
worry (Delaney & Brodie, 2000; Pieper et al., 2007), and to increase as an indicator of 
successful emotion regulation (Thayer, Ahs, Frederikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). For a 
detailed accounting of the other frequency bands see Thayer and colleagues (2010) for 
a recent review. HRV measurement started from the sixth minute after the start of the 
CFT, because the task only becomes stressful after the first negative feedback. The 
heart rate was recorded from the moment they entered the experimenter room, just 
before baseline, and stopped after the 15 minutes relax period at the end of the 
procedure. 
HF-rTMS 
A randomized sham-controlled, single blind, crossover design was used. To avoid 
carry-over effects from the previous stimulation, the second session was carried out 
after an interval of three days. The procedure of the second experiment day was exactly 
the same with the exception of the HF-rTMS session (real or sham), which was 
counterbalanced with random selection of order. HF-rTMS of the left and right DLPFC 
was performed using a MAGSTIM high-speed stimulator (Magstim Co., Whitland, UK) 
with a figure-of-eight shaped coil. In order to correct for individual anatomical 
differences and to avoid stimulation of other cortical areas besides the left or right 
DLPFC, all participants underwent a T1-weighted MRI (3D-TFE, voxel size 1 x 1 x 1 mm) 
of the brain using a 3-T Intera MR scanner (Philips, Best, The Netherlands). We located 
the left and right DLPFC visually in the 3D surface rendering of the brain based on the 
participant’s own gyral morphology and we marked the center of the middle frontal 
gyrus as the target site, which is anatomically localized in the center of the DLPFC 





position was found by determining the perpendicular projection of this point on the 
scalp (Peleman et al., 2010). We used the following stimulation parameters: 110% of 
motor threshold of the right abductor pollicis brevis muscle (stimulation intensity), 20 
HZ (stimulation frequency), 40 trains of 1.9s duration, separated by an inter-train 
interval of 12.1s, resulting in 1.560 pulses per session. The total stimulation time was 
approximately 10 min. The study was conducted according to double blind within-
subjects design by randomized/counterbalanced crossover sham (placebo) and real HF-
rTMS. Real and sham stimulation were performed at the same place on the skull, but 
for sham the figure-of-eight shaped coil was held at an angle of 90° only resting on the 
scalp with one edge. During stimulation, all participants wore earplugs and were 
blindfolded to ensure blindness of the stimulation procedure. The real and sham 
stimulation occurred immediately prior to the stress induction. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival on their first day the participants underwent an anatomical 3D MRI 
scan to define the exact stimulation point, which is based on a 10min scan. At the start 
of the experiment, the polar equipment was put on and the participants were 
subsequently asked to fill in the STAI-State. Then, they were asked to relax for 20 
minutes. After the 15 minutes (which allowed for 5 minutes of adaptation) HRV 
recorded baseline (T1), participants filled in the first series of VASes. Next, each 
participant received a single (sham or real) stimulation session in another room. When 
they returned they filled in their second VASes. Next, they were asked to perform the 
Critical Feedback Task, which took approximately 8 minutes (T2). After the task, they 
were given the third series of VASes. Next, the participants were asked to relax again 
for 15 minutes (T3). The HRV registration was stopped and participants received their 
final (fourth) VASes, together with the second STAI-State and the BDI. The procedure of 
the second day was similar to the first, except for the rTMS session (depending on 
which type of stimulation they received on the first day, e.g. DAY 1 = Sham, DAY 2 = 
Real; or DAY 1 = Real, DAY 2 = Sham). During the experimental procedure all 
participants were in a seated position, as well as for the real and sham stimulation 
sessions. After the experiment, all participants were fully debriefed and asked if they 




were aware of the purpose of the critical feedback task. Some of the participants 
reported to be somewhat aware of the unsolvable nature of the task, but all said that 
they were stressed by the negative feedback they received. Furthermore, no significant 
differences were found when participants were asked to distinguish between real or 
sham HF-rTMS.  
 
Statistical Analysis 
All collected data were analyzed with SPSS 19 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). First, for mood analysis we used a 2 (experimental Condition: rTMS and 
sham) X 4(Time: after T1, before T2, after T2, and after T3) mixed ANOVA with 
stimulation side (left vs. right) as between-subjects factor, followed-up by paired-
samples t-tests. To yield a sensitive measure of global impact of the protocol and so the 
CFT on negative mood, as proposed by Rossi and Pourtois (2012a, 2012b), we collapsed 
the VAS scores into a compound VAS for mood, by adding up the scores of the six items 
(the two positive mood items were reverse-scored): the compound score ranges 
therefore from a minimum of 0 (minimum level of negative mood) to a maximum of 60 
(maximum level of negative mood) (see table 1 for an overview of the separate VAS 
scales). Our HRV data were not normally distributed (Shapiro Wilk test). To address this, 
we log transformed the data, which resulted in a normally distributed dataset, with all 
p-values higher than .11.  For the HRV data we performed a mixed 2 Condition (real vs. 
sham HF-rTMS) X 3 Time (T1 = baseline resting state HRV; T2 = stress induction HRV, 
and T3 = recovery resting state HRV) X 2 Stimulation Side (Left vs. Right) ANOVA, with 
time and condition as within-subjects factors, stimulation side as between-subjects 
factor, and HRV as dependent variable. To follow-up interaction effects, paired sample t 
tests were performed. Effect sizes were calculated as Cohen d (Cohen, 1988) for the 
HRV means (based on the observed means and standard deviations), for both within as 









The ANOVA yielded a marginally significant effect of time, F(3,35) = 2.54; p = .060. 
Given the absence of simulation side and condition interaction effects, as a follow-up 
we computed the means collapsed over condition and stimulation side of the total 
mood scores, to follow up the near significant main effect of time. As shown in Figure 1, 
negative mood increased significantly between T1 and T4 t(37) = 2.05; p = .048, with a 
marginally significant increase between T2 and T3 t(37) = 1.91; p = .064, i.e. before and 
after the CFT. This shows a global increase of negative mood throughout the whole 
procedure, while the increase between T2 and T3 shows an increase of negative mood, 
specifically during the CFT. Next, we also compared the possible mood effects on the 
STAI-State questionnaire before and after the protocol. In the left stimulation study one 
participant failed to complete the STAI questionnaire. The ANOVA with the STAI-State 






















Table 1. Visual Analogue Scales descriptives (in cm). 
 
      Condition 
 
     rTMS condition       
VAS Tired  Vigor  Angry  Tension  Depressed Cheerful 
 
T1  3.67 (2.56) 5.00 (1.87) 0.36 (0.51) 1.00 (1.21) 0.43 (0.87) 5.97 (2.04) 
T2 2.94 (1.97) 5.05 (1.93) 0.54 (0.82) 1.58 (1.56) 0.32 (0.45) 5.43 (2.20) 
T3 3.02 (1.94) 4.72 (1.99) 0.62 (0.93) 1.35 (1.54) 0.34 (0.62) 5.11 (2.11) 
T4 3.40 (2.11) 4.72 (1.74) 0.46 (0.69) 0.96 (1.21) 0.44 (0.72) 4.99 (1.91)  
 
     Sham condition    
VAS Tired  Vigor  Angry  Tension  Depressed Cheerful 
 
T1 4.07 (2.56) 4.70 (2.00) 0.40 (0.58) 1.20 (1.19) 0.48 (0.88) 5.50 (1.85)  
T2 3.60 (2.27) 4.73 (1.97) 0.36 (0.56) 1.14 (1.40) 0.47 (0.83) 5.55 (1.90) 
T3 3.39 (2.20) 4.43 (2.04) 0.61 (0.96) 1.26 (1.69) 0.47 (0.86) 5.21 (1.98) 
T4 3.86 (2.35) 4.31 (2.18) 0.51 (0.80) 0.95 (1.35) 0.43 (0.79) 5.02 (1.81) 
 
 
Table 1. Mean ratings and standard deviations for the VAS subscales before (T1) and immediately after 
HF-rTMS/Sham (T2). Immediately after the Critical Feedback Task (CFT) (T3) and 15 min later (T4) (see 
Figure 1 for graphical presentation of Total Mood Scores). VAS scales are used to capture mood states, 
and scores are expressed on scales going from 0 to 10 (cm) and range from 0 = absence of that emotion; 
tot 10 = max emotion. 
 
HRV 
The 2X3X2 ANOVA showed a main effect of time, F(1,35) = 11.59; p < .001 and 
an interaction effect of time and condition, F(1,35) = 4.04; p = .026. The crucial three-
way interaction effect between condition, time and stimulation side, F(1,35) = 4.63; p = 
.016 was also significant. To further follow-up this interaction effect, we performed 
separate 2X2 within-subjects ANOVA’s for the left and the right side stimulation group. 
For the left side stimulation group, no significant main effects for both condition, 
F(1,18) = 1.20; p = .29 and Time, F(1,17) = 2.16; p = .15 emerged. Most importantly, a 
highly significant interaction between condition and time was observed, F(1,17) = 8.75; 





T1 there was no significant difference in RMSSD between the real HF-rTMS and the 
sham condition, t(18) = .85; p = .41, d = .11. However, at T2 (during the stress task) we 
observed a significant higher RMSSD in the HF-rTMS-condition as compared to the 
sham condition, t(18) = 3.26; p = .004, d = .37. Finally, at T3 the significant difference in 
RMSSD between HF-rTMS-condition and sham-condition disappeared, t(18) = .69; p = 
.50, d = .08. When looking at the within condition differences, we found a significant 
increase in RMSSD in the rTMS condition from T1 to T2, t(18) = 3.05; p = .007, d = .30, 
which remained unchanged from T2 to T3, t(18) = .28; p = .78, d = .02. As such, a single 
rTMS session, successfully led to an increase of RMSSD during the stress induction. In 
the sham condition there was a marginally significant decrease in RMSSD from T1 to T2, 
t(18) = 1.97; p = .065, d = .18. Comparing T2 with T3, a significant increase in RMSSD 
was found in the sham condition, t(18) = 2.48; p = .023, d = .27. The pattern of results is 
shown in Figure 2. Finally, the order of presentation of rTMS versus sham conditions 
across sessions had no significant effect on the stress response, F(1,16) = .25; p = .78. 
For the right side stimulation group, no significant interaction between condition and 
time was observed, F(1,17) = .99; p = .42. The order of presentation of rTMS versus 
sham conditions across sessions had also no significant effect on the stress response, 
F(1,16) = .48; p = .63. The pattern of results is shown in Figure 24. 
  
                                                 
4
 Given that RMSSD, PNN50 and the high frequency component of the power spectrum (HF power) are 
closely related, and all reflect vagal cardiac influence, we included the HF-HRV (frequency domain 
methods) and PNN50 (time domain methods) in a similar mixed 2X3X2 ANOVA. The results show 
converging findings to the RMSSD data. Furthermore, all indices of HF-HRV, PNN50 and RMSSD 
correlated highly (all r >.800;  p < .001) 
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Figure 1.  
A. Left side stimulation of the DLPFC. The stress response measured by HRV on T1, T2, and T3 in rTMS and sham conditions. Higher HRV = lower stress response. 
B. Total Mood Scores at T1, T2, T3 and T4, which ranges from a minimum of 0 (minimum level of negative mood) to a maximum of 60 (maximum level of negative mood) 
 
 
Note. RMSSD (LOG): root mean square standard deviation (log transformed); HRV: heart rate variability; rTMS: repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation; *p > .05; ** p < 






Figure 1.  
A. Right side stimulation of the DLPFC. The stress response measured by HRV on T1, T2, and T3 in rTMS and sham conditions. Higher HRV = lower stress response. 
B. Total Mood Scores at T1, T2, T3 and T4, which ranges from a minimum of 0 (minimum level of negative mood) to a maximum of 60 (maximum level of negative mood)  
 
 
Note. RMSSD (LOG): root mean square standard deviation (log transformed); HRV: heart rate variability; rTMS: repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation; *p > .05; ** p < 




The present study was designed to investigate the effects of a single HF-rTMS 
session over the left and right DLPFC on the physiological stress response of healthy 
female participants. The results showed the expected significant increase of HRV during 
stress induction compared to baseline after left-sided stimulation, which was not 
observed in the sham condition. This increase was not registered in the right-sided 
stimulation group. Moreover, there was no difference between the real and sham 
condition. These effects are in line with the therapeutic effects of rTMS in affective 
disorders (for a review see George, 2010; Lefaucheur et al., 2014), and with models of 
emotion lateralization (Davidson & Irwin, 1999). The clear difference between real left 
sided stimulation and sham during the stressor is indicative of the positive influence of 
HF-rTMS.  
During the recovery period after the whole left side stimulation procedure, the 
differences between sham and real stimulation disappeared, which means that our 
healthy participants showed normal stress recovery after the stressor has disappeared. 
In addition, although the mood analyses did not show a three-way interaction, the Time 
effect shows a general impact of the protocol, with an increase of the total negative 
mood score from before to after the stress induction task, indicative of the mood 
inducing effect of the CFT over Condition and Stimulation Side.  
The present study was the first experimental study using HF-rTMS over the left 
DLPFC demonstrating an impact on parasympathetic modulation in humans. However, 
through which exact pathway left DLPFC HF-rTMS affects the ANS remains to be 
clarified and without concomitant neuroimaging techniques the interpretation of our 
psychophysiological results remains to some extent speculative. A possible working 
mechanism points to a DLPFC / anterior cingulate cortical (ACC) pathway. Indeed, in 
brain imaging studies examining negative affect, besides the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, dorsal (d)ACC areas are often involved as well (Pizzagalli, 2011). Different brain 
imaging studies in MDD lend support to the assumption that left HF-rTMS affects and 





2009; Kito, Hasegawa, & Koga, 2012; Fox, Halko, Eldaief, & Pascual-Leone, 2012). The 
subgenual (sg)ACC, part of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Barbas et al., 2003; Ray 
& Zald, 2012), may be a critical region to be involved in the response to HF-rTMS. In 
addition, in Baeken et al. (2015) PET imaging was used to show the impact of HF-rTMS 
on the subgenual ACC in refractory unipolar major depression, while in Baeken et al. 
(2014b) the effect of rTMS on functional connectivity between prefrontal areas and the 
subgenual ACC was demonstrated. Furthermore, HF-rTMS treatment has been shown 
to affect deregulated sgACC neurocircuits in depressed patients (Baeken et al., 2014a, 
2015; Fox, Buckner, White, Greicius, & Pascual-Leone, 2012). Given that cortical brain 
systems that are hypothesized to regulate cardiac autonomic activity during behavior 
include the medial-prefrontal regions of the cortex (Gianaros et al., 2004),  our HRV 
findings are in line with the existing animal literature showing an attenuating effect of 
rTMS of frontal brain regions on HPA system function (Keck et al., 2001; Hong et al., 
2002).  
Our findings suggest that the left DLPFC may be a critical brain area in the 
neurocircuitry underlying stress reactivity on negative feedback, and suggests that the 
PFC plays a role in the modulation of stress responses in healthy participants. By 
modulating this specific brain region stress resilience may be positively affected, which 
is crucial for coping with stress inducing events. Indeed, the increase in HRV associated 
with emotion regulation has been related to cerebral blood flow changes in the PFC 
(Lane et al., 2009). Our results are consistent with the conclusions of Davidson et al. 
(2002) and Maier et al. (2006) that the PFC is implicated in affect regulating and is vital 
for the protective effects of behavioral and cognitive control over stress 
responsiveness. Moreover, these findings are indicative of the potential of rTMS to 
increase cognitive control to cope with stressful stimuli, which is highly relevant in the 
treatment of stress-related disorders such as major depression (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 
2005). Therefore, De Raedt et al. (in press) emphasize the importance of combining 
conventional therapy with neurostimulation such as rTMS is highlighted, given that 
there is a high relapse rate after conventional therapies, suggesting that resilience is not 
increased perse.  Indeed combining both approaches might have a dual effect of 
reducing the distress and increasing HRV. 




In conclusion, our findings underscore the potential of experimental procedures to 
influence stress responses and negative affect in laboratory settings evaluating the 
effects of HF-rTMS on the HPA-system and ANS (Nummenmaa & Niemi, 2004). Indeed, 
De Raedt and Koster (2010) concluded, based on a review on the cognitive and 
neurobiological correlates of vulnerability for depression that an important therapeutic 
aim would be to restore stress reactivity. HR reactivity and cardiovascular reactivity also 
predict other health-related effects of stressors on the body (Wager et al., 2009). 
However, further research using rTMS combined with the presentation of a stressor to 
probe the physiological stress system in MDD and other disorders is necessary. In line 
with the beneficial use of exposure in the treatment of various disorders, and the 
crucial role of the PFC in these effects (for a review see De Raedt, 2006), it might well 
be that the effects of rTMS can be boosted by combining it with exposure to a stressor. 
Furthermore, we believe that these results show the potential of rTMS to be an 
additional treatment protocol, next to the more conventional (therapeutic and 
medicinal) treatments of depression.  
An important caveat is that the absence of a physiological stress response in the 
right side stimulation group during the sham session, which is difficult to explain. One 
possible reason might be that there was no randomization for group (first left 
stimulation group, then right). Given that high vagally mediated HRV is associated with 
cognitive, emotional, and autonomic self-regulatory capacity (Thayer et al., 2000, 2009), 
and people with high HRV cope better with stress, this might explain the absence of a 
decrease of HRV (and increase in HR) for the right stimulation group. Since the overall 
HRV was larger in the right stimulation group as compared to the left stimulation group, 
a ceiling effect might prevent the stress induction task to influence their physiological 
responses. However, we cannot formally exclude that this group, by coincidence, coped 
better with the induced stress, explaining the absence of the physiological stress 
response in the sham condition in the right stimulation group, compared to the left. 
That said, future research should focus on this randomization issue when conducting 
lateralization studies. 
Some limitations should be noted when interpreting our results. First, in the present 
study only young (18-30 years) healthy women were tested. Although this had the 





generalizability. In addition, there is also evidence that men and women differ in their 
autonomic and cardiovascular responses to psychological stressors (Matthews & 
Stoney, 1988). Future work is thus needed to test whether the present results 
generalize to a male sample or to a sample with a larger variation in age and health 
(e.g., MDD). Second, the fact that HF-rTMS did not induce a subjective differential effect 
(sham versus real stimulation) on the mood scales might be considered as surprising. 
However, subjectively experienced mood gives only limited insight into the 
neurophysiology of emotion and physiological responses might operate independently 
of verbal reports (Buck, 1999; Campbell & Ehlert, 2012). Thus, this may be indicative of 
a difference between subjective experience of distress and physiological responses. 
Furthermore, the menstrual cycle phase could be another systematic inter-individual 
influence, which may have impact on HRV (e.g., Sato, Miyake, & Kumashiro, 1995) but 
was not controlled in the present study. We suggest that this issue should be addressed 
in future research. Moreover, other factors, such as respiratory rate, tidal volume, or 
momentary physical activity may influence a reliable estimation of cardiac vagal tone 
(for an extensive discussion, see Grossman & Taylor, 2007). However, given the 
consistency between our different measures (RMSSD, HF-HRV, PNN50), these factors 
seem to have played a minor role. Third, all analyses are based on RR interval data, no 
ECG signal data or respiratory data was collected. Given the influence of respiratory 
changes on HRV (Cyranoswki et al., 2011), these results should be replicated with 
proper respiratory (and ECG) data included, or this should be taken into account when 
interpreting and generalizing the findings.  
To summarize, the results of this study suggest that the DLPFC plays a significant 
role in the modulation of stress responses in healthy participants. In addition, this study 
also shows that through the use of HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC we can possibly 
augment the cognitive control to cope with emotional stimuli, which is highly relevant 
in the treatment of stress-related disorders (Scher et al., 2005).  
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THE ROLE OF THE PRECUNEUS IN COPING 
WITH CRITICISM: A NEUROMODULATION 
STUDY DURING FMRI 
1 
ABSTRACT 
Being criticized is a distressing experience that activates self-referential ruminative 
thinking. The prefrontal cortex is implied in cognitive control over ruminative self-
referential thoughts, which have been related to  cortical midline structures such as the 
precuneus. To investigate the neurobiological processes underlying the link between 
criticism and self-referential thinking, we applied transcranial Direct Current Stimulation 
(tDCS) to increase dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity in the scanner, and measured 
brain activity in real time before, during and after exposing healthy individuals to social 
evaluative comments. Thirty-two female participants received 20 minutes of anodal 
tDCS over the left DLPFC. Participants were then exposed to neutral, praising, and 
critical audio comments. This procedure was performed during functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the relationship between exposure to self-
referential stimuli and neural activity after both real and sham tDCS. Our behavioral 
data indicated a significant decrease in self-referential thoughts after real tDCS, but not 
sham. After a single sham-controlled tDCS session participants showed lower activation 
in the precuneus compared to sham, when listening to positive and negative audio 
comments. In addition, the decrease in neural activity after tDCS was significantly larger 
after negative than positive comments. Furthermore, functional connectivity analysis 
revealed that real tDCS resulted in a decreased functional connectivity between the 
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precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex seed and the ventromedial PFC (while an 
increased functional connectivity was observed after sham tDCS). The results show that 
a single tDCS session decreases self-referential thinking when confronted with criticism. 
Moreover, only real tDCS decreases activity in the precuneus and decreases functional 
connectivity in areas related to self-referential processing. Our study was the first to 
apply neuromodulation during fMRI as an experimental manipulation to investigate the 
neural correlates underlying the link between criticism and self-referential processes, 
demonstrating that tDCS can alter behavioral and neural responses of self-referential 
processing. 





 Being criticized is a distressing experience that activates self-conscious emotions 
(e.g., feeling hurt) and self-referential thinking (e.g., Davidson, 2010; Vanderhasselt, 
Remue, Muller, & De Raedt, 2015). It also has a detrimental impact on cognitive 
processing and thinking styles, such as rumination (e.g., Saffrey & Ehrenberg, 2007; 
Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna, Metcalf, & Dimidjian, 2015). Rumination is a form of self-
referential processing, which is the process of relating information to the self (Nejad et 
al., 2013). Self-referential processing can be defined as the evaluation of information in 
relation to an individual’s own mental concept (Christoff et al. 2011). More specifically, 
it is a mode of processing requiring one to evaluate or judge some feature or attribute 
in relation to the perceptual image or mental concept one has about oneself. Criticism 
may be a trigger that leads to a reevaluation of a person’s perceptual image and 
provokes ruminative thoughts.  
The importance of criticism as a source of psychosocial stress is well highlighted by 
research that has linked criticism to poor clinical outcomes in patients with mental 
disorders such as major depressive disorder (MDD), alcohol dependence, post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder and obsessive compulsive disorder 
(OCD) (O’Farrell, Hooley, Fals-Stewart, Cutter, 1998; Tarrier, Sommerfield, Pilgrim, 
1999; Chambless, Steketee, 1999). Moreover, various studies have demonstrated the 
link between depression and sensitivity to criticism (e.g., Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; 
Hooley et al., 2009). Of particular importance is the findings that even after full 
recovery from an MDD episode, neural responses to criticism do not appear to 
normalize (Hooley et al., 2009). 
Neuroimaging studies have indicated that a functional balance between ventral 
(ventral anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) and dorsal compartments in the frontal cortex 
(dorsal ACC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC) is necessary for maintaining 
homeostatic emotional emotional control (Seminowicz et al., 2004; Johnstone et al., 
2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2005, 2008; Wager et al., 2008). As such, many studies 





amygdala (e.g., Siegle et al., 2007). Though the DLPFC appears to moderate limbic 
reactivity to emotional cues in healthy individuals (Davidson, 2000) its activity and 
modulatory role is decreased in depressed individuals (Siegle et al., 2007). Activation of 
the DLPFC has also been shown to be decreased when never depressed healthy controls 
are exposed to a sad mood induction (Gemar et al., 1996; Baker et al., 1997; Liotti et al., 
2000).  
Other affective challenges have also been used. In the abovementioned study of 
Hooley et al. (2009), participants were exposed to critical, praising, and neutral 
comments from their own mothers to examine the relationship between exposure to 
personally relevant emotional stimuli and neural activity in the DLPFC, ACC, and 
amygdala. These are regions known to be involved in MDD  (Fitzgerald, Laird, Maller, & 
Daskalakis, 2008). Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) Hooley and 
colleagues were able to demonstrate decreased reactivity in the DLPFC  and an 
increased amygdala reactivity in fully recovered depressed patients versus never 
depressed healthy controls (Hooley, Gruber, Scott, Hiller, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2005; 
Hooley et al., 2009, 2012).  
An obvious next step is to go beyond correlational findings by using experimental 
manipulations. These permit causal inferences to be made. One approach attracting 
increased attention is transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS). This technique can 
be used to temporarily enhance neural activity and cognitive processes, both for non-
emotional (e.g., Fregni et al., 2005; Leite, Carvalho, Fregni, & Goncalves, 2011; 
Mulquiney, Hoy, Daskalakis, & Fitzgerald, 2011; Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014; 
Dedoncker, Baeken, Brunoni, Vanderhasselt, 2016) as emotional information (Boggio et 
al., 2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013). TDCS involves the application of a weak, direct 
electric current through electrodes positioned over the scalp. The resulting stimulation 
reaches the underlying neuronal tissue and induces polarization-shifts on the resting 
membrane potential (Brunoni et al., 2011). Moreover, tDCS elicits after-effects lasting 
for up to one hour (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003). Anodal stimulation 
generally facilitates cortical activity, whereas cathodal tDCS has opposite effects. 
Importantly, anodal tDCS of the prefrontal cortex has been found to reduce state 
rumination via a beneficial change in working memory processes (Vanderhasselt et al., 
2013) and also causally reduce other depressive symptoms (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2013). 




Hence, these results are indicative of a link between remediating the homeostasis in 
the neuro-circuits affected in depression (for a review see De Raedt et al., 2015) 
through experimental manipulation (tDCS), and a subsequent decrease in rumination 
(see also Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Moreover the link between the DLPFC and 
rumination has also been established in fMRI research (e.g., Vanderhasselt, Kuhn, & De 
Raedt, 2011; 2013). As such, in this study we searched to investigate how that 
manipulating these neuro-circuits could affect ruminative processes. Prefrontal regions 
have been associated extensively with cognitive and emotional regulation processes 
(Cerqueira et al., 2008; Damasio, 2000; Davidson et al., 2002b). It is also the case that a 
single session of neurostimulation over the prefrontal cortex does not affect mood in 
healthy participants. From this it can be concluded that the cognitive effects of 
neurostimulation cannot be explained simply by mood changes (see Remue, Baeken & 
De Raedt, 2016). 
Brain imaging studies show that rumination scores are positively correlated with 
functional connectivity (FC) within the default mode network at rest (including the 
anterior and posterior midline structures) (Siegle et al., 2002; Ray et al., 2005; Johnson 
et al., 2009; Berman et al., 2011a,b; Farb et al., 2011; Hamilton et al., 2011; 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2012; Paul et al., (2013); Nejad et al., 2013). The 
resting state literature offers support for the idea that disrupted cognitive control leads 
to intrusive ruminative thoughts, and that rumination has been associated with 
increased connectivity and activity of the default mode network (Sheline et al., 2010; 
Hamilton et al., 2011; Davey et al., 2012; Marchetti et al., 2012). The dynamics between 
the cognitive network and the default mode network can also be considered from a 
bottom-up perspective where increased maladaptive self-focus and thereby 
hyperactive cortical midline regions interfere with normal cognitive function (Nedjat et 
al., 2013). Regarding social evaluations (e.g., interpersonal criticism), research in social 
cognitive neuroscience has emphasized the functions of the precuneus, which is a 
functional core of the default mode network (DMN) (Uteisky, Smith & Huettel, 2014) 
and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) which is involved in social inferential 
processing (Kuzmanovic et al., 2012). Cabanis et al. (2013) have further demonstrated 
that the precuneus and the PCC are involved in the evaluation of social events (based 





life: e.g., “Your boss appreciates your work in the team”; “The waitress ignores you in 
the bar”). Interestingly, Kuzmanovic et al. reported increased neural activation of the 
precuneus and PCC when participants were exposed to verbal interpersonal evaluations 
(based on positive and negative sentences describing a social action suitable to induce 
impression, e.g., “she told the secrets of a colleague to the others”).  
In the current study we sought to manipulate neural processes underlying 
rumination (self-referential processes) that occurred when people were confronted 
with different emotional stimuli (standardized emotional comments of positive, 
negative, and neutral comments). This was accomplished by applying simultaneous 
tDCS over the DLPFC while participants were undergoing fMRI scans. Our study was the 
first to apply neurostimulation during fMRI as an experimental manipulation to 
investigate the neural correlates underlying the link between criticism and self-
referential processes. Given the importance of network analyses (e.g., cognitive 
network, default mode network) we began by investigating the neural activity in 
healthy participants when confronted with different emotional stimuli. This allowed us 
to explore the influence of a single sham controlled neuromodulation session over the 
DLPFC on regional brain activity. We subsequently used those results as a guide to 
define seeds in FC analyses. A first hypothesis is the positive influence of real tDCS on 
rumination, where we expect a decrease in self-referential thoughts (rumination) after 
real tDCS, but not after sham. Second, based on the existing literature on cognitive 




Participants were provided with full details regarding the aims of the study and 
the procedure. All participants gave their written informed consent and received a 
financial compensation for their participation. The study was approved by the Ethical 
Committee of the University Hospital of Ghent University (UZGent), and carried out 




according to the Declaration of Helsinki. This study was part of a larger study on 
neurocognitive effects of tDCS on the brain. 
Participants 
Participants were 36 right-handed female students with a mean age of 22.61 (SD = 
2.22, Min = 20, Max = 29). They were recruited through student forums of Ghent 
University as well as via social media. Each participant received €80 for participation. 
Right-handed female participants were selected because of sex-related influences on 
neural mechanisms underlying emotion processing (e.g. Cahill, 2003; Van Strien & Van 
Beek, 2000). Participants were screened before study entry, based on the following 
inclusion criteria: (a) no current/history of psychiatric disorder, using the International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.; Sheehan et al., 1998), (b) BDI score below 14, (c) 
no current/history of neurological problems or implanted metal objects over the head, 
and (d) no current psychotropic medications. Of the 36 participants, one chose not to 
return for the second session, three had to be cancelled due to technical problems 
during the scans. Before the start of the protocol, the remaining 32 participants were 
randomly allocated to a real-first (n=16) or sham-first (n=16) stimulation condition. 
Materials 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II-NL). A 21 item self-report inventory was 
used to measure the severity of depressive symptoms (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 
1996). The Dutch translation of the BDI-II has shown high internal consistency: 
Cronbach’s α of .92 for a patients and .88 for healthy controls. Also, the validity index 
satisfies general psychometric criteria (van der Does, 2002). In our sample the mean of 
the BDI scores was M = 3.56 (SD = 3.44), which is within the normal range. 
The Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI). To obtain a state measure 
of ruminative thoughts following the criticism paradigm, we used a questionnaire that 
measures momentary self-reflective rumination (Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, 2015). All 
six questions relate to self-referent, ruminative thoughts with a particular focus on 





positive, and are considered as a state measure of ruminative thinking (e.g. “Right now, 
I am thinking about how happy or sad I feel” and “Right now, I wonder why I react the 
way I do”). Participants were requested to indicate whether they were engaging in 
these thoughts during after each resting state (see Figure 1). They were asked to 
respond using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally 
agree) in order to measure the intensity of momentary ruminative self-referential 
thoughts (MRST).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). Mood state was assessed using six visual analogue 
scales (VAS) measuring how fatigued, vigorous, angry, tense, depressed and cheerful 
participants were feeling “at this moment”. The VAS is a 10 cm line, with endpoints 
from “not at all” to “very much”.  
Criticism Challenge 
While inside the scanner, we exposed participants to critical, praising, and neutral 
comments. These comments were directly addressed at the participant (e.g., “One of 
the things that bothers me about you is that you…”) and made by a female voice. All 
comments were based on comments previously used and validated (Hooley et al., 2009; 
2012) and were the same for each participant. The criticism paradigm was used to 
trigger self-referential processes in healthy participants. The content of the comments 
were of different emotional content (positive, negative, neutral). The paradigm always 
followed the same order: neutral, positive, neutral, and always finishing with negative. 
Negative was always last to avoid emotional contamination and to maximize the 
negative impact just before the resting state. Each scanning epoch began with a 30-sec 
rest period, followed by 30 sec of criticism (or praise or neutral), another rest period, 
another 30 sec of criticism (or praise or neutral), and then another rest period. Each 
participant underwent four scanning epochs; thus, each participant heard two 30-sec 
segments of critical and praising commentary and  four 30-sec segments of neutral 
commentary (this was chosen so there would be a buffer between the praising and the 
critical comments). Only one type of emotional comment was included within a 
scanning epoch (i.e., two critical or two praise or two neutral remarks; no commingling 




of comment type occurred within an epoch). Participants heard each comment once 
only, and participants did not hear any of the comments before the scanning. The 
criticism paradigm lasted 8.30 minutes in total. Examples of neutral, praising, and 
critical comments are provided for illustration: 
 “One of the things she did today was to go out to lunch. She decided to go out 
for a sandwich and a cup of coffee around noon. She got there before the place got busy 
so it was pretty easy for her to find an empty table. She was there for about half an 
hour. She ate her sandwich, drank her coffee and read the newspaper. By the time she 
left, the place was quite crowded.” 
 “One thing I really like about you is the way you pay attention to the people you 
are with. You really seem to be able to make the people around you feel good. Part of it 
is that you are a good listener. But you also have a really warm personality and a 
genuine interest in other people. It’s a great combination and it makes people feel really 
happy to be around you.” 
 “One of the things that bothers me about you is how bad you are at dealing with 
negative feedback. If someone says anything even remotely critical of you, you tend to 
get very defensive. You are far from a perfect person -- even if that is how you like to see 
yourself.  I really wish you would listen when other people tell you what bothers them 
rather than getting all hostile and trying to defend yourself.”.   
 
tDCS 
Direct electrical current was applied in the fMRI scanner using a saline-soaked 
pair of surface sponge electrodes (35 cm2) and delivered by a battery-driven stimulator, 
which was MRI-compatible. To localize the target stimulation areas (left DLPFC and right 
supraorbital), Brainsight neuronavigation system (Brainsight™, Rogue Research, Inc) 
was used to navigate into participant structural cerebral MRI and localize both left 
DLPFC as contralateral supraorbital area. Subsequently, the anode was placed over the 
individually located DLPFC, while the cathode was placed over the contralateral 
supraorbital area. A constant, direct current of 1.5 mA with 30 s of a ramp up was 
applied for 20 min. For sham, the electrodes were positioned in the same way as when 
administering tDCS stimulation; however, the current was ramped down after 30 





participants (26/32) could not distinguish real from sham tDCS (the 6 others answered 
correctly to which condition was real vs sham). To avoid carry-over effects from the 
previous stimulation, the second session was carried out after an interval of at least 
48h. 
fMRI Procedure 
To obtain individual anatomical information, all participants first underwent a T1-
weighted MRI (3D-TFE, TR/TE=2530/2.58; flip angle=7°; FOV=220x220mm2; 
resolution=0.9x0.9x0.9mm³; number of slices=176) of the brain using a Siemens 3T 
TrioTim MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). These scans were performed with 
a 32 channel SENSE head coil.  
Then, outside the scanner, using  Brainsight neuronavigation (Brainsight™, Rogue 
Research, Inc), the anodal electrode was visually located over the left DLPFC. For every 
individual we located the left DLPFC visually on the 3D surface rendering of the brain 
based on the known gyral morphology, and marked the center part of the 
midprefrontal gyrus as the left DLPFC target (Brodmann 9/46). The cathodal electrode 
was placed on the right OFC (1 cm above the eyebrows).  
Next, the participants returned in the scanner. For the following fMRI 
measurements were performed using an EPI sequence (TR/TE=2000/29ms; flip 
angle=90°; FOV=192x192mm²; resolution=3x3x3mm3; slice thickness/ 
gap=3.00/1.00mm; number of slices=40). The images were corrected for the temporal 
difference in acquisition among different slices, and then the images were realigned to 
the first volume for head-motion correction. Participants were excluded from the 
dataset because either translation or rotation exceeded ±1.5 mm or ±1.5o, or mean 
frame wise displacement (FD) exceeded 0.3. The resulting volumes were then de-spiked 
using AFNI's 3dDespike algorithm to mitigate the impact of outliers. The mean BOLD 
image across all realigned volumes was co-registered with the structural image, and the 
resulting warps applied to all the de-spiked BOLD volumes. Finally, all the co-registered 
BOLD images were spatially normalized into MNI space and smoothed (8 mm full-width 
half-maximum). 




Concerning the criticism paradigm, audiographic comments were presented over 
non-ferrous, gradient damping headphones, in a blocked design. More specifically, four 
separate blocks of 2 minutes each except the last was followed by 30 sec silence making 
the total paradigm lasting for total duration of 8.30 min (see Figure 1). During this 
criticism paradigm participants were instructed to keep their eyes open, focusing on a 
fixation cross projected on a plexiglas screen mounted at the end of the scanner bore.    
During the resting-state measurements before tDCS, just after stimulation, and after 
the criticism paradigm, which involved each time 7.12 minutes of scanning (see Figure 
1: T1: before tDCS, T2: after tDCS and before criticism, T3: after criticism), the 
participants were asked to stay awake with their eyes closed, as recommended for 
optimal resting state data (e.g., van den Heuvel & Pol, 2010; Patriat et al., 2013). To 
reduce sensory confounds as much as possible, the light in the room was dimmed 
during scanning. After the scan, participants confirmed that they had been awake 
throughout the scan and had complied with the instructions. 
During the fMRI procedure two questionnaires were repeated several times (see 
details in Figure 1). To record any possible mood changes between the scanning blocks 
(which consisted of 3 resting state blocks, a real/sham tDCS stimulation block, and the 
criticism paradigm), mood was measured at five time points during the procedure: 
before the first resting state, after the first resting state, after the tDCS/sham session, 
after the criticism paradigm, and finally after the last resting state. The MRSI was 
administered three times during the fMRI procedure, after each of the three resting 
states. Both questionnaires were read out loud to the participants through the 




















The fMRI data were analyzed using both the AFNI and SPM12 package. For the 
criticism paradigm, the spm maps were submitted to an 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA with comment 
type (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) as the within-subjects factor, order (first real 
then sham vs. first sham the real tDCS) and condition (real vs. sham tDCS) as the 
between subjects’ factors. Significance was set at the cluster level FWE corrected with 
p<0.001 and k of 73 voxels. Post-hoc T-tests were performed for the significant 
interaction clusters for the 3 comment types (positive vs negative vs neutral). 
For the seed FC analysis, several additional processing steps preceded the 
analysis of the voxel-based correlations. Several spurious or nonspecific sources of 
variance were removed from the data through linear regression: i) six head motion 
parameters obtained in the realigning step, ii) the averaged signals of no interest from 
subject-specific white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), iii) the whole-brain 
signal. Following this, the residual time series were linearly detrended and temporally 




band-pass filtered (0.008-0.1 Hz). Then the time series were further scrubbed with 
FD<0.3 (Power et al., 2012).  
Correlation maps were obtained by extracting the BOLD time course from the 
seed region (precuneus) and computing the correlation coefficients between that time 
course and the time courses in all other brain voxels. The degrees of freedom for 
Pearson correlations were adjusted to keep it the same for all participants after 
censoring (i.e., movement artifact reduction).  
To evaluate the effects of tDCS on functional connectivity before and after the 
criticism paradigm, we compared the rest fMRI before and after the criticism paradigm. 
We specifically focus on the precuneus/PCC as region of interest. This seed region was a 
6-mm-diameter sphere centered on a point with MNI coordinates (x= -7, y= -45, z= 24), 
designed to encompass the precuneus/PCC. These MNI coordinates were selected 
following the recent paper of Berman et al. (2011), defining centroids of nodes within 
the default mode network, related to rumination. The seed for our FC analyses was 
selected anatomically and is similar in location to regions that other authors have used 
to define the default network (Greicius et al., 2003; Fox et al. 2005; Monk et al., 2009; 
Raichle, 2010). The precuneus/PCC has been argued to play a central role in the default 
mode network (Greicius et al., 2003), and has been found to reveal connectivity in the 
default network most effectively (Greicius et al., 2003) and is a reason why other 
authors have used the precuneus/PCC as a seed to define the default network (Monk et 
al., 2009). In addition, it is an area of greatest deactivation during off-task behavior 
(Shulman et al., 1997). To combine results across participants and compute statistical 
significance, Fisher’s r-to-Z transformation was used to convert these correlation maps 
into Z-maps characterizing the rsFC of the seed region in each point. 
These rsFC maps were used in a  2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance using GLMFlex and 
SPM12 toolbox, with Time (pre-post criticism) as the within-subjects factor, and 
Condition (real vs. sham), and order (first real then sham vs. first sham then real tDCS) 
 as the between subjects’ factors, while correcting for age, and mean FD. Significance 
was set at the cluster level FWE corrected with p<0.005 and k of 257 voxels. Post hoc 
two-sample T-tests were performed to further investigate the characteristics of the 






Data analytical plan: behavioral data 
All collected data were analyzed with SPSS 23 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). First, to investigate if mood changes occurred throughout the study protocol, 
and if this was linked to any of the condition types, we performed a 2 (condition: tDCS 
vs sham) X 4 (time: Tvas1 = before tDCS/sham; Tvas2 = after tDCS/sham and before 
Criticism; Tvas3 = after criticism, before last resting state; Tvas4 = after last resting state) 
repeated measures MANOVA, with the mood scales as multiple dependent variables. To 
follow up on the significant changes in time, we compared each mood scale between 
blocks, which allowed us to register any mood change before and after a scanning 
block. As such, we could evaluate the impact of the resting states, stimulation block and 
criticism paradigm on mood separately. For this, we performed another MANOVA with 
2 (condition) X 2 (time), with the mood scales as multiple dependent variables. To 
understand if there are any behavioral changes in self-referential thoughts, we looked 
at the three MRST questionnaires, which were measured after each resting state block. 
For the MRST data we used a 2 (condition: tDCS and sham) X 3 (time: TMRST1 = after first 
resting state; TMRST2 = after second resting state; TMRST3 = after last resting state)  
repeated measures ANOVA. 
RESULTS 
Mood 
The MANOVA revealed only an effect of time F(13, 18) = 5.45, p = .002 (not of 
Condition nor an interaction effect), that is over the whole study procedure. Univariate 
main effects of time were significant for fatigue, F(1, 30) = 3.72, p = .035; vigor, F(1, 30) 
= 12.33, p = .002; anger F(1, 30) = 3.48, p = .048; and cheerfulness, F(1, 30) = 6.40, p = 
.001., and there was a trend for depressed feelings: F(1, 30) = 2.85, p = .061; but no 
changes in tension, F(1, 30) = 0.93, p = .41.  
Following up on the significant changes in time, we performed separate MANOVAs 
to compare the scores between each time point. First, we compared mood before 
(Tvas1) and after (Tvas2) tDCS/sham, which revealed that participants were more tired, 
F(1, 30) = 13.27, p = .001; less vigorous, F(1, 30) = 22.41, p < .001; and less cheerful F(1, 
30) = 8.58, p = .006 (all other effects were ns).  




For our manipulation check (before versus after the criticism paradigm = Tvas2 vs 
Tvas3) the MANOVA revealed differences in mood indicating that participants were 
more angry, F(1, 30) = 9.15, p = .005, more depressed, F(1, 30) = 5.55, p = .025, and 
(trend) less cheerful, F(1, 30) =4.05, p = .053. By comparison, there were no differences 
in feelings of fatigue, vigor, and tension (all other effects were ns). In summary, these 
data show an increase in feelings of anger, depression and a decrease in cheerfulness 
after criticism (although the criticism paradigm included neutral, praise and criticism, 
the last block was always criticism to maximize the effect on self-referential thinking 
before the last resting state).  
Finally, we compared mood before (Tvas3) and after (Tvas4) the last resting state, 
which revealed only a significant decrease of vigor, F(1, 30) = 5.13, p = .031 (all other 
effects were ns). 
MRST 
The repeated measures ANOVA yielded no main effects of condition or time (all p’s 
> .09). However, a significant interaction effect of condition and time F(2,30) = 3.83; p = 
.033.  In the real stimulation condition ruminative self-referential thoughts decreased 
from TMRST1 to TMRST2 t(31) = 2.63; p = .013, with no change between T2 and T3 t(31) = 
0.30; p = .767, and an overall decrease from TMRST1 to TMRST3 t(31) = 2.24; p = .033., 
showing that the decrease in MRST after real tDCS stayed significant after the criticism 
paradigm. In the sham condition no significant changes over all time-points were 
observed. When comparing between conditions, no baseline differences were observed 
(p = .20), showing that the decrease in the real stimulation condition (and no changes in 
sham) cannot be ascribed to differences in baseline MRST.  
fMRI results of the mixed ANOVA  
In short, the 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA whole brain analysis showed a significant three-way 
interaction effect for two clusters in the left and right temporal cortices, and one in the 
visual cortex. There was also a significant three-way interaction cluster observed in the 





(See Table 1B) showed that both praise and criticism compared to neutral showed 
significant decrease of precuneus activity after real tDCS (not after sham), however 
more importantly the decrease after criticism was substantially larger when compared 
to praise. See for details in Table 1. 
Finally, the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA seed FC analysis examining the effects of tDCS before 
and after criticism showed a significant interaction cluster in the left ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex  (MNI coordinates: x= -6, y= 51, z= -15).  Follow up T-Test revealed 
that real tDCS resulted in a decreased FC between the precuneus/PCC seed and the 
vmPFC. On the other hand, without stimulation, (sham) FC increase between these two 
areas after receiving criticism. See for details Table 2. 
 
Table 1. A) Results of the 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA whole brain analysis, showing the areas with significant 
interaction. Script (neutral vs. positive vs. negative) is the within-subjects factor, Order (first real then 
sham vs. first sham the real tDCS) and Condition (real vs. sham tDCS) the between subjects’ factors. 
Significance was set at the cluster level FWE corrected with p<0.001 and k of 73 voxels. B) Post-hoc 
significant T-test clusters within the 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA interaction mask for the 3 scripts. The significance 
threshold was set at p< 0.05 for all analyses. Only significant clusters with a threshold of k>50 are 
displayed. 
(A) 2 X 2 X 3 ANOVA (CONDITION X ORDER X SCRIPT)  
 Cluster size Anatomical 
region 





     
CONDITION NO SIGNIFICANT CLUSTERS EMERGED 
  
ORDER 2247 Superior 
Temporal gyrus 
Left 21 197.74 -60 -21 0 
 1925 Superior 
Temporal gyrus 
Right 22 182.66 60 -15 0 
 4055 Lingual Gyrus Right 18 26.45 18 -87 -3 
 114 Cingulate Gyrus Right 31 13.52 6 -36 42 
SCRIPT NO SIGNIFICANT CLUSTERS EMERGED 
 
 
 2-WAY INTERACTION 
CONDITION X 
ORDER 
No significant clusters emerged 
ORDER X SCRIPT  No significant clusters emerged 
   
SCRIPT X 
CONDITION 
No significant clusters emerged 
 
 3-WAY INTERACTION 
CONDITION X 
ORDER X SCRIPT 
2038 Superior 
Temporal gyrus 
Left 21 242.04 -57 -21 3 
 1851 Superior 
Temporal gyrus 
Right 22 241.85 57 -15 0 
 4288 Middle 
Occipital Gyrus 
Left 18 29.73 -9 -96 9 
 103 Cingulate Gyrus Right 31 12.15 3 -36 42 






(B) Post-hoc T tests comparing real > sham tDCS 
Contrasts  Cluster 
size 
Anatomical region Hemisphere BA T-value Peak coordinates 
(x,y,z) (mm) 
Neut > Pos  
 
236 Precuneus Right 19 2.65 33 -84 36 
 218 Precuneus Left 19 3.07 -21 -75 30 
 58 Middle Occipital Gyrus Left 37 3.00 -54 -69 0 
 99 Precuneus Left 7 3.71 -27 -60 63 
Neut > Neg  
 
78 Middle Temporal Gyrus Left 21 2.39 -54 3 -27 
 94 Precuneus Right 7 2.74 21 -57 30 
 80 Middle Temporal Gyrus  Left 37 2.28 -45 -60 0 
 53 Middle Temporal Gyrus Right 37 2.25 45 -60 -3 
Pos > Neg  77 Precuneus Right 31 3.28 21 -45 12 
 
 
Table 2. A) Results of the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA seed analysis, showing the areas with significant 
interaction effects with the precuneus seed. Time (pre-post criticism) is the within-subjects factor, Order 
(first real then sham vs. first sham the real tDCS) and Condition (real vs. sham tDCS) the between 
subjects’ factors. Significance was set at the cluster level FWE corrected with p<0.005 and k of 257 voxels. 
B) Post-hoc significant T-test clusters within the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA interaction mask. The significance 
threshold was set at p< 0.05 for all analyses. 
 
(A) 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA (TIME X CONDITION X ORDER)  
 Cluster size Anatomical 
region 





     
TIME No significant clusters emerged 
  
ORDER No significant clusters emerged  
 
CONDITION no significant clusters emerged 
 
 2-WAY INTERACTION 
CONDITION X 
ORDER 
No significant clusters emerged 
ORDER X TIME No significant clusters emerged 
       
TIME X 
CONDITION 
No significant clusters emerged 
       
       
 
 3-WAY INTERACTION 
TIME X ORDER X 
CONDITION  
257 Medial Frontal 
Gyrus 










(B) Post-hoc T tests comparing real > sham tDCS 
Contrasts  Cluster 
size 
Anatomical region Hemisphere BA T-value Peak coordinates 
(x,y,z) (mm) 
Pre > Post 
 
      
Sham No significant clusters emerged 
       
Post > Pre       
       
Sham 204 Medial Frontal Gyrus Left  11 -3.43 -9 57 -6 
       
Pre > Post       
       
Real 161 Medial Frontal Gyrus Left  11 3.63 -6 51 -18 
Post > Pre       
       
Real No significant clusters emerged 
       
DISCUSSION 
In this innovative study we investigated the impact of a single sham controlled 
neuromodulation session in real time, on the underlying processes of rumination (self-
referential processes), when confronted with online interpersonal criticism. Therefore, 
we exposed participants to different comment types (neutral, praise, and criticism) and 
measured neural activity related to each emotional condition. In a follow up we used 
the coordinates of the ROI that emerged from these initial results to create a seed for 
our FC analyses. This study is the first to use a ‘real time’ design to investigate the 
experimental manipulation of the underlying processes of rumination in response to 
interpersonal criticism. In sum, we examined three different issues (1) how does tDCS 
affect self-referential thinking (rumination), (2) how does tDCS affect neural activity 
during (a) praise and (b) criticism; and (3) what are the effects on functional 
connectivity with regard to self-referential processing, by comparing the resting states 
before and after the criticism paradigm. 
We first focus on our neurobiological results. The data showed a differential pattern 
of neural activity in the precuneus during the criticism paradigm. More specifically, 
after real versus sham tDCS, both praise and criticism compared to neutral comments 
showed a significant decrease of precuneus activity. However, and more importantly, 
the decrease after criticism was substantially larger compared to the decrease after 
praise. In other words, when people are confronted with social evaluations (both praise 
and criticism), and only after real tDCS, they showed a decrease in activation of the 




precuneus, an area known for its crucial role in self-referential processing (Cavanna et 
al., 2006). This is indicative for less self-referential processing when confronted with 
social evaluations (both positive and negative). Moreover, the observation that the 
decrease of precuneus activity during criticism was larger than during praise after real 
tDCS, nicely demonstrates the impact of neuromodulation on negative self-referential 
processing (see also Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). The involvement of the precuneus is in 
line with several correlational studies (Cavanna & Trimble 2006; Summerfield et al. 
2009, Freton et al., 2014) showing a possible role of this region in referential processing 
of socially relevant situations in everyday life.  
Second, in a follow up we conducted functional connectivity analyses based on the 
regions of interest. Our data revealed that real tDCS resulted in a decreased FC between 
the precuneus/PCC seed and the vmPFC. On the other hand, sham resulted in a FC 
increase between these two areas. Importantly, the precuneus/PCC has been argued to 
play a central role in the default mode network (Greicius et al., 2003), and ruminative 
thought has been further associated with increased connectivity and activity of the 
DMN (Sheline et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011; Davey et al., 2012; Marchetti et al., 
2012). In addition, vmPFC–precuneus/PCC interactions are thought to underlie aspects 
of self-referential processing (Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011). Hence, our 
results are indicative of the beneficial effect of tDCS on the reduction (cognitive control) 
of self-referential thinking (rumination) after real tDCS. Moreover, after sham tDCS we 
see the expected increase of self-referential thinking (rumination) in two important 
nodes of the DMN, in response to criticism.  
In line with  our neurobiological results, our behavioral results showed a significant 
decrease in rumination (MRST) when comparing before versus after tDCS. Furthermore, 
we also observed such a decrease when comparing MRST scores at baseline with MRST 
scores after criticism. However, this was only observed in the real stimulation condition, 
but not in the sham condition. As such, we reestablish the beneficial effect of 
neuromodulation on cognitive control over negative information (e.g., Boggio et al., 
2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013) and specifically on rumination (Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013). 
Based on these results, several questions remain to be answered. First, what does 





focused on self-referential processing, Northoff et al. (2006) found that commonly 
activated regions lie in dorsal and ventral areas of the medial prefrontal and anterior 
cingulate cortices, as well as the precuneus/PCC. These regions are cortical midline 
structures (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004) and overlap with the intrinsic default mode 
network (Raichle et al., 2001; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Qin and Northoff, 2011). The 
default mode network is found to be activated during resting state functional imaging 
and deactivated during functional imaging of cognitive task performance (Fox et al., 
2005; Smith et al., 2009). When the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in externally driven 
cognitive processing, self-referential processing is believed to predominate (Gusnard et 
al., 2001) and more activity in the DMN is observed. Importantly, when taking into 
account social evaluations, research in social cognitive neuroscience has demonstrated 
the particular functions of the precuneus/PCC in social inferential processing 
(Kuzmanovic et al., 2012). Moreover, there is increasing evidence that self-referential 
processing as well as the cortical midline structures (such as the precuneus/PCC) play a 
major role in the development, course, and treatment response of major depressive 
disorder (Nejad et al., 2013). Among the CMS, the precuneus may underlie the 
integration of self-relevant mental simulations with past experiences (Cavanna and 
Trimble 2006; Summerfield et al. 2009). Moreover, the results of Freton et al. (2014) 
are consistent with the role of the precuneus in higher order mental processes that are 
related to self-referential processing and self-consciousness. In addition, Freton et al. 
(2014) reported that negative correlations between rumination and the posterior CMS 
during self-focus could be interpreted as a difficulty for ruminators to disengage from 
spontaneous and unwanted thought during self-referential processing. Hence, our 
findings further underscore the existing social-cognitive neuroscience literature on the 
importance of the precuneus/PCC in self-referential processing when confronted with 
social evaluations. 
A second question is, what can we conclude from the functional connectivity 
between the precuneus/PCC and the vmPFC? When looking at brain imaging studies, 
rumination scores are often positively correlated with FC within the default mode 
network at rest (including the anterior and posterior midline structures) (Siegle et al., 
2002; Ray et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2009; Berman et al., 2011a,b; Farb et al., 2011; 
Hamilton et al., 2011; Vanderhasselt et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2012; Paul et al., 2013; 




Nejad et al., 2013). The resting state literature offers support to the idea that disrupted 
cognitive control leads to intrusion of ruminative thought, and ruminative thought has 
been further associated with increased connectivity and activity of the default mode 
network (Sheline et al., 2010; Hamilton et al., 2011; Davey et al., 2012; Marchetti et al., 
2012). The dynamics between the cognitive network and the DMN can also be seen 
from a bottom-up perspective where increased maladaptive self-focus and thereby 
hyperactive cortical midline regions interfere with normal cognitive function (Nedjat et 
al., 2013). Hence, drawing upon our FC results, we find support in the literature, 
emphasizing the role of the vmPFC as crucial ROI in processing emotional features 
during social cognition. Connectivity changes between the vmPFC and other DMN 
regions have been found in Theory of Mind (ToM) studies and morality studies (Li et al., 
2014). Moreover, the vmPFC is engaged in identifying self-relevant information and 
assessing the salience of stimuli (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; 
Northoff et al., 2006). Both the amygdala and precuneus/PCC are densely and 
reciprocally connected with vmPFC (Price, 1999; Barbas, 2000; Raichle et al., 2001; 
Greicius et al., 2003), and vmPFC–precuneus/PCC interactions are thought to underlie 
aspects of self-referential processing (Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011). As 
such, the functional significance of the vmPFC–precuneus/PCC circuit suggests 
involvement in self-reflective cognition (Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011). 
Therefore, we can conclude that our results, which shows an decreased functional 
connectivity after real tDCS (not sham) between the precuneus/PCC and the vMPFC, are 
indicative of the beneficial effect of tDCS on the reduction (cognitive control) of self-
referential thinking (rumination) after real tDCS. 
A third question is how does tDCS over the DLPFC influences the activity of a distant 
region (precuneus/PCC)? A possible explanation might be found in the functionality of 
the regions observed in our study. There is sufficient evidence of the positive influence 
of tDCS over the left DLPFC on cognitive control over rumination (e.g., Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013). In addition, The precuneus/PCC has been argued to play a central role in the 
default mode network (Greicius et al., 2003). Moreover, it has been found to reveal 
connectivity in the default network most effectively (Greicius et al., 2003), and 
ruminative thought has been further associated with increased connectivity and activity 





al., 2012). As such, we can understand this link between anodal tDCS over the left 
DLPFC and activity in the precuneus/PCC as an effect of cognitive control over self-
referential thoughts (rumination). Support for this explanation can be found in a study 
of Keeser et al. (2011), who could demonstrate that prefrontal tDCS changes 
connectivity of resting-state networks, for instance, in the DMN of which the precuneus 
plays a key role. Therefore, it can be concluded that prefrontal tDCS modulates resting 
state functional connectivity in distinct functional networks of the human brain (see 
also Park et al., 2013; Stagg, et al., 2013). Our findings are also in line with the idea that 
rumination could stem from a top-down control failure, where lack of inhibition from 
dorsolateral prefrontal regions to the anterior cingulate cortex allows free reign of 
ruminative thoughts (Nejad et al., 2013), as has been proposed by de Raedt & Koster 
(2010). On the other hand, a bottom-up process with overactive limbic regions could 
tag negative emotionality and salience to experiences leading to increased rumination 
and thereby to an interference with normal higher cognitive function and control 
(Nejad et al., 2013). Hence, targeting this neural circuitry - which is central in the 
conceptualization of depression, that is, a failure to recruit top-down control (e.g. PFC) 
to regulate limbic activity (e.g., amygdala; Davidson et al. 2002; Mayberg 1997; Ochsner 
et al. 2002; Phillips et al. 2003; Phan et al. 2004) - has already been shown to have a 
beneficial effect on rumination (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013) and on other depressive 
symptoms (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2013). Hence, this study is the first that investigated 
neural activity during (ROI analysis), as well as before and after criticism (resting state), 
following a single tDCS session in the scanner, revealing the beneficial effects of 
neuromodulation on the underlying processes of rumination (within the DMN).  
Finally, what do the behavioral results tell us and how do they relate to our 
neurobiological results? Our behavioral data further corroborate the finding that tDCS 
has a beneficial effect on rumination, and as such, further supports our neurobiological 
data. Interestingly, when comparing the MRST scores before and after the criticism 
paradigm, no changes in the real tDCS condition are observed. Although this might 
seem puzzling, we feel that it is strong proof for the potent positive influence of tDCS 
on the cognitive control of rumination. More specifically, by applying tDCS over the 
DLPFC, self-referential thoughts are decreased in such a way that even criticism does 
not affect (increase again) these self-referential thoughts. Thus, our data further 




indicate the beneficial use of tDCS in coping with rumination, which holds promise for 
both experimental and clinical research. In addition, it also underscores the relevance 
of tDCS in clinical treatment, in particular in the treatment of depressed patients, since 
depression is strongly associated with rumination about negative self-relevant 
information (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
Nonetheless, some limitations in this study need to be discussed. Because we were 
not aware of any other existing questionnaires to measure momentary ruminative self-
referential thoughts, we used a short inventory that has only been used in a limited 
number of studies (Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; Mor et al., 2013; 
Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Hence, further research is needed with this questionnaire. 
Secondly, we focused on women because rates of depression are higher in women than 
they are in men (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002) and because we sought to minimize 
heterogeneity in our data due to gender effects. As such, this limits our generalizability 
towards a mixed/male population. Thirdly, and more importantly, further research with 
MDD population is needed to investigate the effects of criticism on rumination and the 
DMN activity within the depressed brain. This is especially important given that 
depressed patients, compared to healthy individuals, have been found to have 
difficulties disengaging from negative information (for an overview, see De Raedt & 
Koster, 2010). Moreover, depression has been conceptualized as a failure to recruit 
prefrontal top-down cognitive control to regulate emotion producing subcortical limbic 
activity (Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008). Thus, the reaction of MDD patients to 
interpersonal criticism might induce more and stronger effects than with healthy 
participants, challenging even more the underlying neuro-circuitry that was targeted in 
this study. However, it was crucial to start testing our causal hypotheses in healthy 
individuals, without the possible interference of the depressed mood state on the 
mechanisms under study. 
In sum, we used a similar paradigm as Hooley et al. (2009; 2012) but added an 
experimental manipulation (while under fMRI) that allowed us to shift away from pure 
correlation research. By doing so we investigated the possible influence of tDCS on the 
processing of emotional stimuli (i.e., interpersonal criticism) and investigated FC during 
rest, to unravel the neurobiological basis of (ruminative) self-referential processing 





intricate relation between criticism, self-referential thoughts (rumination) and the 
underlying neurobiological processes (regional brain activity and FC). Our results further 
underscore the importance of the precuneus/PCC, as well as the FC with the vmPFC in 
self-referential processing and the impact of interpersonal criticism. Our study was the 
first to apply neurostimulation during fMRI as an experimental manipulation to 
investigate the neural correlates underlying the link between criticism and self-
referential processes in real time, showing that tDCS can alter behavioral and neural 
responses of self-referential processing.  With this novel design, we go beyond previous 
correlational research investigating the underlying processes of rumination, to increase 
our  insights in the ‘real time’ neural correlates of these processes while confronted 
with social evaluations. In addition, our experimental manipulation is indicative of the 
importance to use non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques to better 
understand underlying mechanisms of cognitive processes such as rumination, and the 
possible application for and transdiagnostic treatment focusing on underlying processes 
(see De Raedt, 2015).  
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ELECTRIFYING THE SELF: THE EFFECT OF 
TDCS ON THE LINK BETWEEN 




Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is characterized by negative self-esteem and 
ruminative self-referential thinking. Ruminative thinking has been related to decreased 
prefrontal control. In addition the link between MDD and criticism sensitivity has been 
demonstrated. However, how the relation between criticism and ruminative processes 
affects self-esteem is still unclear. In this study we explored whether the effect of 
neurostimulation of the prefrontal cortex on implicit self-esteem would be mediated by  
a decrease in momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts (MRST) before and after 
receiving criticism. We used a single, sham-controlled session of anodal transcranial 
Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) to the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. After 
receiving tDCS/sham we exposed 32 healthy, right-handed female participants to 
critical audio scripts and subsequently asked them to complete two Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedures (IRAPs), to implicitly measure actual and ideal self-esteem. 
First, our behavioral data indicated a significant decrease in momentary ruminative self-
referential thinking (MRST) after real but not sham tDCS. Second, although there was 
no immediate effect on implicit self-esteem of tDCS, an indirect effect was found 
through a double mediation model, with the difference in MRST baseline-after 
stimulation and baseline-after criticism, as our two mediators. Hence the larger the 
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decrease of MRST of participants after real tDCS (and after receiving criticism), the 
higher their actual self-esteem. In line with the beneficial effects of neuromodulation in 
the treatment of MDD, these results further show how tDCS can influence cognitive 
processes, such as rumination, and subsequently, its effect on self-esteem. Given the 
significant role of rumination and negative self-esteem in MDD, these data expand our 
knowledge of the mechanisms of action of tDCS by showing its role in controlling self-
referential processes and self-esteem as well as the important impact interpersonal 
criticism can have on this relation. 





 Although nobody likes to be criticized, for some people receiving criticism is 
especially problematic. Various studies have demonstrated the link between depression 
and sensitivity to criticism (e.g., Burcusa & Iacono, 2007; Hooley et al., 2009). Hooley 
and colleagues (2009) found that even after full recovery from an major depressive 
disorder (MDD) episode, neural responses to criticism do not appear to normalize. That 
is, when individuals who have recovered from depression are exposed to criticism, they 
demonstrate decreased reactivity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) 
compared to never-depressed individuals (Hooley, Gruber, Scott, Hiller, & Yurgelun-
Todd, 2005; Hooley et al., 2009). Neuroimaging studies have indicated that a functional 
balance between ventral (ventral anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) and dorsal 
compartments in the brain (dorsal ACC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex-DLPFC) is 
necessary for maintaining homeostatic emotional control (Seminowicz et al., 2004; 
Johnstone et al., 2007; Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Wager et al., 2008). As such, many 
studies suggest that the DLPFC initiates emotion regulation by causing inhibition of the 
amygdala (e.g., Siegle et al., 2007).  
Furthermore, research has shown that being criticized triggers self-referential 
thoughts and feelings that need to be regulated to prevent maladaptive emotional 
responses to occur (e.g. Vanderhasselt, Remue, Ng, Mueller & De Raedt, 2015). Being 
criticized is a distressing experience and activates self-conscious emotions (e.g., feeling 
hurt) and self-referential thinking (rumination). Importantly, rumination has been put 
forward as one of the most important underlying vulnerability factors for depression, 
and has been associated with onset, severity, as well as duration of depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Even though most studies consider 
ruminative thinking as a trait characteristic, self-referential thoughts fluctuate 
continuously (especially in healthy individuals) and might provide valuable information 
to understand the development of a stable trait. Therefore, we explored the occurrence 
of momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts during rest periods before and after 





result in a stream of undirected thinking patterns – and momentary ruminative self-
referential thinking (MRST) was assessed during this period using a short self-report 
questionnaire. MRST refers to a temporary cognitive thought pattern that is highly 
dependent on situational cues but that is independent of mood. Trait rumination, on 
the other hand, is defined as “behaviors and thoughts that focus one's attention on 
one's depressive symptoms and on the implications of those symptoms”, and is 
measured as a habitual thinking response to sadness (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569).  
The social context is an important aspect of the self as it relates to emotions 
(Hofmann, 2014). When you are criticized, the most common effect is that it can easily 
and negatively impact the self. Moreover, research has shown the detrimental impact 
of criticism on cognitive processing and thinking styles, such as rumination (e.g., Saffrey 
& Ehrenberg, 2007; Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna, Metcalf, & Dimidjian, 2015), and 
subsequently its effect on self-esteem (e.g. Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko, & Eccleston, 
2009); Although healthy individuals can regulate (i.e. cognitive control) criticism-
induced thoughts and emotions to protect their self-esteem (and maintain emotional 
well-being), according to the cognitive theories of depression, depressed patients 
would show decreased self-esteem. Importantly, low self-esteem is not only a correlate 
but also a vulnerability factor for depression (Orth and Robins, 2013). Interestingly, 
however, much work on self-esteem and its relationship to depression has employed 
self-report measures which are susceptible to a variety of response biases such as social 
desirability and self-presentation. Many cognitive models of depression also assume 
that self-related schemata are not always consciously accessible and thus cannot always 
be verbally reported upon (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Young, 1994). 
Consequently, it is questionable whether the use of self-report measures may provide 
meaningful information about such schemata. To overcome these limitations, a number 
of alternative procedures have recently emerged that reduce the participant’s ability to 
control their responses and operate in such a way that they do not depend on 
introspective access to the psychological content of interest. Whereas self-report 
measures of self-esteem can be classified as explicit measures that capture non-
automatic instances of self-evaluation (e.g., self-evaluations that occur when 
participants have ample time and resources to reflect or have the intention to evaluate 
the self), implicit self-esteem measures can be thought of as measures that register 




more spontaneous, automatic self-evaluations (e.g., self-evaluations that occur quickly 
or when participants do not have the intention to evaluate the self; see De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009). Interestingly, in recent years several studies 
have investigated the implicit positivity bias in (remitted) depressed patients and 
healthy controls (e.g. Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy, 2001; De Raedt, Schacht, 
Franck & De Houwer, 2006). Based on these findings Remue and colleagues (2013; 
2014) investigated the premise that self-esteem might be broken down into actual and 
ideal self-esteem, with different patterns specifically related to depressive 
symptomatology (dysphorics versus non-dysphorics). Results showed higher levels of 
ideal self-esteem versus actual self-esteem in dysphorics, while a reversed pattern 
appeared in non-dyshporics (Remue, De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, Vanderhasselt, & De 
Raedt, 2013).  
Hence, in this study we investigated the impact of being criticized on MRST and how 
this affects a person’s self-esteem (both actual and ideal self). Moreover, in order to 
investigate the neurocognitive mechanisms behind this process, we manipulated 
cognitive control over these self-referential thoughts, by using neuromodulation over 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area that is known for its regulatory 
function of coping with negative cognitions. The (dorsolateral) prefrontal cortex is 
implicated in regulating affective states, providing cognitive control over stress and 
emotion responsiveness (Davidson, et al., 2002a) and plays a crucial role in the 
integration of different aspects of cognition, memory, and emotional regulation by 
managing the cognitive control over emotional stimuli and emotional behavior (Hariri, 
Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Kalish & Robins, 2006; Knight, Staines, Swick, & Chao, 
1999; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Moreover, a variety of studies have shown that non-
invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) over the left DLPFC can be effective in reducing 
depressive symptoms in the short term in clinically depressed populations (for an 
overview, see De Raedt, Vanderhasselt & Baeken, 2015).  
To experimentally test if an experimental manipulation would lead to a greater 
control over these self-referential processes, and thus decrease rumination and 
negative self-esteem, we applied anodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) 
to the DLPFC. TDCS consists of the application of a weak, direct electric current through 





induce polarization-shifts on the resting membrane potential (Brunoni et al., 2011). It 
seems important to note that tDCS elicits after-effects lasting for up to one hour 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003). Anodal stimulation generally facilitates 
cortical activity, whereas cathodal tDCS has opposite effects. It is also the case that a 
single session of neurostimulation over the prefrontal cortex does not affect mood in 
healthy participants. From this it can be concluded that the cognitive effects of 
neurostimulation cannot be explained simply by mood changes (see Remue, Baeken & 
De Raedt, 2016). In many previous studies it could already be demonstrated that tDCS 
of the left DLPFC enhances cognitive processes, both for non-emotional (e.g., Fregni et 
al., 2005; Leite, Carvalho, Fregni, & Goncalves, 2011; Mulquiney, Hoy, Daskalakis, & 
Fitzgerald, 2011) as emotional processes (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013a; Wolkenstein & 
Plewnia, 2013). Given that prefrontal regions have been associated extensively with 
cognitive and emotional regulatory processes (Cerqueira et al., 2008; Damasio, 2000; 
Davidson et al., 2002b). More interestingly, anodal tDCS of the prefrontal cortex has 
been found to reduce state rumination via a beneficial change in working memory 
processes (Vanderhasselt, Brunoni, Loeys, Boggio, & De Raedt, 2013) and also causally 
reduce other depressive symptoms (e.g., Brunoni et al., 2013).  
Therefore, we hypothesized that healthy participants would show less ruminative 
self-referential thoughts after criticism during the real compared to the sham condition. 
Furthermore, given that no study to date has provided a clear effect of rumination on 
self-esteem we wanted to explore this link by investigating the correlations between 




Participants were provided with full details regarding the aims of the study and 
the procedure. All participants gave their written informed consent and received a 
financial compensation for their participation. The study was approved by the Ethical 
Committee of the University Hospital of Ghent University (UZGent), and carried out 




according to the Declaration of Helsinki. This study was part of a larger study on 
neurocognitive effects of tDCS on the brain2. 
Participants 
Participants were 36 right-handed female students with a mean age of 22.61 (SD = 
2.22, Min = 20, Max = 29). They were recruited through student forums of Ghent 
University as well as via social media. Each participant received €80 for participation. 
Right-handed female participants were selected because of sex-related influences on 
neural mechanisms underlying emotion processing (e.g. Cahill, 2003; Van Strien & Van 
Beek, 2000). Participants were screened before study entry, based on the following 
inclusion criteria: (a) no current/history of psychiatric disorder, using the International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.; Sheehan et al., 1998), (b) BDI score below 14, (c) 
no current/history of neurological problems or implanted metal objects over the head, 
and (d) no current psychotropic medications. Of the 36 participants, one chose not to 
return for the second session, three had to be cancelled due to technical problems 
during the scans. Before the start of the protocol, the remaining 32 participants were 
randomly allocated to a real-first (n=16) or sham-first (n=16) stimulation condition. 
Materials 
Questionnaire measures To assess the presence of depressive symptoms, we used 
the self-report Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; Van der 
Does, 2002). For explicit self-esteem we administered the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(RSES; Rosenberg, 1965; Franck, De Raedt, Barbez, & Rosseel, 2008). Further, in order to 
assess trait tendencies to ruminate, the Rumination Response Scale was used (RRS, 
Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003, Dutch translation by Raes & Hermans, 
2007). However, to obtain a state measure of ruminative thoughts following the 
criticism paradigm, we used a questionnaire that measures momentary self-reflective 
rumination, that is, the Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory (MRSI) (Mor, 
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Marchetti, & Koster, 2015). All six questions relate to self-referential, ruminative 
thoughts as a particular self-focus on feelings, reactions, and sensations without 
immediate environmental demands. The statements are not inherently negative or 
positive, and are considered as a state measure of ruminative thinking (e.g. “Right now, 
I am thinking about how happy or sad I feel” and “right now, I wonder why I react the 
way I do”). Participants were requested to indicate whether they were engaging in 
these thoughts during the 10 minutes of rest. They were asked to respond using a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) in order to 
measure the intensity of self-referential thinking. Mood state was assessed using six 
visual analogue scales (VAS) measuring how fatigued, vigorous, angry, tense, depressed 
and cheerful participants were feeling “at this moment”. The VAS is a 10 cm line, with 
endpoints from “not at all” to “very much”. Finally, participants were presented with 
the same twelve target stimuli as used in the IRAP (see below) (six positive and six 
negative) and asked to evaluate each of them using a five-point scale ranging from 0 
(Totally Disagree) to 4 (Totally Agree). Each word was rated twice, once with respect to 
their actual self (e.g., ‘I am successful’) and once with respect to their ideal self (‘I want 
to be successful’). In this way we sought to acquire two broad measures of self-esteem, 
one related to self-reported actual (SR Actual) and a second related to self-reported 
ideal (SR Ideal) self-esteem. 
IRAP. The IRAP is a computerized latency-based measure which requires 
participants to respond quickly and accurately to stimuli in ways that are deemed 
consistent or inconsistent with their prior learning history. Specifically, half of the IRAP 
trials require participants to respond in ways that are consistent with their (assumed) 
history of learning, while the other half require participants to respond in ways that are 
inconsistent with that same history. For instance, participants might be asked to 
respond “True” to the statement “I want to be Good” on half of the trials but to 
respond “False” on the other half. The difference in time taken to respond on 
consistent relative to inconsistent trials - defined as the IRAP effect - is assumed to 
provide an index of the strength or probability of the targeted relations. In the current 
study, each IRAP involved a minimum of two and a maximum of six practice blocks 
followed by a fixed set of six test blocks. Each block consisted of 24 trials that presented 




one of two self-related label stimuli (e.g., ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’) in the presence of one of 
two types of target stimuli (positive or negative words drawn from the same set as the 
IAT) and required participants to emit one of two relational responses (‘True’ or ‘False’). 
In this way, the IRAP was comprised of four different types of trials (or “trial-types”: 
Self-Positive; Self-Not Positive, Self-Negative and Self-Not Negative; see Figure 1). Trials 
were presented in a quasi-random order so that each of the four trial-types appeared 
six times within each block in a random order. Prior to the IRAP participants were 
informed that they would complete a word categorization procedure that required 
them to follow a general rule for responding. Specifically, on one set of blocks they 
were presented with the message “Please respond AS IF I am positive and I am not 
negative” (self-positive block), while on the alternative set of blocks they were 
presented with the message “Please respond AS IF I am negative and I am not positive” 
(self-negative block). Stated more precisely, a correct response during self-positive 
blocks required participants to select ‘True’ when ‘I Am’ appeared with a positive target 
stimulus (e.g., ‘Intelligent’) or when ‘I Am Not’ appeared with a negative target (e.g., 
‘Stupid’). At the same time, participants were also required to choose ‘False’ when ‘I 
Am’ appeared with a negative word or when ‘I Am Not’ appeared with a positive target 
stimulus. The opposite pattern of responding was required during self-negative blocks. 
The general rule for responding was alternated across each IRAP block to form three 
successive pairs of test blocks. The IRAP commenced with a pair of practice blocks. 
Participants progressed from the practice to the test blocks when they met accuracy (at 
least 80% accuracy) and latency criteria (median latency of less than 2000ms) on a 
successive pair of practice blocks. Failure to meet these criteria resulted in re-exposure 
to another pair of practice blocks until participants either achieved the mastery criteria 
or a maximum of three pairs of practice block were completed. Failure to satisfy task 
requirements following three pairs of practice blocks resulted in participants being 
thanked, debriefed and dismissed (in the current study one participant failed to 
complete both IRAPs, another three failed the actual self IRAP while six more did not 
satisfy those same criteria during the ideal self IRAP). When the above criteria were 
met, a fixed set of three pairs of test blocks were then administered. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the actual and ideal self IRAPs differed only with respect to their self-related 





valenced target stimuli using the terms ‘I Am’ or ‘I Am Not’ the ideal self IRAP required 
participants respond to the same stimuli in terms of ‘I Want To Be’ or ‘I Don’t Want To 
Be’. 
Figure 1. Examples of the four trial-types used in the actual self-esteem IRAP. On 
each trial, a label stimulus (e.g., ‘I am’ or ‘I am not’), a target stimulus (e.g., ‘Successful’ 
or ‘Incompetent’) and two relational response options (True and False) were shown on 
the screen. Note: the ideal and actual self IRAPs were identical in all regards except for 
their respective label stimuli (‘I want to be’ and ‘I don’t want to be’ versus ‘I am’ and ‘I 
am not’ respectively). 
 
Criticism Challenge 
While inside the scanner, we exposed participants to critical, praising, and 
neutral comments. These comments were directly addressed at the participant (e.g., 
“One of the things that bothers me about you is that you…”) and made by a female 
voice. All comments were based on comments previously used and validated (Hooley et 




al., 2009; 2012) and were the same for each participant. The criticism paradigm was 
used to trigger self-referential processes in healthy participants. The content of the 
comments were of different emotional content (positive, negative, neutral). The 
paradigm always followed the same order: neutral, positive, neutral, and always 
finishing with negative. Negative was always last to avoid emotional contamination and 
to maximize the negative impact just before the resting state. Each scanning epoch 
began with a 30-sec rest period, followed by 30 sec of criticism (or praise or neutral), 
another rest period, another 30 sec of criticism (or praise or neutral), and then another 
rest period. Each participant underwent four scanning epochs; thus, each participant 
heard two 30-sec segments of critical and praising commentary and  four 30-sec 
segments of neutral commentary (this was chosen so there would be a buffer between 
the praising and the critical comments). Only one type of emotional comment was 
included within a scanning epoch (i.e., two critical or two praise or two neutral remarks; 
no commingling of comment type occurred within an epoch). Participants heard each 
comment once only, and participants did not hear any of the comments before the 
scanning. The criticism paradigm lasted 8.30 minutes in total. 
tDCS 
 Direct electrical current was applied in the fMRI scanner using a saline-soaked pair of 
surface sponge electrodes (35 cm2) and delivered by a battery-driven stimulator, which 
was MRI-compatible. To localize the target stimulation areas (left DLPFC and right 
supraorbital), Brainsight neuronavigation system (Brainsight™, Rogue Research, Inc) 
was used to navigate into participant structural cerebral MRI and localize both left 
DLPFC as contralateral supraorbital area. Subsequently, the anode was placed over the 
individually located DLPFC, while the cathode was placed over the contralateral 
supraorbital area. A constant, direct current of 1.5 mA with 30 s of a ramp up was 
applied for 20 min. For sham, the electrodes were positioned in the same way as when 
administering tDCS stimulation; however, the current was ramped down after 30 
seconds. This procedure is a reliable sham condition (Nitsche, et al. 2008). Most 
participants (26/32) could not distinguish real from sham tDCS (the 6 others answered 





previous stimulation, the second session was carried out after an interval of at least 
48h.  
Procedure 
Upon arrival on their first day the participants were given an overall explanation of 
the studies protocol, signed the informed consent, and filled in the PCS. Next, each 
participant started with an anatomical 3D MRI scan. This scan was used to navigate into 
participants structural cerebral MRI and localize both left DLPFC as contra lateral 
supraorbital area, using Brainsight neuronavigation system (Brainsight™, Rogue 
Research, Inc). Subsequently, the tDCS montage was applied based on each 
participant’s specific localization marks. Thereafter, the participants took place under 
the scanner and the tDCS wires were connected to the patches at the end of the 
scanner bore. During the scan period on different time points, participants were asked 
about their mood (VAS) and their momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts 
(MRST). For a full overview of these time points see Figure 2. The scan started with a 
5min resting, after which the tDCS session was switched on for 20min in the real vs 
30sec in the sham condition (each with a ramp up and down of 30sec). The tDCS-block 
was followed by another resting state. Next the criticism paradigm with the neutral, 
positive and negative audio scripts was administered. Each epoch, which lasted for 
2:31, began with a 30 second rest period. This was followed by 30 seconds of 
commentary, another rest period, another 30 seconds of the same type of 
commentary, and then another rest period. Thus, in each epoch, participants heard two 
30 second segments of each type of commentary. There was no commingling of 
comment type in the same scan epoch; participants heard either two critical, two 
neutral or two praising comments. For each scan-session participants heard different 
comments (of the same valence), so that they never heard the same (e.g. criticism, 
neutral or praise) comment twice. The order of the presented epochs was neutral-
positive-neutral-negative. This order was chosen to always end with the criticism audio 
comments, to maximize the effect on the following resting state. Each individual 
comment was heard only once and participants did not hear any of the recorded 
comments prior to the scanning. Finally, a last resting state ended the scan period. 




When participants left the scanner, they cleaned up the patches and the conduction gel 
before sitting in front of a computer. Before performing the two IRAPs, each participant 
listened to a repetition of the negative audio scripts they were exposed to in the 
criticism paradigm. Thereafter, they completed both IRAPs, which were 
counterbalanced, and finished with the explicit self-esteem questionnaire, i.e., semantic 
differentials. At the end of the first day participants received several trait 
questionnaires to be filled in before their next scan session. The second day of each 
participant was identical as the first, with the distinction of the pre-scan and 
neuronavigation. For an overview see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of the protocol during the two days of testing. 
 
 
Data analytic plan 
All collected data were analyzed with SPSS 23 (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences). First, for mood analysis we used a 2 (condition: tDCS vs sham) X 5 (time: Tvas1 
= before tDCS/sham; Tvas2 = after tDCS/sham and before Criticism; Tvas3 = after criticism, 





IRAPs) repeated measures MANOVA, with the mood scales as dependent variables. To 
follow up on the significant changes in time, we compared each mood scale between 
blocks, which allowed us to register any mood change before and after a scanning 
block. As such, we could evaluate the impact of the resting states, stimulation block and 
criticism paradigm on mood separately. For this, we performed another MANOVA with 
2 (condition) X 2 (time), with the mood scales as multiple dependent variables.  
For the MRST data we used a 2 (condition: tDCS and sham) X 3 (time: TMRST1 = after 
first resting state; TMRST2 = after second resting state; TMRST3 = after last resting state) 
repeated measures ANOVA.  
To unravel the mechanism of the effect of tDCS on actual self-esteem, we 
performed a mediation analysis. To this end, we considered the path analysis model 
presented in Figure 3. More specifically, we hypothesized that tDCS would decrease the 
MRST from baseline to after tDCS (the path coefficient a1), which in turn would lead to 
larger decrease in MRST from baseline to after the criticism paradigm (the path 
coefficient d1). Furthermore, it was hypothesized that a larger decrease in MRST from 
baseline to after the criticism paradigm would lead to a higher self-esteem (the path 
coefficient b2). To assess the absence of the direct effect of tDCS on change from 
baseline in self-referential thinking after the third resting state after controlling for the 
change from baseline in self-referential thinking after the second resting state (the 
coefficient a2) and the absence of an effect  of change from baseline in self-referential 
thinking after the second resting state on self-esteem after controlling for the change 
from baseline in self-referential thinking after the third resting state (the coefficient 
b1), we performed a χ2-difference test between the saturated model and the reduced 
model (with the path coefficients of the dashed arrows constrained to zero). In the 
absence of those effects, the mediated effect of tDCS on self-esteem through change 
from baseline in self-referent thinking is given by the product of coefficient a1 X d1 X 
b2. A 95% confidence interval for this mediated effect can be obtained using percentile-
based bootstrap. Given the within-subject design of our study, the path coefficients 
were estimated by relying on the difference method (Judd, Kenny and McClelland, 2001 
; Josephy, Vansteelandt, Vanderhasselt and Loeys, 2015). 
 
 








The MANOVA revealed only an effect of time F(7, 24) = 16.13, p < .001 (not of 
Condition or an interaction effect). Univariate main effects of time were significant for 
vigor, F(1, 29) = 4.19, p = .023; anger F(1, 29) = 3.95, p = .029; tension, F(1, 29) = 7.43, p 
= .001, and cheerfulness, F(1, 29) = 4.13, p = .016. By comparison, there was a trend for 
fatigue, F(1, 29) = 2.50, p = .071; and no differences in depressed feelings: F(1, 29) = 
1.51, p = .23.  
Following up on the significant changes in time, we compared all significant effects 
over the different time points. First, we compared mood before and after tDCS/sham 
(Tvas1vsTvas2), which revealed that participants were more tired, F(1, 29) = 13.27, p = 
.001; less vigorous, F(1, 29) = 22.41, p < .001; and less cheerful F(1, 29) = 8.58, p = .006 
(all other effects were ns). For our manipulation (before and after the criticism 
paradigm, Tvas2vsTvas3) check the MANOVA revealed differences in mood before versus 
after the criticism paradigm indicating that participants were more angry, F(1, 29) = 
9.15, p = .005, more depressed, F(1, 29) = 5.55, p = .025, and (trend) less cheerful, F(1, 





vigorous, and tensed (all other effects were ns). In summary, these data show an 
increase in feelings of anger, depression and a decrease in cheerfulness after criticism 
(although the criticism paradigm included neutral, praise and criticism, the last block 
was always criticism to maximize the effect on self-referential thinking before the last 
resting state). 
Next, we compared mood before and after the last resting state (Tvas3vsTvas4), which 
reveals only a significant decrease of vigorous, F(1, 29) = 5.13, p = .031 (all other effects 
were ns). Finally, we compared mood before and after the IRAPs (Tvas4vsTvas5), here 
participants showed only a significant decrease in tension, F(1, 29) = 12.84, p = .001 (all 
other effects were ns). 
Momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts (MRST) 
The repeated measures ANOVA yielded no main effects of condition or time (all p’s 
> .09). However, a significant interaction effect of condition and time F(2,30) = 3.83; p = 
.033.  In the real stimulation condition ruminative self-referential thoughts decreased 
from TMRST1 to TMRST2 t(31) = 2.63; p = .013, with no change between T2 and T3 t(31) = 
0.30; p = .767, and an overall decrease from TMRST1 to TMRST3 t(31) = 2.24; p = .033., 
showing that the decrease in MRST after real tDCS stayed significant after the criticism 
paradigm. In the sham condition no significant changes over all time-points were 
observed. When comparing between conditions, no baseline differences were observed 
(p = .20), showing that the decrease in the real stimulation condition (and no changes in 
sham) cannot be ascribed to differences in baseline MRST.  
Implicit Measure: IRAP 
Response latency data were transformed into D-IRAP scores using an adaptation of 
Greenwald et al.’s (2003) D algorithm (for details of this data transformation see 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart I, & Boles, 2010). For each IRAP, we calculated 
a single overall D-IRAP score - one for the actual self IRAP and a second for the ideal self 
IRAP. These values were calculated so that higher scores reflected higher levels of 
(actual or ideal) self-esteem. When submitted to a 2 (Condition) x 2 (IRAP-Type; actual 




vs. ideal) ANOVA, a main effect for IRAP-Type, F(1,29) = 12.75, p <.001, with 
participants producing more positive scores on the ideal-self relative to the actual-self 
IRAP. However, no two-way interaction between IRAP-Type and Condition was 
obtained, F(1,29) < 1, p =.60.   
Relation MRST and Self-Esteem 
Although we did not find evidence of a total effect of tDCS on actual self-esteem, it 
is still worthwhile to further explore the presence of an indirect effect through changes 
in self-referential thinking. As noted by Loeys, Moerkerke and Vansteelandt (2015), the 
power to detect an indirect effect may be higher than the power to detect a total 
effect. The possible concern about unmeasured common causes of mediator and 
outcome, which would invalidate the estimated indirect effect, is limited here as 
subject-specific unmeasured common causes can be eliminated in within-subject 
designs (Josephy et al., 2015). We first compared the fit of the saturated model shown 
in Figure 3 with the fit of the reduced model (with the path coefficients of the dashed 
arrows set to zero), and found the reduced model to fit equally well (χ2(2)=4.059 
,p=.131 ). The estimated coefficients on the mediation path are all significant: a1=2.323 
(95% CI: 0.548 to 4.065), d1=-0.929 (95% CI: -1.228 to -0.616) and b2=-0.025 (95% CI: -
0.039 to -0.010). The estimated indirect effect thus equals 0.054, indicating that tDCS 
leads to higher self-esteem through changes in self-referential thinking. Since the 95% 
bootstrap CI (0.009 to 0.123) does not contain zero, we find evidence of an indirect 
effect 
Implicit-Explicit correlations 
Finally, we looked at the correlations between the implicit measures of self-esteem 
(i.e., IRAP) and the explicit measures (RSES, self-reported actual and ideal self-esteem). 
However, no significant correlations were found between implicit and explicit measures 







In this study we first investigated whether real versus sham tDCS would affect the 
change in momentary self-referential thinking by comparing baseline MRST scores with 
the scores after tDCS/sham and after criticism. Second, we investigated the influence of 
DLPFC neurostimulation on self-esteem. Results showed a significant decrease in MRST 
before and after tDCS as well as a decrease in MRST at baseline compared to after 
criticism in the real stimulation condition, but not in the sham condition. As such, 
reestablishing the beneficial effect of neurostimulation on cognitive control over 
negative information (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013) and 
specifically on rumination (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013b). Next, anodal tDCS of the left 
DLPFC (compared to sham) did not directly influence actual (or ideal) self-esteem. 
However, we observed that the influence of anodal tDCS (and not sham stimulation) on 
actual self-esteem was mediated by the decrease in MRST, but only after criticism 
(double mediation model). In other words, the larger the decrease of momentary self-
referential thoughts of participants after DLPFC neuromodulation (and after receiving 
criticism), the higher their actual self-esteem. For the ideal self-esteem no significant 
results were found in either condition. Reports of mood after (as compared to before) 
the criticism paradigm confirmed increased emotional reactivity (feeling more angry, 
more depressed, and less cheerful) in response to criticism.  
Given that neuroimaging studies have indicated that a functional balance between 
ventral (ventral anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) and dorsal compartments in the brain 
(dorsal ACC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex-DLPFC) is necessary for maintaining 
homeostatic emotional control (Seminowicz et al., 2004; Johnstone et al., 2007; 
Ochsner and Gross, 2008; Wager et al., 2008), we sought to challenge the neural 
circuitry implicated in depression, not by inducing a sad mood, but by using a 
psychosocial stressor that has been empirically linked to the relapse process (Hooley et 
al., 2009). Our findings show that cognitive and phenomena can be modulated to 
increase the ability to regulate momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts during a 
period of idleness, a process closely linked to the ruminative thinking style. This 
interplay between biological and cognitive factors is in line with a theoretical 
framework of De Raedt & Koster (2010), which states that cognitive control processes 




play a central and causal role in the relation between prefrontal neural activation and 
rumination. Moreover, the current results go beyond correlational findings by using an 
experimental method that involves neurostimulation of the DLPFC to temporarily 
enhance its activity, thus allowing causal inferences. This is an important next step for 
building and refining our understanding of the neural bases of rumination within 
depression. 
It seems important to mention that there are many ways to assess momentary self-
rumination (see Smith & Alloy, 2009). In studies that have investigated momentary 
ruminative thoughts, participants are asked randomly during daily life to report the 
content of their thoughts (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Moberly & Watkins, 2008), or 
ruminative thoughts are induced by asking participants to focus their attention on a 
specific thought (presented by a statement) for some time (e.g., Cooney, Joormann, 
Eugene, Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). In line with the study of 
Vanderhasselt et al. (2013b) we asked individuals to rest without any specific task, 
which is known to result in a stream of undirected free thoughts (Filler & Giambra, 
1973; Giambra, 1989; James, 1890). Because we did not interfere during this rest period 
and asked our questions immediately afterwards, we were able to assess naturally 
occurring self-focused thoughts without linking them to a precise emotional content or 
response to negative mood. Importantly, these self-referential thoughts do not 
necessarily have unconstructive consequences (Watkins, 2008), however, depression 
vulnerable individuals have the tendency to focus their thoughts on negative 
information and personal concerns. It is therefore crucial to understand how self-
evaluative ruminative thoughts can be regulated in order to prevent them from 
becoming unintentional and unconstructive, particularly in individuals who 
demonstrate a tendency to ruminate in everyday life, such as patients with depression. 
Interestingly, strong criticism in the context of a generally supportive relationship may 
be less disruptive to cognitive functioning than even mild criticism in the context of a 
non-supportive relationship Kaiser et al. (2015). Alternately, individuals with non-
supportive partners may become habituated to criticism, and therefore may be less 
sensitive to the disruptive effects of criticism. On a broader level, supportive 





regulate emotions, while non-supportive relationships may feature maladaptive 
transactions that exacerbate stress (Hofmann 2014). 
This study is the first to find a link between rumination, criticism and a subsequent 
effect on (actual) self-esteem. Research has shown the detrimental impact of criticism 
on cognitive processing and thinking styles, such as rumination (e.g., Saffrey & 
Ehrenberg, 2007; Kaiser, Andrews-Hanna, Metcalf, & Dimidjian, 2015), and 
subsequently its effect on self-esteem (e.g. Weisbuch, Sinclair, Skorinko, & Eccleston, 
2009). Moreover, people who have experienced depression are at risk of relapse or 
recurrence (Burcusa & Iacono, 2007) especially if they live in highly critical family 
environments (Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998). However, the process of how a critical 
environment could lead to depression remains unclear. This study might therefore shed 
a light on this intricate connection, by showing that the possibility to control rumination 
after receiving criticism is linked to a person’s (actual) self-esteem. In other words, the 
better a person deals with self-referential thoughts (rumination) after criticism, the 
more positive he or she perceives him/herself, and subsequently might prevent a 
negative self-esteem that can lead to depression. Therefore, it seems indispensable to 
disentangle the possible vulnerability factors that might lead to a low self-esteem. 
Importantly, in a meta-analysis of Sowislo and Orth (2013) the authors investigated the 
relation between self-esteem and depression. Whereas the vulnerability model states 
that low self-esteem contributes to depression, the scar model states that depression 
erodes self-esteem. Based on 77 studies on depression, the findings supported the 
vulnerability model. Therefore, understanding the influential causes of self-esteem (e.g. 
dealing with rumination, criticism/critical environment), interventions aimed at 
increasing self-esteem might be useful in reducing the risk of depression. Given that 
criticism might be linked to self-esteem, and our results show the possible beneficial 
impact of neurostimulation of the DLPFC on dealing with rumination after criticism, a 
first step might be taken in a better understanding of the development of low self-
esteem and subsequently depression. 
A puzzling finding in our study is related to our IRAP results when comparing them 
with previous self-esteem IRAP findings that showed higher actual and lower ideal self-
esteem (Remue et al., 2013) or absence of any difference between actual and ideal self-
esteem (Remue et al., 2014), in healthy participants. Here we see a somewhat reversed 




effect of lower actual versus higher ideal self-esteem. A first possible explanation for 
this reversed effect might be the time between the end of the stimulation and start of 
the IRAPs, which was about one hour. The after-effects of tDCS can last up to one hour 
(Nitsche & Paulus, 2001; Nitsche et al., 2003), however, there was no apparent 
difference between real and sham condition on implicit self-esteem, which might be 
explained by the fact that the after-effects of the tDCS had worn out. Nonetheless, we 
see a neuromodulation effect on the MRST and subsequently a link between the 
decrease in rumination after criticism and actual-self, so there is an effect of real tDCS 
on self-esteem to be noted, but more indirectly through MRST (after criticism). Another 
possible explanation might be the impact of the criticism on actual but less on ideal self-
esteem. By receiving self-critical comments, participants might be affected in their 
current state and subsequently their state-oriented actual self. Moreover, this might 
also partly explain the absence of a relation between MRST decrease in the tDCS 
condition and the Ideal self IRAP. Namely, in this study we focused on state rumination, 
that is, how people feel about their momentary self-referential thoughts. Moreover, 
when implicitly measuring actual self, we also tap into a more state-oriented concept, 
how a person sees himself right now. However, when we look at the propositional 
nature of the ideal self, we are focusing more on a future oriented self, how a person 
would like to be. Hence, tapping into a more trait oriented concept. It is therefore 
plausible that the momentary nature of how we measure rumination as well as the way 
we exposed participant to interpersonal criticism in that moment, affects the state 
oriented part of self-esteem, i.e. actual but not ideal. Hence, leading to a decrease in 
actual but not ideal self-esteem for the IRAP performances.  
Some limitations of the present study should be emphasized. Because we were not 
aware of any existing questionnaires to measure momentary ruminative self-referential 
thoughts, we used a short inventory that has only been used in a limited number of 
studies (Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; Mor et al., 2015; Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013b). Secondly, we focused on women because rates of depression are higher in 
women than they are in men (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002) and because we sought to 
minimize heterogeneity in our data due to gender effects. Another important limitation 
might be that although we describe the audio scripts paradigm as a criticism paradigm, 





investigate the differences in neural activity between the valences (see Remue et al., in 
preparation). However, given that every participant finished with the negative audio 
script and the mood scores indicated an increase of negative mood after the criticism 
paradigm (comparing before and after), we can assume that it does trigger the 
projected stress (criticism) induction. Finally, given the absence of a control condition 
for self-esteem after criticism (i.e., no condition where participants heard only neutral 
audio scripts), we cannot make any conclusion about the possible influence of criticism 
on the previously reported findings of actual and ideal self-esteem in healthy 
participants (see Remue et al., 2013; 2014).  
In line with the beneficial effects of neuromodulation in the treatment of MDD, 
these results further show how tDCS can influence cognitive processes, such as 
rumination, and subsequently, its effect on self-esteem. Given the significant role of 
rumination and negative self-esteem in MDD, these data expand our knowledge of the 
mechanisms of action of tDCS by showing its role in controlling self-referential 
processes and self-esteem as well as the important impact interpersonal criticism can 
have on this relation. This study was the first to show a link between (state) rumination 
and self-esteem, showing a more positive actual self-esteem after a larger decrease in 
momentary ruminative self-referential thoughts, but only when following criticism, by 
means of a single tDCS session over the left DLPFC.  
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RECAPITULATION OF THE RESEARCH GOALS 
The general aim of this doctoral dissertation was to unravel how the link between 
criticism and ruminative processes affects self-esteem, focusing on both behavioral and 
neurobiological processes. To investigate this mechanism, we explored whether the 
effect of an experimental manipulation of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) on self-esteem is 
mediated by rumination before and after criticism. We focused on three levels of 
measurement. First, we investigated the effects of neuromodulation (transcranial Direct 
Current Stimulation, tDCS) on rumination and self-esteem using self-report measures. 
Second, we used implicit measures to index self-esteem. Third, we assessed the 
neurobiological correlates of this process. However, before we could begin to 
investigate this question, we needed to address some prerequisites by developing and 
testing new instruments. In a general introduction both the overarching theoretical 
framework of the dissertation and the key concepts were outlined. Then, we developed 
a task to measure self-esteem in an implicit way, focusing on both actual- and ideal-self 
(Chapter 2), which was made possible by the introduction of propositions (using the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, IRAP). In a second study, we replicated the 
findings of this first study with more stringent criteria as well as a methodologically fine-
tuned design (Chapter 3). Thereafter, we conducted a systematic review to elucidate 
whether a single neurostimulation session would have an effect on mood in healthy 
participants, since mood effects might confound the  effects found on cognitive 






neurostimulation1 (repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation, rTMS) session can 
influence the physiological stress response (using heart rate variability, HRV) during 
criticism (Chapter 5). In the fifth study we applied a placebo controlled session of tDCS 
in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner, to test the possible impact of 
neurostimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) on the underlying 
neurobiological processes of rumination (regional brain activity and functional 
connectivity) before, during and after a social evaluative challenge (Chapter 6). 
Subsequently we tested whether the effect of neurostimulation of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) on implicit self-esteem is mediated by rumination before and 
after criticism (using the IRAP) (Chapter 7).   
We start this general discussion with a summary of the main findings with regard to 
our main question: what is the link between criticism and ruminative processes and how 
does it affect self-esteem, while focusing on both behavioral and neurobiological 
processes. In chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5 we answer prerequisite questions that are needed to 
answer this overarching research question, which is tackled in chapter 6 and 7. We will 
also discuss the main findings from each of these chapters. Next, both theoretical and 
clinical implications will be discussed. Finally, several limitations of the present studies 
will be considered followed by directions and challenges for future research. 
OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
Self-esteem in depression: an implicit propositional perspective 
Before we could investigate the influence of neurostimulation on rumination 
and self-esteem after receiving criticism, there was need for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the self, how to fully capture its conceptual meaning, and which 
would allow us to extend beyond the simple me-positive/negative associative 
character. Hence, in our first study we developed a self-esteem IRAP that introduced 
                                                        
1
 Although the correct term for rTMS is neurostimulation and for tDCS neuromodulation. However, 
for the readability of this paper and given its common use in the literature we will refer to 
neurostimulation for both techniques 
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propositions in implicit measurement. More specifically, the introduction of labels that 
specify the way in which concepts are to be related allowed us to differentiate between 
actual and ideal self-esteem. In the first study (chapter 2) we explored whether 
dysphoric (scoring high on the Beck Depression Inventory, BDI) and non-dysphoric 
individuals differ with regard to their actual-self and/or ideal-self. Our results indicated 
that the dysphoric group scored lower on actual self-esteem and higher on ideal self-
esteem in comparison to the low BDI group. The D-IRAP total scores also showed that 
low dysphoric individuals have more positive actual self-esteem as compared to ideal 
self-esteem. As such, the results indicated a differentiation in self-esteem scores based 
on the way it was measured, using propositions, and showed a more complex picture 
(as compared to associative measures literature) based on depressive symptomatology. 
The results of this study suggest that dysphoric individuals, who are prone to 
depression, have a higher ideal self-esteem, and lower actual self-esteem, in 
comparison to healthy participants. However, to fully test the aforementioned 
hypothesis whether positive self-esteem Implicit Association Task (IAT) scores would 
reflect different propositional relations, a direct comparison between the IRAP and the 
IAT scores is needed. Hence, in our follow up study (chapter 3) we administered a self-
esteem IAT and the previously used self-esteem IRAPs to low and high BDI groups. In 
addition, we addressed three methodological issues that arose in our first study: first, in 
attempt to increase the reliability of the observed effects, we increased the number of 
test blocks compared to the IRAPs used in chapter 2 (increasing the number of test 
blocks from 2 to 6) (see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013); second, we introduced more 
strict mastery criteria (i.e., stringent set of latency criteria), which could lead to more 
robust IRAP scores (see Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010); third, we only included items that 
were directly related to self-esteem, rather than an overlap with stimuli more related to 
depression in general. As such, we made the implicit measurement more stringent, as 
well as more methodologically fine-tuned. Results revealed no difference in and similar 
positive IAT-scores between dysphorics and non-dysphorics. However, a slightly 
different picture emerged when we looked at the IRAP-scores. With regard to the 
dypshoric individuals a significant difference was observed between their actual and 
ideal-self, showing more positive ideal-self compared to their actual self, as such, 





prone individuals and self-esteem. However, our results also revealed no difference in 
actual versus ideal-self with regard to the non-dysphoric group.  
In sum, our results of chapter 2 and 3 indicated that dysphoric and non-
dysphoric individuals experience implicit positivity towards the self. Most importantly, 
dysphoric participants revealed a stronger discrepancy between actual and ideal self-
esteem compared to non-dysphoric participants as indexed by IRAPs, with higher scores 
on ideal versus actual self-esteem. This finding not only supports the theoretical 
position that the discrepancy between actual and ideal self-esteem is related to 
depressive symptomatology but also demonstrates the added value of using implicit 
measures such as the IRAP that allow for the inclusion of propositions that can capture 
different implicit beliefs.  
The importance of neurostimulation in healthy participants: a neuroscience 
perspective 
Another prerequisite for our main research question revolved around the use of 
non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) in healthy participants. Given the accrued use of 
neurostimulation techniques in experimental studies, we wanted to thoroughly 
investigate the impact of a single session in healthy participants. Hence, we conducted 
a systematic review to identify whether a single neurostimulation session would have 
an effect on mood in healthy participants, since mood effects might confound any 
effects found on cognitive processes. In our review we included 30 studies, of which 13 
tDCS and 17 rTMS studies. We concluded that when the various shortcomings of these 
studies are controlled for - by using a single blind sham controlled, counterbalanced, 
crossover design, a large uniform sample, stimulation of one single region per session 
with a consistently spread time interval in order to exclude interaction effects with 
previous stimulation, and comparing pre versus post mood measurement between 
active and sham stimulation – no significant mood effect of neurostimulation can be 
found. More than fifteen years ago, Mosimann et al. (2000) pointed out that 
neurostimulation studies should fulfill several methodological requirements: a sham-
controlled setup, larger sample sizes, and strictly one single stimulation region per 
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session in order to exclude interaction effects with previous stimulation, to determine 
possible effects on mood in healthy participants. Fifteen years later, we can reiterate 
these guidelines and feel confident that when we take the aforementioned 
methodological demands into account, mood in healthy participants is not affected by a 
single neurostimulation session. 
 
The influence of rTMS on stress resilience: a physiological perspective 
After establishing that a single neurostimulation session does not affect mood - 
which could confound any cognitive effects - we took the next step in our scientific 
endeavor: can neurostimulation influence a person’s response when being criticized. 
Thus, we investigated if a single placebo controlled neurostimulation session could 
influence the physiological stress response (using heart rate variability) during criticism. 
Although the (criticism) induction procedure was efficient in increasing self-reported 
distress in all groups and conditions, only after real high frequency (HF)-rTMS over the 
left DLPFC was the physiological stress response diminished, as indicated by a 
significant increase in HRV. No effects were found in the sham or right side stimulation 
condition. As such, the present study was the first experimental study using HF-rTMS 
over the left DLPFC demonstrating an impact on parasympathetic modulation in 
humans. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate that increasing prefrontal brain 
activity by HF-rTMS can help attenuating physiological stress reactions in light of 
negative feedback (criticism). Moreover, these results suggest that the left DLPFC may 
be a critical brain area in the neuro-circuitry underlying stress reactivity (on negative 
feedback), and suggests that the PFC plays a role in the modulation of stress responses 
in healthy participants. By modulating this specific brain region stress resilience may be 
positively affected, which is crucial for coping with stress inducing events and dealing 
with negative feedback (criticism). Our results are indicative of the positive effects of 
rTMS on stress resilience and underscore the possible benefit of HF-rTMS as a 
transdiagnostic intervention. Finally, the results also show that effects only occur when 






Criticism in the brain: a neurocognitive perspective 
After focusing on how to conceptualize and measure self-esteem and 
investigating the possible impact of neurostimulation and its attenuating effect on 
coping with criticism, our next step was to tackle our main research question. As 
mentioned before, to answer this question we focused on different levels of 
measurement. In chapter 6 we assessed the neurobiological correlates of these 
processes. Finally, in chapter 7 we investigated the effects of neurostimulation on self-
esteem, and evaluated its link with ruminative processes in relation to criticism. Hence, 
after fulfilling the necessary prerequisites to answer our general question, we first turn 
towards the underlying neurobiological processes (regional brain activity and functional 
connectivity) of prefrontal neurostimulation and its effect on ruminative processes 
before and after an experimental induction of criticism. To accomplish this, we 
performed the study under fMRI (both during the criticism paradigm and the different 
resting states before and after). As such, we were able to investigate exactly what 
happens during the administration of criticism as well as to analyze functional 
connectivity (FC) during this process. 
Importantly, regarding social evaluation, research in social cognitive 
neuroscience has demonstrated the particular functions of the precuneus and the 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) in social inferential processing (Kuzmanovic et al., 
2012). Moreover, Cabanis et al. (2012) revealed that the precuneus and the PCC are 
involved in the evaluation of social events. Interestingly, Kuzmanovic et al. reported 
increased neural activation of the precuneus and PCC when participants were exposed 
to verbal interpersonal evaluations. Hence, we expected an activation of these regions 
during the confrontation with the audio comments. Interestingly, our data showed 
neural activity in the precuneus/PCC. More specifically, after real versus sham tDCS, 
both praise and criticism compared to neutral expressions showed a significant 
decrease of precuneus activity. However, and more importantly, the decrease after 
criticism was substantially larger compared to the decrease after praise. In other words, 
when people are confronted with social evaluations (both positive and negative) only 
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after real tDCS they showed a decrease in activation of the precuneus, an area known 
for its crucial role in self-referential processing (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). This may 
mean that participants show less self-referential processing when confronted with 
social evaluations (both positive and negative). However, the beneficial effect of tDCS 
on coping with negative self-referential thinking (rumination) was larger than coping 
with praise, showing again the possible impact of neurostimulation on state rumination 
(see also Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). As such, in line with the literature, our results 
revealed activation in the precuneus was associated with the coping of positive and 
negative evaluations describing socially relevant situations in everyday life. 
In a follow up of our neural activity data, we conducted FC analyses based on the 
regions that were implied, that is, the precuneus/PCC during resting state. Our data 
revealed that real tDCS resulted in a decreased FC between the precuneus/PCC seed 
and the vmPFC. On the other hand, sham stimulation resulted in a FC increase between 
these two areas. Given that the vmPFC is crucial in processing emotional features 
during social cognition, is engaged in identifying self-relevant information and assessing 
the salience of stimuli (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et 
al., 2006), and vmPFC–precuneus/PCC interactions are thought to underlie aspects of 
self-referential processing (Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011), our results 
underscore these findings, showing an increase in FC (in the sham condition) between 
the precuneus/PCC-vmPFC when confronted with social evaluative material towards 
the self. However, and more importantly, after real tDCS we found a decrease in FC 
between the precuneus/PCC and the vmPFC, which might indicate an increase of 
cognitive control over the underlying ruminative processes that are triggered by 
interpersonal criticism. As such, this study is the first to investigate neural activity 
during criticism as well as during resting state before and after criticism, following a 
single tDCS session, while under fMRI. Both research questions reveal the beneficial 
effects of neurostimulation on the underlying processes of rumination. Furthermore, it 
gives a convincing proof of difference in neural activity with regard to negative and 





techniques (e.g., rTMS, tDCS) as an experimental technique to understand the 
neurobiological processes underlying cognitive processes, such as rumination.  
The link criticism, self-referential processes and self-esteem after tDCS 
In our last study we tested the possible impact of a single neurostimulation of 
the DLPFC on the underlying ruminative processes before and after an experimental 
induction of criticism, and subsequently the effect on implicit self-esteem (Chapter 7). A 
first finding was the significant effect real (but not sham) tDCS had on momentary 
ruminative self-referential thoughts. When compared to baseline (i.e. measurement 
before real/sham tDCS) a significant decrease was observed in these momentary 
ruminative self-referential thoughts (MRST) after the real/sham tDCS as well as after 
the criticism paradigm. As such, these data reestablish the beneficial effect of NIBS on 
cognitive control over negative information (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007; Wolkenstein & 
Plewnia, 2013), and specifically on rumination (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). A second 
finding was the effect of real tDCS on implicit (actual) self-esteem. Although there was 
no direct effect, a double mediation effect was observed with the decrease in MRST 
from baseline to after tDCS and, crucially, a decrease in MRST from baseline to after 
criticism as mediators. In other words, the larger the decrease in momentary self-
referential thoughts of participants after prefrontal neurostimulation (and importantly 
after receiving criticism), the higher the participant’s actual self-esteem. 
In this study we showed that neurostimulation is able to increase control over 
ruminative processes after receiving criticism and that this is linked to a person’s 
(actual) self-esteem. In other words, the better a person deals with self-referential 
thoughts (rumination) after criticism, the more positive he or she perceives him/herself. 
This process might prevent a negative self-esteem leading to depression. Hence, this 
study sheds a light on the intricate connection between ruminative processes, coping 
with criticism and self-esteem. 
 




IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS 
Theoretical implications 
Based on the summary of our findings, several theoretical implications can be put 
forward. Clinical implications will be discussed in the next section. 
The Actual and Ideal Selves: Theoretical Implications for Research on Self-Esteem 
 Based on our findings that different propositional knowledge can provide a more 
elaborate view on the conceptualization of self-esteem, an important next step is to 
develop a more sophisticated understanding of how self-related cognitions impact 
implicit and explicit self-esteem. In conducting the work in this dissertation several 
points are worth noting with regard to understanding self-esteem and how to 
conceptualize it. First, based on our findings the relation between implicit and explicit 
measurements of self-esteem remain inconsistent. With this in mind, several authors 
argued that implicit and explicit measures may assess different components of cognitive 
processes (Beevers, 2005; Haeffel et al., 2007), and that implicit measures may better 
predict distress and psychopathology than explicit measures (e.g., Nock & Banaji, 2007). 
Moreover, in a recent study of Roberts and colleagues (2016) both implicit and explicit 
measures of self-esteem were administered among previously and never depressed 
individuals. Their results indicated higher implicit self-esteem, but lower explicit (trait) 
self-esteem compared to never depressed controls (in line with in line with Franck, De 
Raedt & De Houwer, 2007). As such, suggesting dissociations between implicit and 
explicit self-esteem. In addition, another possibility for the inconsistent correlations 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem, might be that implicit and explicit self-esteem 
are more strongly correlated when explicit measures are presented first (e.g., Bosson et 
al., 2000). Furthermore, Klavina and colleagues (2012), argued that one might wonder 





particularly low implicit–explicit correlations. Congruency versus discrepancy between 
implicit and explicit self-esteem seems to be a relevant personality characteristic in 
itself (e.g., Schröder-Abé et al., 2007a; b). Building further on the ideas of De Raedt et 
al. (2006) and the findings in this dissertation: a possible explanation for the recurrent 
finding of higher implicit compared to lower explicit self-esteem in (previously) 
depressed individuals, might be that their explicit self-esteem reflects a current state 
(e.g., how they feel quite poorly about themselves), while the implicit self-esteem might 
reflect more the underlying idea of how they want to be (or know how they would be if 
it wasn’t for the their current mood). Hence, it might be that explicit measures tap in to 
a state concept while implicit measures tap more into a trait concept. Support for this 
assumption can be found in early cognitive theorizing that advocated a dispositional 
conceptualization of implicit attitudes as mental representations that are highly stable 
across time and context (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey & Schooler, 
2000). In the eyes of dispositional theorists, implicit and explicit attitudes represent two 
dissociated, non-interacting types of evaluation simultaneously held toward the same 
object (e.g., the self). Unlike explicit attitudes that develop in response to recent 
information, automatic evaluations were thought to reflect mental associations formed 
through early socialization experiences (e.g., De Hart, Pelham & Tennen, 2006; Rudman, 
2004). Once formed, these associations are highly robust and resistant to change, as 
well as stable across both context and time (for a more elaborate explanation on 
implicit-explicit measurement differences see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & De Houwer, 
2011). However, in recent studies that support the dual-process models (e.g., Grumm, 
Nestler, & von Collani, 2009) the aforementioned findings that implicit attitudes 
measured implicitly are highly stable, are questioned. In Grumm et al. (2009) it is 
emphasized that implicit and explicit attitudes are the result of two distinct kinds of 
mental processes reacting to different manipulation methods. Furthermore, the results 
of our last study clearly showed that actual self-esteem (measured with the IRAP) was 
changed in function of our experimental manipulation, while the explicit measure of 
actual self-esteem did not. Therefore, our findings are inconsistent with the idea that 
implicit measures reflect a trait conceptualization, while explicit measures reflect a 
more state conceptualization. 
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Second, with the use of the IRAP, it feels important to at least briefly mention 
Relation Frame Theory (RFT), since this methodology emerged directly from RFT. RFT 
argues that language, rule-following, and stimulus equivalence are all instances of a 
type of operant behavior known as arbitrarily applicable relational responding (AARR; 
Barnes-Holmes, Luciano, & Barnes-Holmes, 2004a, b; Dymond & Roche, 2013; Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Rehfeldt & Barnes-Holmes, 2009). According to this 
perspective, ‘relating’ is a type of behavior and involves responding to one event in 
terms of another. While nonhumans and humans can both respond relationally to 
stimuli and events, the latter rapidly develop a more complex type of behavior (AARR) 
that fundamentally alters how they interact with the world around them (for a more 
detailed overview of the RFT see Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2016). Furthermore, 
drawing on a wealth of findings from the learning literature (e.g., De Houwer, 2009, 
Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009), which states that associative learning is due to 
the formation and truth evaluation of propositions about relations in the environment, 
we propose that the actual and ideal ‘selves’ are related to two qualitatively distinct 
propositions that can provide a more comprehensive understanding of the self. 
According to this perspective and building further on RFT, humans interact with the 
world around them and develop a rich and complex network of propositions based on 
and about those interactions. This network is continually updated and revised as 
contact with the environment continues and may be selectively activated in response to 
certain cues or contexts. An important sub-class of propositions within this network are 
related to the self (e.g., ‘I am good’, ‘I don’t want to be bad’, ‘Others always seem to do 
better than me’) and depending on the complexity of the proposition(s) involved, and 
the strength of that representation in memory, it may be activated automatically and 
guide how people respond during tasks such as the IAT and IRAP. 
Given that it is generally assumed that propositional processes play a key role in 
more elaborate, non-automatic evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011), the 
challenge for the above model is to explain how implicit self-esteem can be established. 
In fact, little is needed to formulate such an account (see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & De 
Houwer, 2011). It suffices to assume that propositions about the self can be activated 
automatically from memory. For example, once the proposition “I am a good person” 





deduction (e.g., recognizing that others give less to charity compared to one’s self), 
inference or on any other basis, this proposition can be stored in memory. The memory 
representation is propositional in nature insofar as it not only contains information 
about a link between the self and positive valence but also specifies the nature of this 
link, namely, that I AM good. Once the proposition is stored in memory, it can be 
activated automatically (e.g., very quickly, without having the goal to retrieve that 
knowledge, or without being conscious of the retrieved information). While implicit 
self-esteem has largely been conceptualized as involving associations between stored 
representations (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), there is no a priori 
reason why propositional knowledge could not be activated automatically and lead to 
automatic evaluations as well - even those that are related to the self. Indeed, a rapidly 
growing body of work suggests that this may be the case (Gast & De Houwer, 2012; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). 
We believe that the above propositional model may unlock a better 
understanding of (implicit) self-esteem for several reasons. First, it highlights that the 
specific way in which people relate (rather than simply associate) the self with 
evaluative content matters - even under the various conditions of automaticity. The 
propositions ‘I am good’ and ‘I want to be good’ are associatively identical (the self is 
paired with positively valenced words) and yet they lead to different outcomes on the 
IRAP for highly dysphoric individuals, which can be explained because the way the self 
relates to positive content is different in both propositions. This finding introduces an 
interesting new possibility: there could be an entire spectrum of others propositions 
related to the self that (a) can also be activated automatically in order to guide behavior 
and (b) are potentially more predictive of clinically-relevant outcomes that those 
examined thus far. For example, it could be that propositions comparing the individual 
to others provide even more diagnostic information in dysphoric and non-dysphoric 
populations (e.g., ‘I am good but others are better’). Importantly, this assumption 
extends beyond the current research area (depression) and may also apply to other 
clinical and non-clinical domains where automatically active propositions play a role 
(e.g., anxiety, obsessive-compulsions, phobias, chronic pain).  
Second, by adopting this approach we may gain new insight into the 
development and change of self-esteem across time as well as how self-related 
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propositions can be altered or eliminated when they become problematic (e.g., ‘I 
always need to be the best in order to live a happy life’). A number of researchers have 
argued that propositions - including those related to the self - can be formed, modified 
or eliminated in a wide variety of ways, from direct experience to knowledge, 
instructions, intervention, and deductive reasoning (De Houwer, 2009). Given that 
existing attempts to manipulate implicit self-esteem have started from the position that 
this construct is associative in nature (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Grumm, Nestler & von Collani, 
2008) it may be that a more effective strategy is one that directly attempts to enhance 
certain self-related propositions (actual) while reducing others (ideal) (e.g., Smith, De 
Houwer & Nosek, 2013). Third, by identifying problematic propositions within the 
laboratory we may provide clinicians with valuable information about mental content 
that needs to be modified (as in Cognitive-Behavioral Therapies; Beck, 2005) or how 
specific types of thoughts are experienced in order to promote desired behavior change 
and ultimately valued action (as in Acceptance and Commitment therapy; Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).  
In short, we suggest that the actual and ideal selves should not be 
conceptualized as two fundamentally distinct constructs but simply as two sets of 
propositions about the self that can be automatically activated and guide behavior in 
different ways. This framework seems to accommodate existing findings within the 
literature in a parsimonious manner insofar as it draws upon a restricted set of 
concepts in order to account for a wide variety of outcomes (for related arguments at 
the functional level of analysis see Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & Vahey, 2012). It may also 
allow researchers to side-step emerging conceptual issues related to how the self 
should be ‘carved up’. If new experimental evidence continues to implicate different 
‘selves’ in (implicit) self-esteem then researchers may be tempted to treat them as 
fundamentally different from one another, create a taxonomy of these selves (e.g., 
actual, ideal, other-related) and attempt to specify their precise nature and interaction. 
We believe that a more economic approach would be to start from the position that 
people can form different propositions about the self and that - in certain instances – 






Importance of NIBS: are they relevant for experimental research and/or clinical 
treatment? 
 
The advances in our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of depression, 
as well as the mechanisms of psychological interventions and treatment, have inspired 
translational efforts to develop highly intensive and targeted neurocognitive training 
interventions aimed at remediating cognitive impairments in depression (De Raedt et 
al., 2015). The use of NIBS techniques (such as rTMS and tDCS) in both experimental 
research and clinical treatment have substantially increased over the last decade(s). 
Multiple sessions of neurostimulation are frequently used in the treatment of 
psychiatric disorders such as depression (e.g., Burt et al., 2002; Mitchell & Loo, 2006; 
O’Reardon et al., 2007; Boggio et al., 2008; George et al., 2010), while experimental 
research often focuses on single neurostimulation sessions (chapters 5, 6, and 7 are 
examples). In the current project, we have used NIBS techniques to experimentally 
investigate underlying mechanisms related to depression (e.g., stress resilience, 
ruminative self-referential processing, self-esteem). Based on our findings we can 
conclude that neurostimulation can influence these processes, but more importantly, 
their application has helped us to better understand the underlying mechanisms that 
we have focused on throughout our research. First, we succeeded in demonstrating 
that the physiological stress response can be manipulated and attenuated in the face of 
a stressor (interpersonal criticism). Indeed, this is indicative of a possible beneficial 
effect of neurostimulation as a transdiagnostic intervention (applying multiple sessions 
of neurostimulation). De Raedt and Koster (2010) concluded, based on a review on the 
cognitive and neurobiological correlates of vulnerability for depression that an 
important therapeutic aim would be to restore stress reactivity. Second, our results 
indicated that a single neurostimulation session can influence (decrease) ruminative 
self-referential thoughts, as such, re-establishing the beneficial effect of NIBS on 
cognitive control over negative information (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007; Wolkenstein & 
Plewnia, 2013) and specifically on rumination, in line with the results of Vanderhasselt 
et al. (2013). In addition, through this decrease of rumination and only after receiving 
interpersonal criticism, NIBS had also an (indirect) influence on (actual) self-esteem. 
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Thus, underscoring the importance of criticism and rumination with regard to a 
person’s actual self-esteem. Furthermore, these findings underscore the use of NIBS 
techniques in the attenuating effect over ruminative self-referential processes and as 
such, reiterating the crucial importance of cognitive control with regard to rumination. 
Third, on the level of neural activity and functional connectivity, our findings are in line 
with previous physiological results. By demonstrating that when people are confronted 
with social evaluations (both positive and negative) they show a decrease in activation 
of the precuneus, an area known for its crucial role in self-referential processing 
(Cavanna et al., 2006), but only after real tDCS. However, the decrease in activity during 
self-referential thinking (rumination) was larger compared to the decrease in activity 
during praise, showing again the possible impact of neurostimulation on state 
rumination (see also Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Furthermore, our data also revealed 
that real tDCS resulted in a decreased FC between the precuneus/PCC seed and the 
vmPFC. On the other hand, sham stimulation resulted in a FC increase between these 
two areas. These results are in line with an increase of cognitive control over the 
underlying ruminative processes that are triggered by interpersonal criticism.  
That said, these results indicate that these mechanisms can be manipulated 
experimentally with effects at different levels of measurement (physiological, 
behavioural, neurocognitive). A central, common feature throughout our NIBS studies is 
the PFC as target site. Our findings suggest that the (left DL)PFC may be a critical brain 
area in the neuro-circuitry underlying stress and cognitive reactivity to interpersonal 
criticism, and suggest that the PFC plays a role in the modulation of stress and 
ruminative responses (in healthy participants). By modulating this specific brain region 
cognitive control and stress resilience may be positively affected, which is crucial for 
coping with negative life events. Our results are consistent with the conclusions of 
Davidson et al. (2002) and Maier et al. (2006) that the PFC is implicated in affect 
regulating and is vital for the protective effects of behavioural and cognitive control 
over stress responsiveness. Moreover, these findings are indicative of the potential of 
NIBS to increase cognitive control to cope with stressful stimuli, which is highly relevant 
in the treatment of stress-related disorders such as major depression (Scher, Ingram, & 
Segal, 2005). It seems important to note that this study was the first to investigate 





This novel approach opens up the possibility to accurately investigate what happens will 
these underlying processes are in play.  
 
In summary, the research in this dissertation showed the possible influence of (a 
single) NIBS session at the physiological (HRV), cognitive (rumination, criticism, implicit 
self-esteem) and neurobiological (neural activity and functional connectivity) level. In 
addition, the prefrontal cortex can be established as an important region of interest 
when investigating stress reactivity and cognitive control. Research has established the 
importance of stress resilience, rumination, coping with criticism and self-esteem within 
depression, as such, our findings tried to increase our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of these concepts and their intricate relation. Moreover, using NIBS 
techniques allowed us to experimentally and more directly scrutinize these underlying 
mechanisms in light of a better understanding of their relation. As postulated in Koster, 
Bockting, and De Raedt (2015) there are important advances in understanding and 
applying psychological interventions for depression. Integrating existing knowledge 
from psychological, physiological and neurocognitive research might hold promise for 
the development of combined interventions, allowing a personalized medicine 
approach for depression treatment, which has the potential to markedly change and 
improve the way depression is treated throughout all its stages. Below we highlight the 




The Self is just more than who I am! 
 
Establishing a more fine-grained understanding of the self-esteem concept may 
have clinical implications. Because implicit measures have been shown to predict 
distress and psychopathology (e.g. Franck, et al., 2007 ), these results further highlight 
the importance of actual versus ideal self-discrepancy theories, which might hold 
promise to refine therapeutic interventions. Moreover, our findings of a more 
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comprehensive view on self-esteem, based on the use of propositions, hold promise for 
clinical research. Following the discrepancy theory of (Higgins, 1987) which states that 
the discrepancy between the actual and ideal-self is a cognitive risk factor for 
depression, and consistent with previous work in this area (e.g., Stevens, Holmberg, 
Lovejoy, & Pittman, 2014), individuals suffering from higher levels of self-reported 
depressive symptomatology displayed greater discrepancies between their actual and 
ideal self-evaluations than those who did not report such symptoms. For instance, it is 
possible that a high ideal self in a (sub-clinical) depressed population could lead to self-
discrepancy issues, that is, people experience and internal conflict between how they 
see themselves (actual-self) and how they want to be (ideal-self). Hence, a possible 
treatment strategy in therapy might be to directly focus on some specific sets of 
propositions related to the self. In our abovementioned self-discrepancy example, one 
can try to question the higher ideal-self and scrutinize it’s “high and/or unrealistic” 
character, while at the same time focus on strengthening the actual-self through, for 
instance, competitive memory training (COMET - Korrelboom, 2011), which proved its 
efficacy in the treatment of low self-esteem for patients with a depressive disorder (for 
detail, see the randomized clinical trial study, Korrelboom, de Jong, Huijbrechts, and 
Daansen, 2009). As such, decreasing the discrepancy between what people think they 
are (actual-self) versus what they want to be (ideal-self), could be a new strategy in the 
clinical treatment of self-esteem issues within depression. 
In addition, looking at the possibilities of propositional knowledge, it could be 
that propositions comparing the individual to others provide even more diagnostic 
information in (e.g., ‘I am good but others are better’). Importantly, this assumption 
may also apply to other clinical and non-clinical domains where automatically activated 
propositions may play a role (e.g., anxiety, obsessive-compulsions, phobias, chronic 
pain). As such, maybe a better way to understand the complex concept of self-esteem, 
is to conceptualize it as a combination of an entire spectrum of propositions related to 
the self that (a) can also be activated automatically in order to guide behavior and (b) 
are potentially more predictive of clinically-relevant outcomes that those examined 
thus far. Hence, by identifying problematic propositions within the laboratory we may 
provide clinicians with valuable information about mental content that needs to be 





The importance of criticism and NIBS in the treatment of depression 
 
Given the intricate relation between ruminative self-referential thoughts and 
interpersonal criticism, it seems important to integrate our current understanding of 
these concepts for the treatment of depression. An abundance of research has shown 
the importance of rumination within depression, but only limited research has focused 
on the effect of criticism on rumination and indirectly on self-esteem.  
Our research builds further on the studies of Hooley and (2005; 2009; 2012) 
which investigated the sensitivity to criticism as an important factor in the recurrence of 
a depressive episode. These studies emphasized that people suffering a depressive 
episode had a higher risk of relapse after growing up in critical environments. More 
specifically, those people showed a lower activation of the DLPFC in response to 
criticism, thus, making them more vulnerable for relapse. As such, our research findings 
might have an added value with regard to a better coping for this population when 
confronted with criticism. Given the beneficial effects of NIBS, targeting the DLPFC, we 
can help augment cognitive control over these ruminative processes in dealing with 
criticism. However, (see next paragraph) the remediating effects of NIBS techniques will 
not suffice to prevent any relapse or provide a constructive coping with criticism in 
general. Moreover, the responsiveness to NIBS after criticism with regard to rumination 
is linked with a person’s self-esteem. In other words, NIBS allows people to better cope 
with rumination that comes as a result of criticism and as such creates a buffer for one’s 
actual self-esteem. This can be of high value in a population that is sensitive to criticism, 
has a high correlation with rumination, and is linked with lower levels of (actual) self-
esteem. In light of these accounts, it feels important to emphasize that the underlying 
processes of coping with criticism should be given a more prominent focus in the 
treatment of depression. Especially given its link to ruminative responsiveness as well 
as to actual self-esteem (both rumination and self-esteem are concepts highly relevant 
for depression and its treatment).  
In addition, since our research has shown that NIBS can have a positive impact 
on the reactivity to criticism-induced responses (physiological and cognitive), as well as 
decrease ruminative processing, this might hold promise for a combined application in 
the treatment of affective disorders. Our findings proved that NIBS can increase 
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cognitive control to cope with stressful stimuli, which is highly relevant in the treatment 
of stress-related disorders such as major depression (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005). 
Hence, we further corroborate the ideas of De Raedt and colleagues (2015), who 
propose combining conventional therapy with NIBS, given that there is a high relapse 
rate after conventional therapies, suggesting that resilience is not increased per se. In 
their review De Raedt and colleagues (2015) provided evidence that NIBS over the PFC 
influence neuro-circuits involved in rumination, cognitive control, attentional control 
and emotion regulation (De Raedt et al., 2015). Since NIBS techniques (such as rTMS 
and tDCS) are able to influence and modulate neuroplasticity (Kuo, Paulus, & Nitsche, 
2014), the underlying neurobiological abnormalities can be remediated by these 
techniques. However, this remediation effect is not sufficient to permanently restore 
any pathophysiological abnormalities, and subsequently establish constructive, 
behavioural coping. Therefore, there is the need to revalidate the given re-establishing 
effect after NIBS, by combining it with CBT (e.g., emotion regulation training, cognitive 
restructuring). Hence, the effects of NIBS could thus be boosted by combining these 
techniques with training of cognitive strategies that foster new learning and thus 
facilitate plasticity, and ultimately increase resilience for (future) depressive episodes. 
This way of combining behavioral and neurocognitive findings with the actual treatment 
of psychopathology, might open up an array of possibilities (e.g., in OCD, anxiety 
disorders, addiction) and allow us to further optimize psychopathology interventions.  
LIMITATIONS 
The studies presented in this dissertation are not without limitations. A primary 
issue concerns the different possibilities of how rumination can be conceptualized and 
operationalized. In our studies, momentary self-referential ruminative thinking refers to 
a temporary cognitive thought pattern that is highly dependent on situational cues but 
that is independent of mood. Trait rumination, on the other hand, is defined as 
“behaviors and thoughts that focus one's attention on one's depressive symptoms and 
on the implications of those symptoms”, and is considered a habitual thinking response 





ruminative thinking as a trait characteristic, self-referent thoughts fluctuate 
continuously (especially in healthy individuals) and might provide valuable information 
to understand the development of a stable trait. Moreover, there are many ways to 
assess momentary self-rumination (see Smith & Alloy, 2009). In studies that have 
investigated momentary ruminative thoughts, participants are asked randomly during 
daily life to report the content of their thoughts (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Moberly 
& Watkins, 2008), or ruminative thoughts are induced by asking participants to focus 
their attention on a specific thought (presented by a statement) for some time (e.g., 
Cooney, Joormann, Eugene, Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2012). Since we 
did not use any behavioral measures, and we were not aware of any existing 
questionnaires to measure momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts, we used a 
short (so far unpublished) inventory that has only been used in a limited number of 
studies (Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; Mor et al.,2015; Vanderhasselt et 
al., 2013). 
A second limitation to the present research is that we did not use patient 
populations. In chapters 2 and 3 a normative sample of students was used that varied in 
their respective levels of self-reported depressive symptomatology. It remains to be 
seen whether a sample of clinically depressed, remitted or recovered participants 
would also show evidence of elevated ideal and diminished actual self-evaluations. 
However, dysphoric students have been shown to be prone to depression (e.g. Ingram 
& Siegle, 2009), and can thus be considered as a clinical analogue sample. Nevertheless, 
our findings can stimulate future research aimed at investigating the role of self-esteem 
in depression in different populations. i (e.g., remitted depressed, MDD, etc.). This 
especially given that depressed patients, compared to healthy individuals, have 
difficulties to shift their attention away from negative stimuli (Williams et al., 1996). 
Moreover, depression has been conceptualized as a failure to recruit prefrontal top-
down cognitive control to regulate emotion producing subcortical limbic activity 
(Phillips, Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008). Thus, the reaction of MDD patients to 
interpersonal criticism might induce more and stronger effects than with healthy 
participants, challenging even more the underlying neuro-circuitry that was targeted in 
this study. 
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Finally, some general concerns can be highlighted, on which future research can 
focus in continuing this research line: the sample sizes on most included studies were of 
medium size, future studies should aim to replicate our findings in larger study samples; 
in almost all of our studies we focused on female participants because rates of 
depression are higher in women than they are in men (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002) and 
because we sought to minimize heterogeneity in our data due to gender effects. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The self in the eye of the beholder 
 
First, as discussed before, it may be that other implicit propositions such as 
those related to people’s personal expectations (e.g., ‘I should be’ or ‘I need to be’), 
how they compare themselves to others (e.g., ‘I am good but others are better’) or 
perceived failures (e.g., ‘I’m not good enough’), can be more important for predicting 
behaviour. With this in mind, future research could examine whether IRAPs targeting 
other types of propositional knowledge provide even better diagnostic and predictive 
information about clinical and non-clinical populations. With this in mind, a potential 
expansion of our research would be to focus more on the dimension of the other. For 
over a century, scholars have suggested that feelings about the self reflect beliefs about 
how one is evaluated by others (e.g., Cooley, 1902; Hardin & Higgins, 1996; James, 
1890; Maslow, 1970; Mead, 1934; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 
2004; for a review, see Tice & Wallace, 2003). A classic example is the notion of the 
‘‘looking-glass self” in which Cooley (1902) contends that people take the attitude 
toward the self that is assumed to be held by others. Cooley writes, ‘‘the character and 
weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our 
feeling. . .We always imagine and in imagining share the judgments of the other mind” 
(p. 184). In line with this theory, Leary and Baumeister (2000) developed the sociometer 
model (Leary & Baumeister, 2000), which states that self-esteem is a gauge of 





valued by those around him or her. Moreover, it indexes one’s apparent value to others 
and is high to the extent that individuals feel accepted and appreciated, but low when 
they feel disapproved and rejected. Hence, again mirroring the importance to 
understand the possible impact of criticism on the self and subsequently stress 
resilience and depressive symptomology. Thus, by looking further than actual and ideal 
self-esteem, future studies could pinpoint the social dimension via the proposition of “I 
ought to be”.  
Drawing upon the results on actual and ideal self-esteem, another possible 
future avenue for this research lies in the use of social media, such as Facebook, 
Instagram, etc. These platforms are a widely used and might be interesting to 
researchers focused on self-esteem, especially in young adults. Some authors have 
hypothesized that heavy use of online social networks, e.g., Facebook, may contribute 
to an increased incidence of depression (Chou & Edge, 2012; Jelenchick, Eickhoff, & 
Moreno, 2013; Soo Jeong et al., 2013). Moreover, recent studies argued whether or not 
heavy Facebook use can lead to depression (Jelenchick et al., 2013; Moreno et al., 2012; 
Wright et al., 2012). One possible interpretation of our findings contributes to this 
argument. Specifically, the idea that people create an ideal version of themselves on 
Facebook (e.g., posting only happy thoughts, fun events and beautiful pictures), rather 
than a representative view of themselves (e.g., failures, less beautiful pictures, doubts 
about the self). As such, creating a possible discrepancy between how they actually 
view themselves versus how to would like to be, ideally. In addition, because of the 
“like” function, the social component is also included, and people can perceive this as 
an evaluation of the person they are. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate 
self-esteem in relation to Facebook use and its influence on the perception of the self as 
well as the evaluative dimension of “liking” a comment, picture of status. 
 
Towards combined interventions (psychological, pharmacological, neurocognitive 
treatments) 
 
In facing the challenges of improving our understanding of depression it is clear 
that, given the heterogeneity of risk for depression (e.g., Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & 
Pedersen, 2006), a wealth of different research strategies are required and need to be 
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integrated in order to provide more solid answers on which pathogenic mechanisms 
should be targeted in order to more successfully treat depression (Koster et al., 2015). 
In this dissertation we focused on specific levels (physiological, behavioural, 
neurobiological) in order to integrate our findings and combine them in one large study 
that transcends the singular level. By doing so, we used different modalities to obtain a 
more comprehensive oversight into more innovative research in the field of 
experimental psychopathology. However, an important observation in this context is 
that given the divergence between different treatments strategies (e.g., psychotherapy, 
pharmacology, neurostimulation, etc.), with studies being frequently published in 
specialist journals, it is not always easy to obtain a comprehensive oversight into the 
most important innovations in this field or how they should be integrated. As such, 
integrating existing knowledge from psychological and neurocognitive research might 
hold promise for the development of combined interventions, allowing a personalized 
medicine approach for depression treatment, which has the potential to markedly 
change and improve the way depression is treated throughout all its stages (for an in 
depth discussing see Koster et al., 2015). In sum, there is a dire need for integration of 
psychological, pharmacological, and neurobiological findings to positively impact the 
treatment of depression on several levels of the etiology.  
 
 In this dissertation, there are several comments to be made, which could guide 
future research and further the understanding of the underlying mechanisms of 
depression. A first observation is that NIBS allows people to better cope with 
rumination due to interpersonal criticism and as such creates a buffer for one’s actual 
self-esteem. Thus, this can be of high value in a population that is sensitive to criticism, 
has a high correlation with rumination and linked with low levels of (actual) self-
esteem, such as depression. Thus, several findings in our studies need to be conducted 
with clinical populations. In chapters 2 and 3 a normative sample of students was used 
that varied in their respective levels of self-reported depressive symptomatology. It 
remains to be seen whether a sample of clinically depressed, remitted or recovered 
participants would also show evidence of elevated ideal and diminished actual self-
evaluations. Therefore, it is imperative that our findings are replicated in other affective 





the role of self-esteem in depression. A second observation is that most of our findings 
are confined to the use of an all-female population. Therefore future studies should 
replicate these results in a male population to identify the presence or absence of 
gender effects. Third, our study (Chapter 6 & 7) was the first to apply neurostimulation 
during fMRI as an experimental manipulation to investigate the neural correlates 
underlying the link between criticism and self-referential processes in real time, 
showing that tDCS can alter alter behavioral and neural responses of self-referential 
processing. With this novel design, we extend beyond previous correlational research 
investigating the underlying processes of rumination, to increase our insights in the 
‘real time’ neural correlates of these processes while confronted with social 
evaluations. Hence, there is an important need for research that investigates these 
underlying mechanisms under fMRI. Moreover, given the accrued literature on the 
DMN, we need to further fine-grain the relationship between cognitive control over 
ruminative self-referential thoughts and the DMN. Furthermore, the beneficial use of 
NIBS in our studies, should stimulate researchers to combine these techniques while 
using fMRI, accurately pinpoint its effect on the depressed brain. Finally, with regard to 
the measurement of self-referential thoughts, and given that we were not aware of any 
existing questionnaires to measure momentary ruminative self-referent thoughts, we 
used a short (so far unpublished) inventory that has only been used in a limited number 
of studies (Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Inventory; Mor et al.,2013; Vanderhasselt 
et al., 2013). Therefore, future research should further proof the sufficient 
psychometric properties of this questionnaire.  
 
FINAL CONCLUSION 
This research project set out to investigate how the link between criticism and 
ruminative processes affects self-esteem, focusing on both behavioral and 
neurobiological processes. The work in this dissertation has unlocked some parts of the 
intricate relation between these underlying mechanisms as well as the role NIBS can 
play in unraveling their functioning. Yet much remains to be discovered about how the 
link between criticism and rumination influences self-esteem. Only by further improving 
our understanding of these processes and their complex relation, can we gain a more 
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comprehensive understanding of the behavioral, cognitive and neurobiological 
foundations of the depressed brain. 
 Going back to the two friends at the start of my dissertation, Tyler and Edward, 
we might reevaluate their situation based on the findings of this dissertation. Hence, 
some deductions of their situation can be made based on our work. With regard to 
Edward, it is possible that the criticism originating from his boss lead to an increase in 
rumination, and has ultimately affected his actual self-view. But what does that tell us, 
and more importantly what could we do to help him? According to our results, it seems 
crucial to focus on how to deal with the increased ruminative thinking, following the 
interpersonal criticism, and investigate his possibly affected self-esteem. Before 
treating his depression with CBT, some NIBS techniques could be administered to 
increase his cognitive control to deal with ruminative self-referential thoughts as well as 
his stress reactivity when confronted with criticism. Either way, solely working on his 
depressive mood, would detract from the more complex relation of the underlying 
mechanisms involved in his story and this dissertation. 
 
“One's self-image may be criticized, vandalized and cruelly mocked, but it can never be 
broken unless it is surrendered.”  
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In de laatste decennia is de prevalentie van geestesziekten sterk toegenomen en 
dit vooral voor stemmingsstoornissen zoals depressie (e.g., Witcchen et al., 2011). 
Volgens de World Health Organization (WHO, 2016) is depressie een veel voorkomende 
ziekte, met op dit moment wereldwijd ongeveer 350 miljoen getroffen mensen. De 
geschatte life-time prevalentie bedraagt 19% in de Verenigde Staten (Kessler et al., 
2009) en vertoont vergelijkbare cijfers in Europa (Witcchen et al., 2011). Hoewel 
farmacologische en psychologische interventies op korte termijn tot bevredigende 
effecten leiden, is er dringend nood aan een verbeterde effectiviteit van behandelingen 
op lange termijn. Bovendien wordt een deel van de patiënten therapieresistent (tot 
15%) (Burrows, Norman, en Judd, 1994; Fava, 2003). Het is duidelijk dat een belangrijke 
uitdaging in het verbeteren van het begrijpen van de onderliggende mechanismen van 
depressie ligt in een integratie van verschillende onderzoeksstrategieën. Zo kunnen we 
meer omvattende antwoorden vinden die focussen op de pathogene mechanismen die 
aan de grondslag liggen van depressie en op die manier een betere behandeling 
mogelijk te maken (Koster, Bockting, & De Raedt, 2015). Echter, daarvoor is er dringend 
nood aan onderzoek waarbij een integratie gemaakt wordt van zowel cognitieve als 
neurobiologische bevindingen in verband met de onderliggende mechanismen van 
depressie. Een aantal van deze onderliggende mechanismen – waarvan uit onderzoek 
blijkt dat ze een grote impact hebben bij depressie – vormen de focus van dit 





Het algemene doel van dit doctoraatsproject was te onderzoeken hoe de link 
tussen kritiek en ruminatie van invloed is op zelfwaarde, waarbij we ons hebben 
gefocust op zowel gedrags- als neurobiologische processen. Om deze mechanismen te 
onderzoeken, gingen we na of het effect van een experimentele manipulatie van de 




krijgen van interpersoonlijke kritiek. Hoewel we vertrokken vanuit de opzet dat deze 
onderliggende mechanismen relevant zijn binnen depressie, was het cruciaal om met 
het testen van onze causale hypothesen te beginnen bij gezonde individuen. Op deze 
manier vermijden we een mogelijke vertekening van de te onderzoeken mechanismen 
in deze studie te wijten aan de depressieve stemming van de patiënt. In het onderzoek 
richtten we ons op drie meetniveaus. Ten eerste, onderzochten we de effecten van 
neurostimulatie op ruminatie en zelfwaarde door middel van zelfrapportagematen. Ten 
tweede, gebruikten we impliciete maten om zelfwaarde te meten. Ten derde, 
onderzochten we de neurobiologische correlaten van dit proces. Echter, vooraleer we 
deze vragen konden beantwoorden, moest er eerst aan een aantal vereisten worden 
voldaan door het ontwikkelen en testen van nieuwe meetinstrumenten. In de eerste 
plaats zijn we begonnen met de ontwikkeling van een taak om het gevoel van 
zelfwaarde te meten op een impliciete manier, met de nadruk op zowel het actuele als 
het ideale zelf (hoofdstuk 2). In een tweede studie, herhaalden we de resultaten van 
deze eerste studie met striktere criteria, evenals een methodologisch verfijnder design 
(hoofdstuk 3). Ten derde, voerden we een systematische review uit om te 
verduidelijken of één enkele neurostimulatie-sessie (repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, rTMS) een effect zou hebben op stemming bij gezonde deelnemers. Dit 
laatste, omdat stemmingseffecten de effecten op cognitieve processen zouden kunnen 
vertekenen (hoofdstuk 4). Ten vierde, onderzochten we of een placebo-gecontroleerde 
neurostimulatie-sessie de fysiologische reactie op stress (gemeten aan de hand van 
hartslagvariabiliteit) tijdens het krijgen van kritiek (hoofdstuk 5) kan beïnvloeden. Tot 
slot, combineerden we een placebo-gecontroleerde sessie van transcraniale direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) in de fMRI-scanner, om de mogelijke effecten na te gaan van 
neurostimulatie van de dorsolaterale prefrontale cortex op de onderliggende 
neurobiologische processen van ruminatie (hersenactiviteit en functionele 
connectiviteit) voor en na een experimentele inductie van kritiek (hoofdstuk 6). 
Vervolgens hebben we het effect op impliciete zelfwaarde bestudeerd (met behulp van 
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Overzicht van de belangrijkste bevindingen 
 
Zelfwaarde in depressie: een impliciet, propositioneel perspectief 
In een eerste studie (hoofdstuk 2) ontwikkelden we een impliciete maat die ons 
toeliet om te differentiëren tussen actuele en ideale zelfwaarde. Via zelfwaarde IRAPs 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006) onderzochten we of dysfore versus niet-dysfore (opdeling 
van hoge versus lage depressieve symptomatologie) individuen verschillen met 
betrekking tot hun actuele en ideale zelf. Op basis van onze resultaten konden we 
besluiten dat dysfore individuen een lagere actuele en een hogere ideale zelfwaarde 
vertoonden, en dit in vergelijking met de niet-dysfore groep. Daarnaast vertoonde deze 
laatste groep een meer positieve actuele zelfwaarde in vergelijking met hun ideale 
zelfwaarde. Op deze manier toonden de resultaten een differentiatie in zelfwaarde-
scores op basis van een impliciete meting. Door proposities (i.p.v. associaties) te 
gebruiken, kwam er een meer complex beeld naar boven gerelateerd aan depressieve 
symptomatologie.  
In onze tweede studie (hoofdstuk 3) bouwden we verder op deze bevindingen 
en includeerden we naast een propositionele, impliciete maat (IRAP) ook een 
associatieve, impliciete maat (IAT) in een vergelijkbaar opzet als onze eerste studie. 
Daarnaast pasten we in deze studie ook een aantal methodologische aanpassingen toe 
die de studie meer betrouwbaar, strikter en methodologisch verfijnder maakten. De 
resultaten toonden een vergelijkbaar positief, impliciete zelfwaarde (o.b.v. IAT scores) 
voor zowel laag als hoog dysfore individuen. Opnieuw verscheen er een meer 
gedifferentieerd beeld bij gebruik van de IRAPs. Ook hier vertoonden de dysfore groep 
een positievere ideale zelfwaarde in vergelijking met hun actuele zelfwaarde (herhaling 
eerste studie). Echter, voor de niet dysfore groep werden geen verschillen gevonden. 
De resultaten uit deze twee studies toonden aan dat zowel dysfore als niet-
dysfore individuen een impliciete positiviteit t.o.v. zichzelf ervaren. Daarnaast, 
vertoonden dysforen een grotere discrepantie tussen hun actuele en ideale zelfwaarde 
in vergelijking met niet-dysforen, met hogere ideale t.o.v. actuele zelfwaarde scores. 
Deze bevinding onderbouwt niet alleen de theoretische opvatting dat een discrepantie 
tussen actuele en ideale zelfwaarde gerelateerd is aan een depressieve 




impliciete maten (o.b.v. proposities) die verschillende impliciete overtuigingen kunnen 
onderzoeken. 
 
Zelfwaarde in depressie: een impliciet, propositioneel perspectief 
 Vervolgens (hoofdstuk 4) gingen we op zoek naar de mogelijke impact van niet-
invasieve hersenstimulatie technieken op stemming bij gezonde individuen. Dit gezien 
de effecten op stemming de effecten op cognitieve processen kunnen vertekenen. In 
een systematische review includeerden we 30 studies, waarvan 13 tDCS en 17 rTMS 
studies. Op basis van onze bevindingen konden we concluderen dat door het 
controleren van bepaalde methodologische tekortkomingen (bvb. sham-gecontroleerd, 
gecounter-balanced, een grote steekproef, etc.) er geen stemmingseffecten worden 
gevonden na een eenmalige neurostimulatie-sessie. 
 
De invloed van rTMS op stressweerbaarheid: een fysiologisch perspectief 
 Na de bevindingen uit studie 3, richtten we ons in een volgende studie 
(hoofdstuk 5) op de vraag of een eenmalige neurostimulatie sessie (rTMS) van de 
prefrontale cortex een invloed zou hebben op de fysiologische stress respons (gemeten 
via hartslagvariabiliteit) na het ontvangen van negatieve feedback (kritiek). Onze 
manipulatiecheck toonde aan dat onze kritiekinductie een zelf gerapporteerde 
stressverhoging teweegbracht, en dit over beide condities (actieve stimulatie en 
placebo). Echter, de hartslagvariabiliteit data toonden aan dat er enkel na een actieve 
stimulatiesessie een verminderde fysiologische stressrespons werd geregistreerd. In de 
placebo conditie was er geen significant effect op te merken. Deze studie was de eerste 
experimentele studie die neurostimulatie over de prefrontale cortex gebruikte die een 
impact op parasympatische modulatie aantoont. Bovendien tonen deze bevindingen 
hoe het verhogen van prefrontale activatie, via neurostimulatie, kan helpen om een 
fysiologische stressrespons te verminderen. Daarnaast kunnen we ook stellen dat door 
de prefrontale cortex te stimuleren we mogelijk de stressweerbaarheid positief kunnen 
beïnvloeden, wat cruciaal is voor het omgaan met stressvolle gebeurtenissen en 
negatieve feedback (kritiek). Deze bevindingen liggen in de lijn van de therapeutische 
effecten van neurostimulatie van de prefrontale cortex bij de behandeling van 
affectieve stoornissen (e.g., Boggio, 2008). 




Kritiek in het brein: een neurocognitief perspectief 
 Na het op punt stellen van de conceptualisatie en meetwijze van zelfwaarde en 
het onderzoeken van de impact van neurostimulatie op de fysiologische stressrespons, 
kwam onze focus te liggen op de hoofdonderzoeksvraag in dit doctoraatsproject: wat is 
de link tussen kritiek en ruminatieprocessen en hoe heeft deze invloed op zelfwaarde? 
In hoofdstuk 6 onderzochten we de neurobiologische correlaten van deze 
onderliggende processen. Daarnaast analyseerden we de effecten van neurostimulatie 
op zelfwaarde en bekeken we de daar bijhorende link met ruminatieve processen 
alsook de relatie met kritiek (hoofdstuk 7). 
 In hoofdstuk 6 voerde we de studie uit waarbij we tDCS (versus placebo) 
toepasten in de fMRI scanner, gevolgd door een sociale evaluatie-paradigma (luisteren 
naar neutrale, bekrachtigende en kritische commentaar). Door hersenactiviteit te 
meten tijdens rust voor en na het sociale evaluatie-paradigma, alsook tijdens het 
paradigma konden we in ‘real time’ onderzoeken wat het specifieke effect is van het 
krijgen van kritiek (in vergelijking met neutrale en bekrachtigende commentaar) op 
regionale hersenactiviteit en de functionele connectiviteit. In de sociale, cognitieve 
neuro-wetenschappelijke literatuur worden de precuneus en de posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC) geassocieerd met sociaal evaluatieve verwerking (Kuzmanovic et al., 2012). 
Meer bepaald toonde Cabanis et al. (2013) aan dat de precuneus en PCC betrokken zijn 
bij de evaluatie van sociale gebeurtenissen. Ook Kuzmanovic et al. (2012) 
rapporteerden een toegenomen neurale activering van de precuneus/PCC wanneer 
gezonde individuen werden blootgesteld aan interpersoonlijke evaluaties. Uit de 
resultaten blijkt inderdaad een neurale activatie in de precuneus/PCC na het ontvangen 
van bekrachtiging en kritiek. Meer specifiek, observeerden we enkel na actieve tDCS 
een significante afname van activiteit in de precuneus bij zowel bekrachtiging als kritiek 
(in vergelijking met neutrale commentaar). Belangrijk om op te merken is dat de 
afname groter was na kritiek in vergelijking met de afname na bekrachtiging. Met 
andere woorden, wanneer mensen worden geconfronteerd met sociale evaluaties, ziet 
men na actieve tDCS een afname in activatie van de precuneus. Dit kan betekenen dat 
de participanten minder zelf refererende gedachten vertonen wanneer ze 




groter was bij het omgaan met kritiek (t.o.v. bekrachtiging), is dit indicatief voor de 
gunstige impact van neurostimulatie op negatieve zelf refererende gedachten (zoals 
ruminatie) (zie ook Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). In lijn met de literatuur tonen deze 
resultaten een associatie van de precuneus met het omgaan met positieve en negatieve 
evaluaties bij de confrontatie met sociaal relevante situaties in het alledaagse leven. 
 Daarna onderzochten we de functionele connectiviteit gebaseerd op de 
relevante hersenregio’s geïmpliceerd in de neuro-wetenschappelijke literatuur en de 
resultaten van onze regioanalyses (namelijk, precuneus/PCC). Onze resultaten toonden 
na actieve tDCS een afname in functionele connectiviteit tussen de precuneus/PCC en 
de ventromediale prefrontale cortex (vmPFC). Na placebo stimulatie zagen we een 
omgekeerd effect, namelijk een toename in activatie tussen deze twee regio’s. Gezien 
de vmPFC cruciaal is bij het verwerken van emotioneel stimuli tijdens sociale cognitie, 
en betrokken is bij het identificeren van zelf refererende informatie (Gusnard et al., 
2001; Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006), alsook dat interacties tussen 
de vmPFC en de precuneus/PCC aan de grondslag liggen van zelf relevante verwerking 
(Buckner et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011), ondersteunen onze resultaten de 
bevindingen in de literatuur. Ze toonden een toename in de functionele connectiviteit 
tussen de precuneus/PCC-vmPFC na blootstelling aan sociale evaluatieve stimuli. Meer 
bepaald, na actieve tDCS zien we een daling in functionele connectiviteit tussen de 
precuneus/PCC en de vmPFC, wat indicatief kan zijn voor een toegenomen cognitieve 
controle over de onderliggende ruminatieve processen die getriggerd worden door 
interpersoonlijke kritiek. Deze studie is de eerste die neurale activiteit gedurende kritiek 
onderzoekt alsook de functionele connectiviteit voor en na de kritiek, en dit onder 
fMRI. Beide bevindingen (regioanalyse en functionele connectiviteitsanalyse) tonen de 
gunstige effecten van neurostimulatie op het omgaan met ruminatie (na het ontvangen 
van sociale evaluatieve commentaar). Bovendien tonen onze resultaten dat het gebruik 
van neurostimulatie technieken als experimentele tools zinvol is bij het beter begrijpen 
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De link tussen kritiek, zelf refererende processen en zelfwaarde na tDCS 
 In onze laatste studie (hoofdstuk 7) onderzochten we de mogelijke impact van 
neurostimulatie op ruminatieve processen voor en na kritiek, en vervolgens het effect 
op impliciete zelfwaarde. Een eerste bevinding was dat we een afname vaststelden in 
zelf refererende gedachten (ruminatie) na actieve tDCS. Daarnaast was er ook een 
afname in zelf refererende gedachten na kritiek in vergelijking met de baseline. 
Opnieuw toont dit de gunstige impact van neurostimulatie op de cognitieve controle 
over negatieve informatie (e.g., Boggio et al., 2007; Wolkenstein & Plewnia, 2013), en - 
meer specifiek - op ruminatie (Vanderhasselt et al., 2013). Een tweede bevinding was 
het effect van actieve tDCS op zelfwaarde. Hoewel er geen direct effect gevonden werd, 
vonden we een indirect effect via twee mediatoren, nl. de afname in zelf refererende 
gedachten baseline versus na tDCS én de afname in zelf refererende gedachten baseline 
versus na kritiek. Met andere woorden, hoe groter de afname in zelf refererende 
gedachten na actieve tDCS en na kritiek, hoe hoger de actuele zelfwaarde. 
  
In dit doctoraatsproject toonden we aan dat neurostimulatie de cognitieve 
controle kan verhogen bij ruminatieve processen na het krijgen van kritiek én dat dit 
gelinkt is aan iemands actuele zelfwaarde. Dus, hoe beter een persoon omgaat met zelf 
refererende gedachten na kritiek, hoe positiever hij/zij zichzelf percipieert. Dit positieve 
proces kan een rol spelen bij het voorkomen van een lage zelfwaarde die op zich kan 
bijdragen tot het krijgen van een depressie. Op deze manier schept deze studie meer 
duidelijkheid over de ingewikkelde link tussen ruminatieve processen, omgaan met 
kritiek en zelfwaarde. 
 
Implicaties van de onderzoeksbevindingen 
 
Op basis van de bevindingen in dit doctoraatsproject kunnen we een aantal 
implicaties naar voor schuiven. 
 
Het Actuele en het Ideale Zelf: Theoretische Implicaties voor Zelfwaarde Onderzoek 
Met betrekking tot onze onderzoeksgegevens rond zelfwaarde, stellen we voor 




fundamenteel verschillende constructen, maar als twee sets van proposities over het 
zelf die automatisch geactiveerd kunnen worden en gedrag in verschillende richtingen 
kunnen sturen. In lijn met de literatuur gebruikt dit raamwerk een beperkt aantal 
concepten om een verscheidenheid aan uitkomsten te verklaren (voor een uitgebreide 
beschrijving zie Hughes, Barnes-Holmes & Vahey, 2012). Het kan onderzoekers ook 
toelaten om conceptuele problemen, die gerelateerd zijn aan hoe het zelf zou moeten 
geconceptualiseerd worden, te omzeilen. Indien nieuw experimenteel bewijs 
verschillende “zelven” blijft betrekken in zelfwaarde, dan zouden onderzoekers er 
kunnen voor kiezen om hen te behandelen als fundamenteel verschillend van elkaar. 
Meer nog, zouden ze een taxonomie kunnen creëren van “zelven” (actuele, ideale, etc.) 
en proberen hun precieze aard en interactie te specifiëren. Wij vinden het meer correct 
om er vanuit te gaan dat mensen verschillende stellingen over het zelf kunnen vormen 
en dat - in sommige gevallen - deze stellingen selectief kunnen worden geactiveerd en 
op een gedifferentieerde manier gedrag kunnen kleuren. Bijvoorbeeld, iemand die de 
overtuiging over zichzelf heeft dat “ik ben goed”, “ik wil geen slechte persoon zijn”, en 
“anderen zijn slimmer dan mij”, kan in een specifieke situatie een vriend helpen (omdat 
het belangrijk is voor wie hij is, conform “ik ben goed”) en zo zijn gedrag ‘om te helpen’ 
laten bepalen door een specifieke stelling over zichzelf.  
 
Het belang van neurostimulatie: zijn deze technieken relevant voor experimenteel 
onderzoek en/of klinische behandeling? 
 Het onderzoek in dit doctoraatsproject toont aan dat neurostimulatie een 
invloed kan hebben op een fysiologisch (hartslagvariabiliteit), cognitief (ruminatie, 
omgaan met kritiek, zelfwaarde) en neurobiologisch (neurale activiteit en functionele 
connectiviteit) niveau. Daarenboven kan de prefrontale cortex gezien worden als een 
cruciale hersenregio mbt stressreactiviteit en cognitieve controle. Onderzoek heeft 
reeds uitvoerig aangetoond hoe belangrijk stressweerbaarheid, ruminatie, omgaan met 
kritiek, en zelfwaarde is voor depressie. Daarom zijn we ervan overtuigd dat de 
resultaten in dit doctoraatsproject een duidelijker licht werpen op de onderliggende 
mechanismen en hun complexe relatie. Het gebruik van neurostimulatie technieken 
laat ons bovendien toe om experimenteel en meer nauwkeurig deze onderliggende 
mechanismen te onderzoeken. Zoals vooropgesteld door Koster, Bockting en De Raedt 
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(2015) is er een belangrijke vooruitgang in het begrijpen en toepassen van 
psychologische interventies voor depressie. Het integreren van bestaande kennis vanuit 
psychologisch, fysiologisch en neurocognitief onderzoek kan een rol van betekenis 
spelen bij het ontwikkelen van gecombineerde interventies. Deze interventies kunnen 
een meer gepersonaliseerde medicatie-aanpak voor de behandeling van depressie 
betekenen. Dit biedt bovendien potentieel om de behandeling van depressie sterk te 




 Dit doctoraatsproject stelde zich tot doel om onderzoek te doen naar de link 
tussen kritiek en ruminatieve processen, en hoe deze zelfwaarde beïnvloedt. Daarbij 
focusten we ons op zowel gedragsmatige als neurobiologische processen. Het werk in 
dit onderzoeksproject heeft meer duidelijkheid geschept over verschillende delen van 
de complexe relatie tussen deze onderliggende mechanismen (ruminatie, kritiek, 
zelfwaarde). Daarnaast hebben de resultaten ook opnieuw het belang aangetoond van 
de rol die neurostimulatie kan spelen in het ontwarren van hun functioneren. 
Niettegenstaande deze conclusie blijft er nog veel te ontdekken over de link tussen 
omgaan met kritiek, ruminatie en zelfwaarde. Enkel door ons begrip van deze 
onderliggende processen en hun relatie verder te verbeteren, kunnen we een meer 
omvangrijk begrip van de gedragsmatige, cognitieve en neurobiologische basis van het 
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  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: see discussion section in the article 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: personal & research group hard drive back up 
  - [X] other: co-author Sean Hughes 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
  - [X] responsible ZAP 
  - [ ] all members of the research group 
  - [ ] all members of UGent 





DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS 
288 
 
4. Reproduction  
=========================================================== 
* Have the results been reproduced independently?: [X] YES / [ ] NO 
 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
   - name: Maarten De Schryver 
   - address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
   - affiliation: UGENT 
   - e-mail: Maarten.DeSchryver@UGent.be 
  
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEETS  
289 
 
DATA STORAGE FACT SHEET Neurostimulation & Stress Reactivity: Chapter 5 
 






1a. Main researcher 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
-name: Jonathan Remue 






-name: Rudi De Raedt 
-address:Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
-email: Rudi.DeRaedt@UGent.be 
 
1c. Research group 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
- name: Psychopathology Affective Neuroscience Lab (PANLab) 
- address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
- website: http://www.ugent.be/pp/ekgp/en/research/research-groups/panlab/ 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
=========================================================== 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: Remue, J., 
Vanderhasselt, M.A., Baeken, C., Rossi, V., Tullo, J., & De Raedt, R. (2015). The effect of 
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[x] other (specify): fMRI DATA: personal & co-authors & research group hard drive back 
up 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another person)? 
[x] main researcher 
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[ ] all members of the research group 
[ ] all members of UGent 
[x] other (specify): co-author Chris Baeken 
 
3b. Other files 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
* Which other files have been stored? 
  - [X] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify: see 
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  - [X] file(s) containing processed data. Specify: SPSS files location: 
C:\Users\jremue\JONATHAN\05 PhD - Research\Studie 4 - tDCS\PROCESSED DATA 
  - [X] file(s) containing analyses. Specify: see findings section in the article 
  - [X] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: a blank copy is 
saved on my PC 
  - [X] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: The documents that were 
submitted to the Ethical Commission are with co-author Prof. Dr. Chris Baeken, MD as 
well as a paper letter with the approval of the Ethical Commission. 
  - [X] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content should be 
interpreted. Specify: see discussion section in the article 
  - [ ] other files. Specify: ... 
     
* On which platform are these other files stored?  
  - [X] individual PC 
  - [ ] research group file server 
  - [X] other: personal & co-authors & research group hard drive back up 
 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)?  
  - [X] main researcher 
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  - [ ] all members of the research group 
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